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 The main objective of this thesis is to review, contrast and compare some of the key 
equity market regulations emanating from the United Kingdom, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates. The thesis has researched several key themes in each of these 
markets in an attempt to pinpoint the key regulatory frameworks that are either lacking or 
under-represented with specific relevance to KSA and the UAE. The thesis has studied 
disclosure & transparency issues in the three chosen jurisdictions as well as the role played 
by the capital market regulator in each of them. This study intends to provide a regulatory 
analysis to influence those regulations that should be implemented to adjust market practices 
as they affect the Saudi and the UAE capital markets. The capital market regulations and 
rules passed by the governments in these countries are instrumental in the overall direction 
that a market takes. The thesis examines the role of the United Kingdom's Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA) compared to that of Saudi Arabia's Capital Market Authority (CMA) and 
the United Arab Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA). 
 
 The research has found that key financial regulations such as those relating to market 
abuse, market conduct, transparency and corporate governance must be cognizant of the 
norms of the nation in which they apply. Furthermore, Saudi Arabia and to a larger extent, 
the UAE, have successfully emulated some of the key rules and regulations enacted in the 
UK to boost and build investor confidence. Having researched the rules and regulations in 
both Saudi and the UAE, the thesis finds that any perceived or actual lack of prevention of 
violations may be related to the financial authorities lack of intervention. Regulators in the 
GCC do not appear to move as swiftly nor take the necessary preventative measures as the 
UK's FCA does. With this in mind, the thesis concludes with recommendations including the 
reforms of capital market regulations in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab 
Emirates and with particular emphasis on transparency and disclosure, corporate governance 
and market abuse practices as well as the eventual adoption of the Twin Peaks model of 
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 The first and foremost function of financial regulation is to protect investors and 
ensure that markets operate smoothly and cohesively. The remit of regulation is responding 
to the need to ensure financial stability and adequate consumer protection, raising standards 
in transparency, systems and controls and conduct of business. Taken in isolation, none of 
these can cohesively glue together capital markets. However, taken in conjunction, they 
create a complex series of requirements that must be effectively balanced to ensure that 
financially regulated firms as well as licensed individuals operate within an optimal regime. 
 This thesis will capitalise on the experiences encountered by the researcher in many 
years of work in the securities regulatory environment. As any regulator the goal is to write 
and enforce regulations that would help construct a sound system that would provide the 
required level of protection for capital providers especially the retail and minority investors. 
Since both the KSA and the UAE are very young is the securities industry (10 to 15 years) 
they wanted to benefit from other regulators who had a long headway in this field, namely 
the UK. 
The regulations use the civil law due to the construct of the regulatory systems and cultures 
of these countries. The legislators would approve high level principle-based provisions that 
would leave room for the implementing authorities to enact bylaws and executive rules for 
their personal to carry out these provisions in their day to day operations. 
 Although both the UAE and KSA are both Islamic countries and both do exert efforts 
in making Islamic products available to the traditional investors; they both to a large extent 
follow the free market economy paradigm. The reason for that is to assume an active role in 
the international financial system, to attract international capital along with the experience 
that come with it, and to offer the businesses a dual system to raise capital and to broaden the 
choice of investment venues to a wider spectrum of investors.  
    The thesis will focus on traditional finance vis-à-vis Islamic finance for the reasons 
mentioned above and due to the fact that Islamic products lacks the level of standardisation 
that is required by both local and international investors. It is well documented in literature
1
 
that there are numerous schools of thoughts within the Islamic system (Shari'a); what is 
found to be Shari'a compliant by some Shari'a scholars can be found prohibited by others. 
The approaches of the regulations discussed in this research have diverse approaches to 
regulating Islamic products. The KSA approach is to have the government enforce securities 
                                                          
1
 For example see Al-Zuhaili W. (1984) Islamic Law and Its Evidence. Syrian Arab Republic: Dar Al Fikr. 
[Arabic]. For a general overview about the principles of Islamic jurisprudence (Uṣūl al-fiqh) and school of 
thought see, Hallaq, W. B. (2005) The Origins and Evolution of Islamic Law. United Kingdom: Cambridge 
University Press; Hallaq, W. B. (2005) What is Shari'a?.Yearbook of Islamic and Middle Eastern Law. Volume 
12. Issue 1. 151-180; and Hallaq, W. B.(1997)  A history of Islamic legal theories: an introduction to Sunnīuṣūl 
al-fiqh. New York: Cambridge University Press. 
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regulations through entities other than the securities regulator including the issue of Shari’a.
2
 
While the UAE takes a completely different approach, the securities regulator 
commercialised some of the securities decisions and left them for the investing public like 
the case with the Shari'a decisions that are left to the industry to determine the school of 
thought they want to follow and the quality of the scholars and their fatwas.
3
 The only 
requirement that the SCA requires is a statement by the issuer that it has a Shari'a board and 
it is that of Shari'a board's opinion that the product is Shari'a compliant.
4
 
 The investors will demand such product when they believe that the Shari'a board is 
credible and when the fatwa conforms to the beliefs of the majority of the investors. Hence, it 
is to the benefit of the issuer to choose a high quality and credible board with a fatwa that 
would make the financing costs low. The above mentioned reasons make the Shari'a issue 
outside the remit of this thesis and an issue in its own to be tackled in separate research. 
 This thesis will tackle issues of prominence in both academic and professional media. 
The added value in the academic literature would be to introduce an empirical dimension to 
comparative analysis of regulatory systems where researchers will get detailed exposure to 
newly formed as well as well-established jurisdictions like the UK. As a rule setting exercise 
this thesis will take into consideration six topics: Disclosure and Transparency Issues, 
Systemic Risk Management Issues, Shortage of the Investors Confidence,  Insider dealing, 
False Accounting, and shortage of Corporate Governance. 
 In the professional dimension the findings of this research will be shared with 
professionals from the industry and the regulators to draw benefits by reforming existing 
regulations and introducing new ones. The analysis will look into account the different 
challenges in the main themes of the regulatory issues mentioned earlier, for example, 
cultural features will be stressed upon in some of the issues while regulatory differences will 
                                                          
2
 In Saudi Arabia, a special judiciary has jurisdiction over all securities disputes. The Committee for the 
Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD) was established by Article 25 of the Saudi Arabia Capital Market 
Law No. (M/30) of 2003 to have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes and courses of action arising under this 
Law and its appurtenant rules and regulations. The law grants the CRSD a broad range of authorities and 
powers in order to effectively enforce the law and maintain fairness amongst securities market participants. See 
Cma.org.sa (2013) Capital Market Law. [Online] available from: http://www.cma.org.sa/En/AboutCMA/ 
CMALaw/Documents/CAPITAL%20MARKET%20LAW-26-8009.pdf. [Accessed: 13 June 2013]. While the 
CRSD functions as the court of first instance (or first degree court), the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Conflicts (ACRSC) functions as the appellate (or second degree) court. More information about the 
two committees are available in Chapters Four and Six, infra.  
3
 Examples can be found in the Authority Board of Directors Decision No. (48) of 2012 Concerning the 
Regulation for Short Selling of Securities where Article 11 of the Regulation states that it shall apply to any 
agreement or arrangement that is consistent with the principles of Islamic Shari’a and permits a person to sell 
Securities that he does not own at the date of sale. In addition, Article 15 of the Authority Board Decision No. 
(47) of 2012 concerning the Regulations as to Lending and Borrowing Securities indicates that these 
Regulations shall apply to any agreement or arrangement that is consistent with the principles of Islamic Shari’a 
and permits the temporary transfer of ownership of Securities from one person to another. For full versions of 
these Decisions see, Sca.gov.ae (2012) Rules and Regulations. [Online] available from: http://www.sca.gov.ae/ 
english/legalaffairs/pages/scaregulations.aspx. [Accessed 28 December 2012]. 
4
 Article 5 of the Authority Board of Directors Decision No. (16) of 2014 Concerning the Regulation of Sukuk 
(tradable financial instruments which represent a share of ownership of an asset or a group of assets and are 
issued in accordance with Shari'a) indicates that applications for the issuance and primary listing of sukuk states 
that such Sukuk must be approved by the Shari'a committee at the obligor or by the arranger. Ibid. 
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be more emphasised in others to give the readers the most benefit of this effort. In some 
instances the different natures of the systems being researched and the extent of the 
availability of information mandates examining issues by using different but similar variables 
that would serve the intended purpose.  
 This thesis is unique in that it is one of the few to research such a wide spectrum of 
topics (mentioned earlier) in such a great details to add to the limited existing literature and 
to enrich the regulatory experience in actual practice. It also attempts to find well thought and 
scientifically researched solutions to exiting inherent problems in the securities industry in 
both the KSA and the UAE, in particular the areas of enforcement and disclosure which 
constitute a good part of this work.    
 Furthermore, it taps on the long experience of a well-established jurisdiction that 
contributed greatly to setting the standards of the industry practice. One of the limitations 
that needed to be overcome though out the write up of this thesis was the shortage of 
resources that would serve in producing a comprehensive level of discussion and findings. 
This was remedied by delving into secondary and tertiary resources to verify the findings and 
conclusions and produce more credible outcomes.        
 This thesis has, in detail, reviewed the capital market regulations of both Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia (KSA) and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) vis-à-vis those in the United 
Kingdom (UK). This is one of few works of its kind that provides extensive regulatory and 
legal evidence regarding the effectiveness of certain key financial reforms in the laws and 
institutions of the equity capital markets of KSA and the UAE. 
 This thesis acknowledges that promoting an adequate regulatory platform is necessary 
for the development of a broader and deeper equity capital market but accepts as inevitable 
that some of these reforms, particularly in KSA, will proceed at a less than satisfactory rate 
due, in part, to lack of up to date data coupled with a lack of clarity as to the mechanics of an 
efficient capital market. Creating new financial legislation is, after all, difficult in developing 
nations whose legal and societal traditions are at best weak in enforcement and financial 
regulatory development. 
 Furthermore, the evolution of KSA's and the UAE's financial systems cannot be 
correctly analysed nor understood in isolation from the state of their general economy. The 
UAE has experienced significant booms over the last decade or so and has a very forward 
and progressive government leadership in place. This open mindedness and willingness to 
change and adapt has served the UAE well, its economy is booming and the nation has 
become a magnet for international investors. 
 On the other hand, although KSA has the deepest market in the Middle East, it is, 
primarily, wholly dependent upon local investors. This insularity has not benefited KSA nor 
has it added to the development of the regulatory system. In the context of KSA, it was the 
collapse of KSA exchange at the beginning of 2006 which prompted KSA regulator to take 
31 
 
steps to protect the securities market and investors as a precautionary measure, in case of 
further unpredicted future collapse.
5
 
 This thesis recognises these efforts as well as pointes out the less admirable changes 
or lack thereof in the financial and regulatory structure of the regime. Certainly, comparing 
the UAE's and KSA's financial regime to that of the UK may be construed as somewhat 
unfair. However, the benchmarks that most nations attempt to attain are those that are 
considered to be the best.  
The UK regulatory regime is one of the most advanced and sophisticated on the globe 
and many developing nations have based their developmental policies on the UK model as a 
result of this supremacy. The UK regulatory system has had a long and distinguished history 
and has had the added advantage of developing and changing through trial and error over the 
last two hundred years. The scope and breadth of the UK markets is vast but it only fully 
developed into a cohesive regulatory platform via the 1986 Financial Services Act and the 
establishment of the Financial Services Authority (FSA). London is recognised globally as a 
leading financial centre with world-renowned capital markets primarily revolving around the 
London Stock Exchange (LSE).
6
 All major financial institutions, hedge funds, private equity 
firms and investment banks are present in London. It is for this very reason that the 
regulatory platform in the UK has had to advance and constantly change to take account for 
the large presence of both local and international investors.
7
 
 The UAE government has been most pro-active in emulating the UK structure. Over 
the last few years alone the Emirates Securities and Commodities Authority (SCA) has 
passed several key regulations that, it is hoped, will serve to attract a greater number of 
foreign international investors to the market. This thesis recognises that such efforts by the 
financial regulators in the UAE have certainly contributed to the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Index (MSCI)
8
 ranking being upgraded from a 'frontier' to an 'emerging' market. 
A tremendous effort no doubt and one which shall bring further funds, investors and kudos to 
the nation.   
                                                          
5
 The Saudi stock market suffered from six major collapses that resulted in significant depreciation of the 
general price index during the years of 1986, 1990, 1993, 1994, 1998, 2006, and 2008, but the worst was in 
2006. For chronicle details on these crises, see Alanazi, B. M. A. (2012) Investor Protection and the Civil 
Liability for Defective Disclosures in the Saudi Securities Market: A Legal Analysis. PhD Thesis. 
Commonwealth of Australia: University of Wollongong, 'Introductory Chapter'. 
6
 Londonstockexchange.com (2013) Homepage. [Online] available from: http://www.londonstockexchange. 
com/home/homepage.htm. [Accessed: 27 April 2013].  
7
 Notably, in 2006, a total of £52 billion was raised from the London Stock Exchanges primary markets, with 
£29.4 billion of that raised by the 367 companies who chose to list on the Exchange. This is more than any other 
equity exchange in the world, and more than NYSE and NASDAQ combined. See Londonstockexchange.com 
(2007) A Guide to Capital Markets. [Online] available from: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/companies-
and-advisors/listing/markets/guide-to-capital-markets.pdf. [Accessed: 27 April 2013]; and Londonstock 
exchange.com (2013) Our History. [Online] available from: http://www.londonstockexchange.com/about-the-
exchange/companyoverview/our-history/our-history.htm. [Accessed: 22 June 2013]. For an updated figures, see 
Londonstockexchange.com (2014) Main Market factsheets. [Online] available from: http://www.londonstock 
exchange.com/statistics/ historic/main-market/main-market-factsheet-archive-2014/dec-14.pdf. [Accessed: 27 
April 2015]. 
8
 Msci.com (2014) Morgan Stanley Capital International. [Online] available from: https://www.msci.com. 
[Accessed: 21 August 2014]. 
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The financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 demonstrated that when things go wrong in the 
financial sector, the impact on the economy can be severe. The financial crisis exposed the 
inherent weaknesses in the 'tripartite' system of regulation in the UK. Perhaps the most 
significant failing is that no single institution had responsibility, authority or powers to 
oversee the financial system as a whole. Before the crisis, the Bank of England (BOE) had 
nominal responsibility for financial stability but lacked the tools to put this into effect; the 
HM Treasury, meanwhile, had no clear responsibility for dealing with a crisis which put 
billions of pounds of public funds at risk. All responsibility for financial regulation was in the 
hands of a single, monolithic regulator, the Financial Services Authority (FSA), and there 
was clearly, in the run-up to the financial crisis, too much reliance on 'tick-box' compliance, 
or as called "window-dressing" regulation.
9
 
That is why the Government pushed ahead at the time with its plans to reform the UK 
system by following the Twin Peaks model, hence, establishing a macro-prudential regulator, 
the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) within the Bank of England to monitor and respond to 
systemic risks; transferring responsibility for prudential regulation to a focused new 
regulator, the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA), established as a subsidiary of the Bank 
of England; and creating a focused new conduct of business regulator, the Financial Conduct 
Authority (FCA), to ensure that business across financial services and markets was 
conducted in a way that advances the interests of all users and participants. It is clear that the 
FCA as the financial market conduct regulator has broad ranging responsibility in both retail 
and wholesale markets. It will continue to have responsibility for areas previously held by the 
FSA and will potentially take on responsibilities in new areas such as consumer credit. The 
FCA's responsibility as market conduct regulator can be split into three areas: 
i. supervising trading of financial instruments infrastructure (other than systemically 
important infrastructure – central counterparty settlement systems and clearing houses 
– for which the Bank of England will be responsible). 
ii.  supervising markets for issuing of securities, including the UK Listing Authority. The 
FCA will perform the functions that the FSA previously performed and will therefore 
be responsible for reviewing and approving prospectuses and circulars, determining 
eligibility for listing and maintaining the Official List. 
ii. oversight of on-exchange and over-the-counter markets and monitoring to prevent 
market abuse. The FCA will also police the ongoing compliance of issuers and major 
shareholders with the ad hoc and periodic disclosures required under the Disclosure 
and Transparency and Listing Rules. 
 
 Financial regulators, in particular, the PRA and the FCA are committed to a 
fundamental overhaul of regulation to make sure that the financial system stays abreast of 
                                                          
9
 HM Treasury (2010) A new approach to financial regulation: judgment, focus and stability, Presentation to 
Parliament. [Online] available from: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ 
data/file/81389/consult_financial_regulation_condoc.pdf. [Accessed: 15 March 2012].See also, Miller, M. et al. 
(2010) Restoring prudent banking in Britain: evidence and policy. University of Warwick. [Online] available 
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Nov _paper.pdf. [Accessed: 15 March 2012]; and Black, J. (2012) Paradoxes and Failures: 'New Governance' 
Techniques and the Financial Crisis'. The Modern Law Review. Volume 75. Issue 6. 1042. 
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global trends. The developments after the financial crisis in such a developed market like the 
UK was followed with keen interest globally and especially in the Arab world. The impact of 
these developments can be seen in both the jurisdictions under study in this thesis, the 
specifics of which will be examined in detail in the subsequent chapters.  
 
2. Aims and Objectives of the Thesis. 
The scope of the thesis is as follows: 
a. It will examine the current business and regulatory environments of the public 
securities markets; securities regulatory systems, processes, and objectives; and the 
degrees to which these systems actually achieve their intended goals within each of the 
three jurisdictions to be examined in Chapter One. The well-developed and historically 
old, westernised jurisdiction of the UK will be compared and contrasted with two 
relatively younger, emerging Arabian jurisdictions, the KSA and the UAE. 
b. The thesis will commence with an examination of the historic foundations upon which 
the securities regulatory mechanisms of each of the three separate jurisdictions being 
compared and contrasted currently rest. From these historic fundamentals, the goals and 
policy objectives which underlie attempts to regulate securities and the markets within 
which they are traded will be discerned, identified, and explained in Chapter Two. To 
the extent that policy objectives may differ as within the three separate jurisdictions that 
are the subject of this inquiry, the nature of the differences and the underlying reasons 
therefore, will be examined and explained in subsequent Chapters of the thesis 
c. In the next three Chapters, both the fundamental as well as the legal and technical 
underpinnings for the securities regulatory laws, regulations, and rules of each of the 
three subject jurisdictions will be examined and explained, as well as compared and 
contrasted with one another. The nature and respective roles of the actual principal 
regulatory authorities themselves – the former Financial Services Authority in the UK 
and the subsequent Twin Peaks system; the Capital Market Authority in KSA; and the 
Securities and Commodities Authority in the UAE – will also be examined and 
illuminated. 
d. Fundamentally, the thesis will take advantage of, and endeavor to explain, the lessons 
that have been learned over the many years that securities and their trading markets 
have been regulated within the jurisdiction of the UK. The essential objective of the 
thesis will be to apply these lessons to the less-developed regulatory environments and 
structures that now exist within KSA and the UAE, by first identifying, and then 
arguing in favor of, the adoption of regulatory mechanisms that have been applied 
within the older UK jurisdiction and found to have led ultimately to solutions to many 
of the same problems, difficulties, and abuses that the two younger jurisdictions, and 
the markets that operate within them, have experienced, and continue to experience, 
during what are still those latter markets' relatively formative years. 
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e. As with the case of all-things-new, the evolving markets of KSA and the UAE have 
also experienced various issues and problems that are either unique to both of these 
markets vis-a-vis the other, more mature markets of the UK and other Western 
jurisdictions, or in some cases strictly unique to one or the other of these two particular 
countries. 
f. Overall, it may be said of this thesis that its principal objectives are those of first setting 
a historical background to use as a backdrop for what will later be the identification and 
dissection of the assortment of endemic problems that have characterised, and continue 
to characterise, each of the subject securities markets. The problems have been 
identified and thoroughly analysed in Chapter Six and suggested approaches will be 
formulated that could be utilised for the purpose of either resolving, or to the fullest 
extent possible, minimising, these problems, with a view toward ultimately leading to 
reforms in the way securities are traded within each of the three subject jurisdictions in 
Chapter Seven. 
 
3. Thesis Methodology. 
 In terms of documentary research, papers, statistics, data, documents of institutions 
and associations, newspapers, magazines, websites as well as scholarly journals and 
secondary news sources were the main sources for this thesis. All research was conducted via 
computer and all primary data, such as legislation and laws, was sourced from respective 
internet websites.The following institution's research and regulatory data bases were 
accessed, amongst others, for primary research: The Financial Conduct Authority in London 
as well as the Bank of England, the Treasury and Parliament in the UK, the Capital Market 
Authority of KSA, Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, the Securities & Commodities 
Authority UAE, and the UAE Ministry of Economy. 
 The research itself required substantial preparation and selection. Not all relevant 
laws could be defined and contrasted since clearly, that task would be beyond the remit of 
this thesis. The relevant associations and institutions had to be identified and assessed as to 
suitability. For example, data accumulation in the Middle East as well as good quality 
research is hard to come by whereas data and research available on the UK regulatory 
environment is significant and abundant. Clarifying and selecting the most pertinent 
information therefore was one of the key challenges of this thesis. 
 
4. Outline of the Thesis .  
 This thesis is laid out in eight Chapters beginning with this introduction that 
presented the aims and objectives of the thesis, the questions, methodology, and the outline. 
The first Chapter indicates in brief a historical background on the origin and development of 
securities markets with special focus on globalisation. The legal frameworks and markets in 
the UK, KSA, and the UAE were generally described. 
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The second Chapter provides a detailed description and a historical perspective on the 
goals, policy and objectives of securities regulations. It further explains the natural 
progression of inherent risks in financial markets and the persisting need for regulators and 
regulations to manage these risks. A brief on the historical outline of this process was 
described in some of the pioneering countries, especially the UK. 
The third Chapter discusses, in detail, the regulatory environment within the United 
Kingdom with a strong emphasis on the role of the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA).  The 
with particular reference to the Financial Services Act of 1986, the Financial Services & 
Markets Act of 2000 as well as the newly adopted Financial Services Act of 2012. The key 
reasons for the adoption of the newly passed act are highlighted and discussed as well as the 
UK Shift from "Integrated" to "Twin Peaks" system.  
The UK's shift from an integrated financial regulatory system to the twin peaks model 
carefully contrasted and the benefits and advantages highlighted as well. It is clear that the 
goals and objectives of the incumbent regulator, namely the FCA in this case, must be in 
alignment with the overall vision and aims of the regulatory act supporting it to avoid any 
regulatory misinterpretations. The effect of the Financial Services Act passed in 2012 has yet 
to be discerned but it is hoped that the results of the meltdown experienced in the last 
financial crisis can be avoided or mitigated by the adoption of the twin peaks model as 
envisaged by the new financial act. 
The fourth Chapter will examine the regulatory environment within the Kingdom of 
Saudi Arabia. A historical background reveals that the regulatory environment in KSA has 
traditionally been quite archaic and insipid as a result of the inward looking approach 
adopted by authorities. Before the establishment of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority 
(SAMA), which is the current regulator of the banking industry, KSA market operated in an 
informal manner with no strict rules and regulations binding parties together. However, with 
the adoption of the Capital Market Law (CML) and the establishment of the Capital Market 
Authority (CMA) in 2004, KSA equity market has grown from strength to strength.  
The role of the Arab world's largest stock market, namely Tadawul, has been globally 
emphasised and this role has persuaded KSA authorities to address some of the key issues 
that must be changed in order for KSA to emerge as a key destination for international 
investors. Some of the key regulations passed by the CMA including Tadawul's listing rules, 
securities business regulations, and corporate governance are also examined and addressed as 
to their suitability.  
The fifth Chapter analyses the United Arab Emirates (UAE's) financial and regulatory 
environment with an introduction to the historical background and development of the equity 
capital market over the last few decades. The UAE's equity market is a lot more varied and 
diverse than that of KSA and examination of the primary securities regulators and stock 
exchanges in Dubai and Abu Dhabi clearly highlights this variation. The UAE's SCA is the 
primary equity market regulator in the UAE and has been responsible since inception in 2000 
for the issuance of several key legislative rules including the regulation of brokers and 
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financial advisors as well as the recent approval for the introduction of liquidity providers 
and market makers into the equation. The SCA's role has been pivotal as a bridge between 
gauging investors' needs and the balancing government and federal financial policy in 
meeting those needs.  
The SCA closely benchmarks international best practices including those of the UK 
and the US in particular in the hopes of attracting continued foreign investment, and the 
lifeblood of the nation. Laws and regulations passed by regulators are examined in light of 
the government's strong desire to re-structure the financial regulatory environment alongside 
the twin peaks model adopted by the British via the creation of the FCA. Under this new 
Twin Peaks structure, the UAE Central Bank shall be required to exercise the prudential 
supervision of financial enterprises and the SCA will be required to exercise the supervision 
of conduct of the financial markets and to decide on the admission of financial enterprises to 
those markets.   
The sixth Chapter is a comparison between key regulatory problems in the UK, KSA 
and the UAE. Some of the key issues examined include disclosure and transparency related 
to the secondary markets. The transparency of a market plays a direct role in investor 
confidence and as the thesis demonstrates, transparent markets attract deeper pools of capital. 
The chapter also compares and contrasts corporate governance issues, false accounting, 
systemic risk and insider dealing
10
 in the three jurisdictions.  
The seventh Chapter discusses the historical regulatory solutions presented by the 
three jurisdictions. The important role of the financial regulators such as the newly minted 
FCA, KSA's CMA and the UAE's the SCA are examined in light of the solutions advanced to 
solve and alleviate transparency, disclosure and corporate governance issues. Suggestions to 
ameliorate problems in regimes are emphasised as well as legislative tools used for making 
changes to the system with corresponding examples are illustrated. Among the key issues 
discussed are the restrictions placed on foreign ownership in KSA and the UAE markets.  
Chapter eight concludes the thesis by offering the researcher's recommendations and 
suggestions with regard to the regulatory framework discussed in this thesis. The thesis has 
researched several key themes in each of these markets in an attempt to pinpoint the key 
regulatory frameworks that are either lacking or under-represented with specific relevance to 
the UAE and KSA vis-à-vis the UK. 
Finally, a brief write-up is presented at the beginning of each Chapter which presents 
the part of the thesis objectives which are covered in that Chapter by highlighting the main 
topics presented as well as outlining the flow of the contents in those topics.  
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The History of the Public Securities Markets 
 
This Chapter traces the beginning and evolution of trading in securities, first for the 
pioneering western markets, especially the UK; then proceeds to identify similar pattern of 
evolution of the markets in the history of KSA and the UAE financial markets.  
 
1.1 The Origin and Source of Securities Markets 
 1.1.1 Increasing Globalisation. 
 The first known stock exchange (secondary market) dates back to 12th century, when 
the first brokers are believed to have commenced trading in debt and government securities. 
Unofficial secondary share markets existed throughout Western Europe through the 1600s, 
where brokers would meet outside or in coffee houses to make trades. When it began trading 
shares of the Dutch East India Company the Amsterdam Stock Exchange became the first 
"official" securities exchange in 1611.
11
 By the early 1700s there were fully operational stock 
exchanges in France, England, and America followed in the later part of the century.  
 The phenomenon of "increasing globalisation" is not something that is a mere 
creature of the world's securities markets. In order to be properly viewed within context, 
globalisation must be thought of in terms of something that first began happening around the 
early 1990's, and happening not just in stock markets. It is a landmark, watershed event that 
encompasses nearly every sector of civilised society, from the very manner in which people 
interact socially (e.g., Facebook, MySpace, Twitter, and numerous other social media 
Internet sites), to the way that transnational economies function. Most of what qualifies under 
the all-encompassing label of "globalisation" consists of developments that were first 
fostered by enhanced electronic technology that had not, up until the early 1990's, been 
previously available, principal among them being the ability to communicate on a world-
wide basis virtually instantaneously, through such comparatively new developments as 
telefax machines and, later, electronic mail ("e-mail"). 
 As a result of the sweeping and constantly changing effects of technology, an 
explosion of internet and computer based trading systems has changed our perception of 
stock markets. Anyone, anywhere can trade from home today. Stock exchanges are 
completely accessible from anywhere in the world. Twenty years ago this would have been 
unheard of and investors would have been forced to go through a long and lengthy process in 
order to register, open an account, transfer funds and make phone calls to their brokers. This 
is no longer the case today. Contemporary investors, from the smallest individual shareholder 
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to the largest institutions, are demanding and increasingly getting instant access to 
information and immediate execution of trades. Accordingly, stock markets have to change 
to meet these needs. Today's generation of stock markets must provide worldwide and 
instantaneous price discovery via sophisticated electronic communication networks (ECN's), 
allow for trade executions in a fair, orderly and low-cost environment without time zone 
limitations and thus must provide regulations that facilitate this phenomenon. 
 The proliferation of ECN's has forced stock markets over the world to review their 
survival strategies. Mergers and buy-outs have become customary between exchanges in the 
last decade. During the last decade the market structure for stock trading in Europe has 
experienced some major changes. A number of mergers and acquisitions have been made, for 
example, the Euronext merger (2005), the NYSE acquisition of Euronext (2006), the OMX 
merger (2003-2006), the NASDAQ acquisition of the OMX Nordic stock exchange (2007), 
and the merger between the LSE and Borsa Italian (2007) have all been directly impacted in 
some form or other by the advent of globalisation and technological advances.
12
 
 With globalisation of the markets, there are a number of new factors that continue to 
affect the operation of the stock exchanges. Listing rules have been harmonised on major 
global exchanges and information disclosure requirements are generally similar on the major 
stock markets. The way companies present their annual and quarterly statements is moving 
towards a set of harmonised international standards. Some multinational enterprises are 
raising new capital on several stock markets simultaneously. This requires coordination 
between exchanges. It is increasingly being realised that the home country of a company 
which has shareholders around the world has a responsibility for ensuring that price-sensitive 
and material information is available to all shareholders and not just to those in the home 
country. 
 Thus international regulatory initiatives, particularly those aimed at standardising 
accounting and other disclosure requirements need to be enforced vigorously. These changes 
will further empower investors, giving them more control over trading in these global 
markets and access to company information that is formatted to a global standard. The 
combination of institutionalisation, automation and globalisation will lead to more market 
liquidity, greater volatility and lower trading costs. It would therefore appear that the world's 
stock markets are heading rapidly toward globalisation through two major changes namely, 
the liberalisation of international stock trading rules, and the globalisation of stock trading 
practices. 
 Therefore, globalisation of securities markets generally refers to two key aspects. The 
first is the global phenomenon of being able to trade during 24 hours, where access to capital 
markets is increasingly being open cross-jurisdictionally. The second is the phenomenon of 
multiple listing and the adoption of many standardised international regulatory rules vis-à-vis 
many aspects of capital market trading and settlements (i.e.: through the adoption of 
regulatory "harmonisation", cross-jurisdictional "minimum" standards or "equivalence" in 
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regulation). In this respect, one can easily, for example, discern the regulatory impact of the 
EU on the internationalisation of securities markets in the latter sense.
13
 
 Up until fairly recently, the majority view among economists on the question of 
whether the international integration of financial markets that has been the inevitable result 
of increasing globalisation was quite positive. Many qualified writers on the subject have 
viewed the benefits of wide, deep, and most importantly, open capital markets as including 
features such as international portfolio diversification, optimal resource allocation on a 
transnational basis, and the discipline on policy makers that transnationalisation necessarily 
imposes. This optimism has proven to be somewhat short-lived, however, given the series of 
monetary and debt crises that first afflicted Latin America and nations in the Asian region – 
crises which, while thought to be quite serious at the time they arrived, turned out to be the 
harbinger of the even worse calamities which for the past two-to-three years have infected 
the member nations of the European Union.
14
 These events have led some economists and 
policymakers to assert that the costs of complete liberalisation of financial markets for 
emerging countries may far outweigh the benefits.
15 
 The primary role of financial globalisation in the development of financial markets 
can be summed up in a single word:  GROWTH.
16
 Despite some regional crises and the 
failure of up to half of the world to participate, until very recently (namely, the years in the 
aftermath of the worldwide 2008 financial meltdown that commenced with the collapse of 
the American housing market, which was immediately followed by the collapse of 
                                                          
13
 Al-Rimawi, L. (2001) Securities markets: Instruments, globalisation and benefits for emerging economies. 
Arab Bank Review. Volume 3 (2), 33-44. 
14
 Ross, J. M. (1995) The globalisation of financial markets and its impact on the financial services industry. 
MSc Thesis. United Kingdom: Heriot Watt University. 
15
 Ibid, 73-83. See also Kose, M. A., Prasad E. S. & Terrones M. E. (2009) Does financial globalization 
promote risk sharing?. Journal of Development Economics. Volume 89. Issue (2), 258-270; Berg, A., 
Borensztein, E. & Pattillo, C. (2004) Assessing Early Warning Systems: How Have They Worked in Practice?. 
IMF. Working Paper 04/52; Rodrik, D. & Velasco, A. (1999) Short-term capital flows. The National Bureau of 
Economic Research. Working Paper No. w7364. September 1999. [Online] available from: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=194648. [Accessed: 28 August 2014]; Clausen, N. J. (2000) 
Securities market co-operation: A new regulatory standard in the next millennium. The Company Lawyer. 
Volume 21. Issue (2).; Furman, J. & Stiglitz, J. E. (1999a) Economic crises: evidence and insights from East 
Asia. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity. Brookings Institution. Washington. No. 2. 1-64; and Knight, M. 
D. (1998) Developing Countries and the Globalization of Financial Markets. Monetary and Exchange Affairs 
Department. World Development. Volume 26. Issue (7). July 1998. [Online] available from: 
http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ ft/wp/wp98105.pdf. [Accessed: 23 March 2013]. For more information on 
the topic in relation to the GCC and Arab Countries, see Alonso-Gamo P. et al. (1997) Globalisation and 
Growth Prospects in Arab Countries. Middle Eastern Department. International Monetary Fund. WP/97/125; El 
Serafi, H. & Abdel Shahid, S. F. (2002) World Stock Exchanges are integrating/consolidating/merging: what 
could be done by Arab Exchanges?. Cairo & Alexandria Exchanges Working Paper Series. No. 2. [Online] 
available from: http://www.egx.com.eg/pdf/world_stock_exchanges.pdf. [Accessed: 15 March 2012]; Talet, N. 
A. (2004) The Establishment of WTO tailored according to the Growth of Information. In Legal & Economic 
Aspects of the World Trade Organization Agreements Conference. Dubai. 9th to 11th May 2004. UAE 
University & Dubai Chamber of Commerce Publication. Volume 6. 1-35; and Al-Yousif, K. Y. (2004) The 
GCC, the WTO, and Development. In Legal & Economic Aspects of the World Trade Organization Agreements 
Conference. Dubai, 9th to 11th May 2004. UAE University & Dubai Chamber of Commerce Publication. 
Volume 6. 105-133. 
16
 Bekaert, G., Harvey, C. R. & Lundblad, C. (2005) Does financial liberalization spur growth?. Journal of 
Financial Economics. Volume 77. Issue (1). 3–55. 
01 
 
securitised mortgage obligations that had been underwritten by, among other famous names, 
the now-failed Wall Street financial firm of Lehman Brothers) the years of globalisation were 
also years of sustained economic growth in all types of countries.
17
 Conventional 
macroeconomic theory provides ample support for the theory that trade, in almost every 
situation, brings consumption benefits to both sides of each individual transaction, this is in 
turn is communicated to financial markets and hence their growth and development. 
 The milestones of the new wave of globalisation seem to have been the stock market 
deregulation in the USA in 1975, the removal of capital movement controls in various 
countries, and the new generation of regional trade agreements such as the Maastricht Treaty 
(deepening the European Union) in 1991, the MERCOSUR Treaty of 1991, the Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free Trade Area of 1992, and the North America Free 
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) of 1994. Together with innovations and competition which 
reduced the costs of transportation and communications, these government regulatory 
decisions helped stimulate the decisions of firms to invest in new areas and new technologies 
and eventually creating new wealth as successful entrepreneurs invested and consumed in the 
virtuous circle of economic growth. While the growth to today's hyperactive financial 
markets following each other through the day from Asia to Europe to the Arabian Gulf to 
North America, and in which news of economic or market developments in a particular 
region or a particular industry is translated within hours to the financial market values of 
firms in that region or industry.
18
 
 It seems that a large part of the problems that do not help the development of 
financial markets, stem from the increased competitiveness and risk taking among the largest 
banks in the developing nations as these increasingly depend on profits from in-house trading 
operations, or in other words, speculation on all sorts of financial matters, while even the 
money-lending portion of the banking business has grown riskier as bankers seek new 
markets for loans among other financial institutions (which are engaged in speculation 
themselves) or low end retail consumers, presumably the first to be affected by any possible 
recession. These factors were all forerunners of the world financial crisis that first became 
manifest beginning in December, 2007; to a remarkable degree, they are still factors and 
behaviors that remain characteristic as the world slowly tries its best to recover from the 
numerous business debacles that were brought to light following the onset of that crisis.
19
 
 The optimistic answer in this situation would be that so far the financial crises in 
Mexico, East Asia, Russia, and the Eurozone have been contained by national and 
international action, and that after relatively brief periods of correction, financial markets 
have generally resumed their upward course, at least in the developed nations. That was true 
up until December, 2007. As for the validity of the theory following the aftermath of that 
still-extant worldwide meltdown, the best that can really be said is that "much remains to be 
seen."  
                                                          
17
 Das, D. K. (2004) The Economic Dimensions of Globalization. United States: Palgrave Macmillan. 
18
 Dicken, P. (2015) Global Shift: Mapping the Changing Contours of the World Economy. 7th Ed. United 





 One final disadvantage of financial globalisation that should be mentioned is the loss 
of control suffered, or perceived to be suffered, by governments, businesses, and individuals 
and hence financial markets. 
20
 Clearly, situations of over investment boom-and-bust, as in 
southeast Asia, Russia, and the Eurozone, represent businesses losing control over their own 
fate in the course of competition. Situations of government loss of control over the course of 
the economy and the relationship of national institutions might be illustrated by several 
examples, such as the political hesitations in both the developed United States and 
developing India towards placing their trade policy fully under the control of multinational 
institutions, or the story of how President Obama personally intervened, apparently in 
response to campaign contributions from American exporters, to greatly loosen rules 
governing high technology exports to China, and how this has become a political issue in 




 Whether the wave of financial globalisation that has swept the world in the last three 
decades will be seen as primarily advantageous or primarily disadvantageous to financial 
markets will depend, of course, largely on how the story turns out – specifically, whether the 
warnings by many economists of yet another worldwide, deflationary recession come true, 
and whether the humiliations of this (possible) outcome outweigh the pleasure of the 
booming phase of the cycle (as seems to have happened with the 1930's versus the 1920's, 
and more recently with the post-2007 years versus the 1990's). It is inherently difficult to 
pass judgment on these predictions of economic depression; on one hand, thinking about 
such predictions is frightening (which clouds one's judgment), but on the other hand, many 
predictions never come true – though some do. The optimist would point out that markets 
always tend to rebound – eventually.
22 
  
1.2 The Markets of the United Kingdom. 
 The LSE is a stock exchange located in the City of London. The Exchange was 
founded in 1801 and is part of the London Stock Exchange Group.
23
As of December 2013, 
the Exchange had a market capitalisation of US$4.429trillion, making it the fourth-largest 
stock exchange in the world by this measurement (and the largest in Europe).
24
 
 The LSE was a booming market, for the most part, in the years following World War 
II. Like all other markets, it tended to be cyclical, and had its share of ups and downs, bear 
markets followed by bull markets followed, inevitably, by bear markets, in an endlessly-
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repeating cycle. But by far and away the most talked-about development in this Market in the 
post-World War II years was the time of the "Big Bang," brought about in 1986 by the 
sudden deregulation of the financial markets in the UK. The phrase "Big Bang" was coined 
to describe measures including abolition of fixed commission charges and of the distinction 
between stockjobbers and stockbrokers on the LSE, as well as change from an open-outcry to 
electronic, screen-based trading.
25 
 In 1995, the Exchange launched the Alternative Investment Market "AIM," 
26
 to allow 
growing companies to expand to international markets. Two years later the Electronic 
Trading Service (SETS) was launched, bringing greater speed and efficiency to the market. 
Following this, the CREST settlement service was also launched. On the year of the new 
millennium, 2000, the Exchange's shareholders voted to become a public limited company: 
London Stock Exchange plc. The LSE also transferred its role as UK Listing Authority to the 
Financial Services Authority ("FSA-UKLA").
27 
 EDX London, a new international equity derivatives business, was created in 2003 in 
partnership with OM Group. The Exchange also acquired Proquote Limited, a new 
generation supplier of real-time market data and trading systems. The old Stock Exchange 
Tower became largely redundant with the advent of the Big Bang, which deregulated many 
of the Stock Exchange's activities as it enabled an increased use of computerised systems that 
allowed dealing rooms to take precedence over face to face trading. In 2007 the LSE merged 
with BorsaItaliana, creating the London Stock Exchange Group ("LSEG").
28
 
 During the 1980s, the major British banks had secured an unrivalled position in that 
country's retail securities market by combining an extensive branch network with a broking 
and dealing facility. Only the development of online broking provided an opportunity for 
others to enter the retail side of the securities market, with the largest US firm, Charles 
Schwab, establishing a foothold in the late 1990s at the time of the dot.com boom.  
 In the wholesale market the position was different, with strong competition for the 
business of large institutional investors. Major banks and brokers, including many from 
abroad, were willing to buy and sell at very low rates of commission or for free, expecting to 
profit from the difference between the buying and selling price. Institutional business was 
concentrated in the hands of a small number of financial firms as only they had the extensive 
resources and connections necessary.Some of these were British but most were not. The 
largest London dealers, Smith New Court, became part of MerrillLynch, whilst the most 
prestigious broker, Casenoves, allied itself with J. P. Morgan Chase. By 1999, membership 
of the LSE was down to 298, with 80% of all trading being done by only sixty large banks 
and brokers. The level of concentration was even greater by 2005 when ten firms did 50% of 
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the trading. By then the LSE had become a suite of markets catering for distinct groups of 
investors and served by banks and brokers from home and abroad.
29
 
 Due to Big Bang, the LSE had made the successful transition from a floor-based 
trading system to a screen/telephone-based one. However, many of the vestiges of the old 
restrictive practices remained and further progress was slow. Until 1995 there were attempts 
to monopolise trading by limiting access to the prices generated by market-makers. It was not 
until 1997 that a fully electronic market place was introduced where trading could take place 
on-screen and a central computer automatically match orders in terms of securities, amounts, 
and prices. Similarly, it was not until 2000 that the LSE was converted from a member-
owned institution into a company, so giving it the flexibility to compete internationally. 
Accompanying this change in status was the final abandonment by the LSE of the wider 
regulatory powers it had acquired during and after the Second World War such as control 
over the dissemination of price sensitive information and policing broker–client 
relationships. Instead, the LSE became subject to the Financial Services Authority, which 
had been set up in 1997 to oversee the entire British financial system, including the 
international activities taking place in London.
30
 
 Thus, the LSE was no different from any of the other securities markets operating out 
of London, whether it was the Swiss Stock Exchange, Virt X, the government bond trading 
platform Euro MTS, or the international organisation supervising the Eurobond market. At 
one level was the AIM, which traded the issues of new and small companies. These were 
riskier investments involving fewer safeguards to protect investors, with many of the stocks 
traded being issued by companies operating in such fields as new technology, 
pharmaceuticals, mining, and oil exploration. By the early 2000s, AIM had established itself 
as one of the world's most successful junior markets, attracting listings from numerous 
companies from outside Britain.Finally, the LSE also provided a market for foreign 
companies that attracted the interest of the international investment community such as a 
succession of Russian enterprises operating in a variety of sectors. The LSE was no longer 
exclusively identified with British companies and British investors. Crucial to the success of 
the LSE a securities market were the facilities it provided through which securities could be 
easily and cheaply traded.
31 
  
1.3  The Markets of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. 
 1.3.1 Background Information on the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)  
  and Markets in General. 
 The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) was formed in 1981, as a regional organisation 
comprising of six countries: Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, the United 
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Arab Emirates and Qatar. Its aim was to achieve economic and political integration in the 
wake of the second oil-price shock and political change in the region. The most salient 
objective of the GCC programme is to achieve ― eventually ― a confederal framework in 




 The GCC States enjoy close similarities; common language― Arabic, a common 
religion―Islam, closely comparable social structures, roughly the same economic 
developments, very similar systems of governments, a collective culture and  shared 
geography characteristics.
33
 Also, the GCC economies are broadly similar in characteristics. 
First, the main source of government income is derived from oil and gas exports. Second, the 




 All these factors, enhanced by one geographical entity extending from sea to desert, 
have facilitated contacts and interaction among them, and created homogeneous values and 
characteristics. Therefore, while, on one hand, the GCC is a continuation, evolution and 
institutionalisation of old prevailing realities, it is, on the other hand, a practical answer to the 
challenges of security and economic development in the area. It is also a fulfillment of the 
aspirations of its citizens towards some sort of Arab regional unity.
35
 
 Free movement of capital, services and persons are the GCC Charter cornerstones on 
which the Council legislative competence in the economic field is based. Thus, the Council 
has adopted, or in the implementation process in some areas, several vital policies in the 
economic field which are aimed at accelerating joint economic action. The most important 
are those relating to the establishment of common market, customs, economic and monetary 
union. Moreover, the GCC Charter has also provided the basis for further conventions 
intended to ratify and develop specific areas of cooperation. In this regard, the most far-
reaching of the subsidiary legal instruments to emerge from the Charter is the Economic 
Agreement. The Economic Agreement of 2002 represents a new style of GCC joint work as 
it does not only call for cooperation and coordination among Member States, but goes 
beyond that to expressly provide for the economic integration among them through the 
adoption of specific programs and workable mechanisms.
36
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 Realising the importance of the financial market, the GCC has included this activity 
to play a major role in the integration of the members' economies. Notably, the word 
"integration" has been used for the first time in the Economic Agreement of 2002. Article 5 
explicitly states that:  
"for the purpose of enhancing local, external, and intra-GCC investment levels, and 
provide an investment climate characterised by transparency and stability, Member 
States agree to take the following steps: 
1. Unify all their investment-related laws and regulations. 
2. Accord national treatment to all investments owned by GCC natural and legal 
citizens. 
3. Integrate financial markets in Member States, and unify all related legislation and 
policies. 
4. Adopt unified standards and specifications for all products, according to the 




 In the trade sector, the abolition of internal customs tariffs on regional products was 
the first major step toward creating a GCC common market thus the GCC free-trade area was 
established in 1983.
38
 The establishment of the common external tariff (CET) was another 
significant step toward creating a GCC common market. At the same time, the GCC has 
agreed to the establishment of a range of common institutions aimed at positive integration. 
In the areas of individuals and capital, the right of unrestricted movement and the freedom to 
conduct economic activity anywhere in the GCC arena is conferred on GCC nationals. Also, 
the GCC nationals have been permitted to own and deal with shares in the joint stock 




 The GCC Monetary union is ratified by KSA, Kuwait, Qatar and Bahrain. Oman had 
opted out of it in 2006 and the UAE did so in May 2009. Although on March 15, 2010 the 
UAE re-iterated that it is committed to the concept of a single currency however the free 
trade in the region should precede single currency realisation. Riyadh is selected as the 
location for the monetary council and the future central Bank. Nevertheless, the GCC summit 
had established a Joint Monetary Council (JMC) which will take necessary steps to issue the 
GCC single currency. The GCC Monetary Union has thus remained a long term goal to be 
preceded by monetary and fiscal policies and creation of an effective regional central bank. It 




 The Supreme Council, in its 23rd Session held in Qatar (December 2002), approved the launch of the customs 
union of the GCC States as of 1st January 2003. It also approved the procedures and steps recommended for the 
establishment of the customs union of the GCC States. See Dubaicustoms.gov.ae (2003) Common Customs 
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Show&ID=53. [Accessed: 18 May 2013]. 
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is expected that a full monetary union will indeed take place within at least the next decade 
or so once all political and financial ramifications have been ironed out.
40
 
 Generally, under pressure from dwindling oil reserves, plummeting oil prices, and 
domestic unrest, the GCC members are striving to reduce their dependence on oil/energy 
revenues. To do so, the GCC nations must both diversify their economies (i.e., expand 
economic activity into non-energy sectors) and construct a sound financial infrastructure. A 
thorough examination of the securities markets of the two most prominent members of the 
GCC, namely, KSA and the UAE cannot take place without first briefly surveying the 
banking systems of the GCC region. 
 By the standards of most emerging markets, the stock markets of the GCC are still 
relatively small in terms of both total capitalisation and number of listed companies.
41
 There 
are a number of reasons which explain the smaller, less developed stock markets of the GCC. 
One factor is the low level of active investors in the region. Another factor is the 
comparatively short history of the markets – most have only been open since the mid-1990s. 
Another factor is their limited scope (e.g., whether they encompass funds, bonds, futures, 
etc.). There is limited margin trading and no short selling in the Gulf markets except the 
UAE.
42
 OTC derivatives are not available on the GCC exchanges apart from call options that 
are available in Kuwait and exchange traded derivatives that are listed and traded on the 
Nasdaq Dubai,
43
 in the UAE and the Dubai Gold Commodities Exchange.
44
 A final, critical 
factor is the limitation on foreign investor involvement– especially given the low ratio of 
domestic shareholders to the general population. While Bahrain allows 100% foreign 
involvement in some areas, only Oman allows full foreign investor participation.  
 The performance of the GCC markets has varied considerably over the period 1996 to 
2012. During 1996, most markets posted modest growth. By 2012, virtually all markets had 
shown remarkable signs of significant improvement and enhancement vis-a-vis the other 
securities markets of the world.
45
 Once thought of as relatively undeveloped, backwater types 
of markets, the markets of the GCC – particularly those of KSA and the UAE– are now 
considered to be some of the most advanced of the world, even though, comparatively, the 
number of issues traded in these markets is still relatively small. 
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 The securities markets of the GCC region must also be considered against the 
backdrop of their policies on foreign trade. By maturing country standards, the GCC nations 
maintain relatively open and liberal trade regimes. They do not maintain exchange controls 
nor do they impose trade restrictions on imports. All of the GCC countries are members of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO).
46
 Compared to most of the newly industrialising 
countries and including the fast-growing Asian economies, the GCC countries have a 
relatively well-developed basic financial sector infrastructure. Particularly impressive is the 
stability and health of the banking sector, despite the impact of the aftermath of the onset of 
the late-2007 world financial near-meltdown on some of these countries. 
  
 1.3.2    The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Stock Market. 
 Stock trading began in KSA in 1935 with the Arabian Automobile Company being 
the first joint stock company to go public in the country. This company was, however, 
subsequently liquidated. In 1954, the Arabian Cement Company was made public, and was 
followed by the privatisation of a number of electricity companies in the 1960s. As well, 
bonus shares (a scrip dividend) were issued. By 1975 there were 14 public companies. The 
1970s were a period of Saudisation of foreign banks operating in the Kingdom. Seven 
foreign joint ventures banks were Saudised, and their shares were offered to the general 
public.
47 
 The market remained informal, until the early 1980's when the government embarked 
on a rapid development program. In the oil price boom years between 1980 and 1983, the 
stock market was driven to a speculative boom that sent trading volume and market prices 
soaring. In 1984, fearing excessive speculation and volatility in KSA Stock Market, and the 
possibility of a Kuwait type occurrence,
48
 a Ministerial Committee consisting of Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy, Ministry of Commerce and Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency 
(SAMA) was formed to regulate and develop the market. In 1985, KSA government placed 
all stock trading under the supervision and control of SAMA and was additionally charged 
with the day-to-day regulation of the market. With the aim of improving the regulatory 
framework, SAMA discontinued the existing broker-based stock trading system and 
authorised 12 domestic commercial banks to act as brokers.
49
 The government also created a 
company in 1985, the Saudi Share Registration Company (SSRC), for the registration of 
sales and chose the banks to broker and register shares on behalf of their customers. The 
company provides central registration facilities for joint stock companies and settles and 
clears all equity transactions.
50 
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 Although business has fallen on hard times, the market was geared up for a public 
offering of shares in the state-owned Saudi Basic Industries Corporation (SABIC). That was 
in line with the government's long-standing commitment to privatise as much of State 
business as is practical.
51
 These moves by the government created a more homogenous 
market and prices against the adverse effects of speculation, and allowed the public to deal in 




 At that time, KSA had no stock market operating as an independent formal entity, and 
trading was conducted through an electronic network, i.e., the Electronic Securities 
Information System "ESIS" that was operated by banks and founded by SAMA in the year 
1990. However, the CML provides for the establishment of the Saudi Stock Exchange 
"Tadawul" as a joint-stock company. The functions of the Stock Exchange are currently 
operated by Tadawul for trading of securities, clearing and settlements, which was launched 
in October 2001 and officially replaced ESIS.
53 
 The ongoing growth of KSA market demanded additional reforms to be adopted by 
KSA government in order to keep pace with the stock market development. Therefore, the 
Capital Market Authority was established by the CML, issued by Royal Decree No. (M/30) 
of 2003.
54
 The CMA is a government organisation with financial, legal and administrative 
independence. The CMA functions are to regulate and develop KSA capital market. It issues 
the required rules and regulations for the implementation of the provisions of CM L aimed at 
creating an appropriate investment environment.
55 
 By the end of the year 2007, KSA stock market enjoyed a huge market capitalisation 
of SR 1,946 billion, which made it one of the world's biggest emerging-market stock 
exchanges. However, the global meltdown of 2007-2008 saw a sharp fall in Tadawul index 
and reached its lowest in the past 7-odd years. Yet, in 2013 the total market capitalisation 
reached US$ 467 billion representing a 25% increase on 2012
56
 with Tadawul All Share 
Index (TASI) closing at 8,500 at the end of 2013.
57
 Tadawul facilitates electronic trading in 
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shares (settlement T+0) and sukuk/bonds (settlement T+2) but does not conduct a derivative 
market.
58 
 When Tadawul was formed, there were many restrictions on share-dealing and 
trading by foreigners on KSA stock market. But, in August 2008, the government came out 
with the news that Tadawul would gradually be opened to foreign investors. Non-Saudi 
Arabia residents are now allowed to deal and trade on KSA stock market provided they do so 




 1.3.3 The United Arab Emirates Stock Markets 
 The success of the first public offering of the National Bank of Dubai in 1963 
encouraged investors to incorporate more public companies especially after the unification of 
the Emirates on the 2nd of December 1971. There were more than 20 public companies at the 
end of 1976. However, the participants in public offerings were limited generally to the 
government and the merchant class. Thus, share trading was minimal when compared with 
Kuwait and Bahrain.
60 
 The most significant development during this period was the emergence of Gulf 
companies founded by Kuwaiti investors under licenses issued, not by the federal authority 
but by local Emirates governments. Between the years 1976-1984 seventy public companies 
were formed mostly by Kuwaiti investors in the UAE and this was as a result of the 
emergence of the Souq Al-Manakh and the Kuwaiti government ban on incorporating public 
companies, due to the financial crisis in 1977.
61
 As Gulf companies appeared and their shares 
were being traded at the Al Manakh stock exchange in Kuwait, an unofficial stock market 
began to develop in the UAE. Brokers' offices had been springing up in some of the Emirates 
since 1979. The Emirate of Sharjah was the pioneer in organised mass share trading through 
brokers' offices and afterwards more offices were opened in the rest of the Emirates. These 
offices as a whole were connected to the stock market in Kuwait and subject to its influence. 
All share trading was not subject to any law or regulation, except in Sharjah as it 
promulgated a law to regulate brokers.
62
 It must be noted that there was no company law that 
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 After the collapse of the Souq Al-Manakh
64
 a committee was established in the UAE 
to propose a study for the formation of an official UAE Stock Exchange and in 1984 a 
Federal Commercial Companies Law was enacted.
65
 In the year 1998 the UAE stock market 
experienced its first stock bubble which resulted in sharp decline in share prices that lasted 
for the following three years. The total market value of public companies lost over 55% of its 
value during that period which resulted in huge losses to investors and most importantly 
caused investors to lose confidence in the stock market for years to come. Some of the 
problems occurred during the "98 crash" was the lack of transparency by public companies in 
terms of financial reporting and in terms of board share-dealings. The majority of the studies 
attributed the cause of the crash to the lack of rules and regulations that governs the industry 
and the virtually nonexistence of the infrastructure such as stock exchanges clearing, 
depository systems… etc. The absence of the infrastructure of capital market regulations 
allowed market participants (brokerage offices, mutual funds, etc.) to conduct unfair trading 
practices which resulted in harming small investors.
66 
 Thereafter, two official stock exchanges, the Dubai Financial Market (DFM)
67
 and 
the Abu Dhabi Securities Exchange (ADX),
68
 were formed in the year 2000. Both markets 
were established as local public establishments having their own independent corporate body. 
They operate as secondary markets for the trading of securities issued by public shareholding 
companies, bonds issued by the federal Government or any of the local Governments and 
public institutions in the country, units of investment funds and any other financial 
instruments, local or foreign. Clearance and settlement is at (T+2) in both markets.
69
 
 The DFM was converted into a public joint stock company by an initial public 
offering in November 2006.DFM offered 1.6 billion shares, representing 20 per cent of its 
paid-up capital of 8 billion Dirhams. The government of Dubai retained the remaining 80 per 
cent of DFM Company through Borse Dubai Limited.
70
 The initial public offering of DFM 
shares was hugely oversubscribed with the official DFM website stating that total 
subscriptions exceeded201 billion Dirhams or the equivalent of US$57 billion.
71
 DFM shares 
commenced trading in March 2007 and the exchange is subjected to all the rules and 
regulations that applied to listed companies.  
 The ADX takes the form of a local public establishment owned by the government of 
Abu Dhabi and based in the capital of the UAE, Abu Dhabi. The Exchange is vested with a 
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legal entity of autonomous status, independent finance and management, and has the 
necessary supervisory and executive powers to exercise its functions.
72
 Unlike the DFM, the 
ADX is not a listed entity and has remained a local entity. The exchange was formerly 
known as Abu Dhabi Securities Market and changed its name to Abu Dhabi Securities 
Exchange in May 2008. The ADX has 65 listed companies
73
 on its exchange and the DFM 
has 55 locally established companies as well as foreign entities.
74 
 In addition, the UAE government issued Federal Law No. (4) in the year 2000
75
 
which called for establishing the Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority (SCA) a 
government entity with the objectives of regulating and developing the capital market.
76
 This 
Law states that the Authority enjoys a legal entity, financial and administrative independence 
with the control and executive powers necessary for it to discharge its tasks in line with the 
provisions of this law and the regulations issued in implementation thereof, noting that the 
authority reports to the minister of economy. The Authority may set up subsidiary branches 
or offices to discharge the tasks of supervising and monitoring the markets but may neither 
practice trade activities nor seek benefit in any project nor own or issue any securities.
77 
 The UAE is the second largest economy and capital market after Saudi Arabia. The 
UAE also has the second largest volume of traded shares after Saudi Arabia. As of end-2014, 
the trading volume was 2,087,124,132 billion Dirhams (US$568210972.054). However, 
during 2004-2005 there was a substantial increase in share prices and trading activity. Then, 
towards the end of 2005 through until mid-2006 the bubble burst and the share values 
dropped by around 60% on DFM and over 30% on ADX like all other GCC markets.
78
 As 
the above indicates, the short but eventful story of the growth of the DFM and ADX has 
covered dramatic changes over their fifteen year history. Expected forecasts are equally 
positive especially considering the MSCI re-classification of the UAE from a frontier to an 
emerging market effective as of mid-2014. The expected benefits of this re-classification are 
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significant. It is hoped that increased international investors in the form of funds will move 
into the markets and take long positions.
79
 
 Finally, at the heart of the Dubai International Financial Centre is Nasdaq Dubai,
80
 an 
exchange that is regulated by the Dubai Financial Services Authority.
81
 Nasdaq Dubai is the 
international financial exchange in the Middle East that offers a wide product range. 
Companies can raise capital through shares, sukuk and bonds. Exchange-traded funds, 
derivatives, exchange-traded commodities as well as Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) 
can be listed and traded too. The value of trades in 2013 was US $366 million compared to 




1.4    Conclusion 
 This chapter has attempted to provide an account of the securities markets in general 
looking at factors that affected and shaped those markets. Then it briefly gives a historic 
overview of the foundations of each market of the three jurisdictions, UK, KSA and the UAE 
in order to set the background for the subsequent chapters. 
 Market development depends greatly on sound regulation that deals with setting the 
infrastructure its own goals and policy objectives. Issues of investment complexity and risks 
introduce the necessity of disclosure based regulation that helps enhance the allocational 
function of capital market while limiting unlawful conduct and protecting stakeholders. 
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The Goals and Policy Objectives of Securities Regulations 
 
 
This Chapter discusses the main policy objectives of securities market regulations 
in general and then elucidates how disclosure based regulatory regimes emerged as a 
solution to meet the goals of securities regulations as well as contrasts disclosure based 
regulation with more prescriptive alternative of 'command and control' regime. 
 
1.1 Background:  Increasing Investment Complexity and New Risks 
 As globalisation ever increases, the results have included both the availability of a 
greater range of potential investment opportunities, along with the fact that investors also 
face an increasingly complex investment environment. A general source of increased 
investment complexity is that the operations of securities issuers are now more complex than 
in prior years.  As economies develop and the division of labor intensifies, the production of 
goods and services becomes more specialised, technological, knowledge-intensive, and 
complex, and thereby more difficult for any individual to fully comprehend. In addition, the 
increasing dependence of the global economy on knowledge assets has also increased the 
complexity of the investment decision-making process.
83
 
 Furthermore, innovations in financial instruments have introduced a vast array of 
complex derivatives into the financial system. Complex derivatives increase the complexity 
of the operations of non-financial companies, as they are used to manage risk and engage in 
other transactions. A result of the combination of globalisation and financial innovation, 
complexity is at a new level of interdependence in the financial markets, where seemingly 
isolated events in one market can manifest themselves in unpredictable risks in others.
84
 
 The combination of complexity, new risks, and global interdependence has led 
several recent commentators to observe that investment risk has reached a new level of 
unknowability and uncertainty.
85
 The increasing complexity of financial markets means that 
the return and risk of a company's securities has a less cognizable relationship to the 
company's activities and the information contained in its financial statements.  
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Mandatory disclosures are thus, and increasingly so, incapable of providing retail investors 
with readily understandable information about the factors that affect the value of companies' 
shares. Consequently, it is more expected that an investor may be unsuccessful to fully 
incorporate the risks involved and make suboptimal investment choices with such 
information. In this situation, innovative methods of diversification are especially important 
and regulations need to be conducive to help investors reap the benefits of the market 




1.1 Overview of Disclosure Based Regulation 
 Over the course of the past several decades, both legislators and regulators have 
adopted disclosure schemes to accomplish regulatory goals.
87
 The promulgators of both laws 
and rules have turned to information as a regulatory tool because it is politically acceptable 
and it interferes less with individual choice and with the operation of markets. Mandatory 




 Even as disclosure requirements have become increasingly common and their 
regulatory goals increasingly ambitious, however, research in psychology and economics has 
cast doubt on the traditional account of how people process information. Current 
understanding of heuristic biases and bounded rationality suggests that information may 
affect behavior in unexpected ways and may not, in some circumstances, affect behavior at 
all. More troubling, we may not be able to predict how information will affect behavior.  
Behavioral research also suggests that more information is not necessarily a good thing.  
Such behavioral research has led to increased calls for changes in the way disclosure-based 




 The model for the use of disclosure as a regulatory device is the system established 
by the securities laws of most civilised countries. That system is not perfect, but to the extent 
it is successful, its success is largely because it operates in a singular environment: a highly 
developed, relatively efficient market with an enormous support structure of both market and 
informational intermediaries, in a context in which decision-makers often seek professional 
advice and make great efforts to be as rational as possible. This environment provides a 
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mechanism by which disclosed information can reach its audience, affect behavior, and cause 
a desired result through its operation on a single variable, the price of a security. It is at least 
doubtful whether disclosure could accomplish similar goals in different circumstances, and 




 Even though there is a worldwide commitment to the allocational function of capital 
markets, each country shapes the capital raising process by its own set of mandatory 
disclosure rules. Thus, although the securities laws of nations share common goals, they vary 
widely in how they seek to achieve these objectives. Investors, therefore, not only enjoy a 
choice of investment opportunities, but they also enjoy choice among competing markets, 
which are distinguished by, among other features, their differing regulatory regimes.
91
For 
example, baseline disclosure requirements and timelines for offerings and trading in 
securities in the UK that are regulated by the FCA are different, of those in KSA that are 
regulated by the CMA, and from those in the UAE that are regulated, principally, by the 
SCA. Correlatively, each securities regulator's jurisdiction is confined to the borders of the 
nations in which it is located so that transactions within its jurisdiction are regulated 
exclusively by its disclosure rules, even though investors and issuers may prefer a different 
regime.
92
 In this way, each securities regulator enjoys a regulatory monopoly over securities 
transactions within its nation's borders.
93
 
 To apprise how regulators should respond to the threat that globalisation poses to 
their regulatory monopolies, we need to understand the overall pricing function of markets. 
There is a good deal of debate regarding not only whether securities markets are efficient,
94
  
more fundamentally what the meaning of market efficiency is.
95
 This chapter proceeds first 
on the assumption that security prices are fundamentally efficient, which is to say that 
investors impound in their trading beliefs respecting the intrinsic value they attach to an 
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additional unit of disclosure.
96
 This chapter's initial assumptions are that market forces 
accurately price the risks posed by a security and that to the extent two securities are similar 
in all respects except that one security provides an additional unit of disclosure that the 
investors believe relevant and the other security does not, investors not only distinguish 
between the two securities but also rationally price the consequences of the differing 
disclosures made between the two securities. With a market that is so efficient, our comfort 
level in a regulatory strategy that permits parties to opt for the reporting metrics of their 
choice -- for example, GAAP or IFRS -- should be influenced by our belief that the security 
will be accurately priced to reflect the bargain that is struck including the disclosure risk 
implicit in that bargain.
97
 
 Simply put, inaccurate securities prices impair the allocational efficiency of capital 
markets, a central objective of securities regulation.
98
 Thus, the securities regulator will 
consider disclosure requirements that will bring about greater pricing accuracy for securities. 
Suppose that the baseline disclosure requirements in the above illustration do not include line 
of business reporting requirements and that if such information were disclosed it would 
distinguish issuers of one security from those of comparable others.
99
 The securities regulator 
could pursue the objective of improved pricing of securities and allocational efficiency by 
adopting line of business reporting so that investors are able to distinguish between 




 There are four well-recognised interrelated objectives sought to be achieved by 
mandatory disclosure requirements of the securities laws. Each objective reflects the 
regulator's fear that his intervention is necessary to address a harmful market failure. First, 
mandatory disclosure is believed necessary to provide investors with information they need 
to make informed intelligent investment decisions.
101
 Stated simply, absent mandatory 
disclosure requirements, investors will not receive the information they need to assess 
competing investment opportunities; the information they do receive will vary widely across 
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issuers so that comparability among them is not practicable.
102
 A core feature of this 
objective is comparability among investment choices, at least with respect to choices among 
securities competing for the investor's funds. Comparability implicates the scope and detail, 
and to a lesser extent its presentation format, of the information the regulator requires all 
issuers to disclose. 
 Second, securities laws seek to enhance the allocational function of capital 
markets.
103
 Adam Smith's invisible hand is believed to operate more effectively if, on the 
basis of disclosed information, investors can differentiate risk and return relationships among 
competing opportunities.
104
 Mandatory disclosure rules are believed to facilitate allocational 
efficiency because uniform disclosure will lead to sharper comparative judgments respecting 
the relation of risk and return. This is described in detail in subsequent Chapters. 
 Third, mandatory disclosure rules are justified as a useful prophylactic to reduce the 
frequency and scale of fraudulent offerings and other manipulative practices. The connection 
between mandatory disclosure rules and manipulative practices is illustrated by the pump-
and-dump schemes that plague penny stock markets in jurisdictions such as the United 
States
105
 (at least, in comparison with the three nations under examination here – the United 
Kingdom, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates). Pump-and-dump 
can be described as a scheme for public trading in securities of issuers about which there is 
no reliable public information. This permits the unscrupulous promoter to pique investor 
interest through rumors and false reports; with large numbers of credulous investors 
providing upward price momentum for the security, the promoter can dispose of his holdings 
at a substantial profit. Thus, mandatory disclosure rules fill what otherwise would be an 
information void that allows the unscrupulous promoter to carry out his fraudulent scheme. 
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 Fourth and finally, mandatory disclosure both empowers stockholders vis-a-vis the 
firm's managers and restrains opportunistic behavior by company managers.
106
 Disclosure 
not only nurtures the managers' responsiveness to their stockholders, certainly in connection 
with any regulated proxy solicitation, but also can attract a bid for control. Additionally, 
there is a fear that in the absence of mandatory disclosure managers will time their 
disclosures so as to maximise gains they can reap through insider dealing.
107
 A further 
concern is that absence of reliable information, managers may calculate a disproportionate 
value of the firm while going private or other forms of restructuring. By providing 
information regarding the company's performance and its managers' stewardship in a timely 
manner, mandatory disclosure rules are believed to reduce the frequency of these ill effects.  
 As this chapter further examines, most of these objectives are adversely affected if 
IFRS and GAAP are permitted in a single market. This chapter also seeks to examine the 
goals and policy objectives which underlie regulatory disclosure systems generally, using the 
securities laws as a paradigm, in an effort to determine when and how disclosure systems 
work and to provide guidelines for the use of disclosure by regulators. Included is a 
discussion of the practical and philosophical reasons for the popularity of disclosure-based 
regulations. 
 
1.2 The Popularity of Disclosure-Based Regulation 
 There are dozens, possibly hundreds, of regulatory schemes that use disclosure in 
whole or in part to accomplish their purposes.
108
 Regulatory disclosure schemes blossomed 
in the 1980s as part of a trend to inform and educate rather than regulate. Disclosure-based 
regulation has both pragmatic and political justifications. First, it comports with the view that 
command-and-control regulation does not work.
109
 Moreover, it is easier to require 
disclosure than to regulate substantively,
110
 which requires identifying desirable and 
undesirable behaviors, showing them to be beneficial or harmful, showing that the proposed 
regulation will have the desired effect on the behavior, and showing that the costs of 
compliance with the regulation and the unintended consequences of the regulation will not 
outweigh its benefits.
111
 Disclosure can be used to regulate even when we are unsure what to 
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regulate, because the decision about behavior is left to a third party, the target of the 
disclosure. Also, disclosure moves decision-making away from the government and down to 
the individual or firm, which often permits more efficient decision-making.
112
 
 Second, disclosure schemes comport with the prevailing political philosophy in that 
disclosure preserves individual choice while avoiding direct governmental interference. 
Disclosure is a "soft" form of intervention that does not directly mandate change in the 
underlying behavior.
113
 In other words, it is a form of civil regulation-regulation by society, 
not the government. Moreover, disclosure-based regulation appeals to those with a pro-
market political orientation because it addresses market failure without disturbing other 
beneficial features of the market. 
 In addition, disclosure-based regulation may reflect a changing political dynamic.
114
 
The insights of public choice theory apply to statutes requiring disclosure as well as to any 
other kind of statute, and it may be that the increase in regulation by disclosure reflects an 
improved ability by regulated groups to use the legislative process to avoid direct regulation. 
Similarly, the adoption of less intrusive disclosure schemes by regulators may reflect 




1.2 The Goals of Disclosure Within the Context of Securities Regulation 
 The purpose and goals of securities regulation are multiple, overlapping, broad, and 
include the following four principal objectives: 
 
 1.2.1 Reducing Informational Asymmetries 
 The purpose of securities disclosure is often stated to be providing more information 
to investors. Alternatively, the policy can be described as remedying information 
asymmetries that existed between investors, on the one hand, and issuers and promoters of 
securities, on the other, before securities laws and regulations first commenced to be 
adopted.
116
 Because information asymmetries cause market participants to demand 
compensatory premium, a disclosure policy that reduces those asymmetries will improve the 
price-setting function of the market.
117
 Generally, the securities laws and rules are based on 
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the proposition that the independent judgments of buyers and sellers in a securities market 
will best determine accurate prices for securities if those buyers and sellers have adequate 
information. Thus, disclosure is essential to the functioning of the capital markets because 
the most efficient allocation of resources will occur when the information is sufficient for the 
purposes of those making decisions, when it is reliable, and when it is disseminated in a 
timely manner. Pricing risk is one of the essential functions of the securities markets, and 
disclosure of information improves market participants' ability to assess and price risk.
118
 
 Also, by making information available to all, rather than allowing it to be distributed 
unevenly to selected market participants in a manner that would be perceived to be unfair, 
disclosure requirements can increase public confidence in the markets.  Mandatory disclosure 
requirements also ensure that disclosed information is standardised and, therefore, more 
easily comparable. Finally, disclosure requirements assure investors that additional 
information will be available on a regular and timely basis.
119
 
 If the sole objective of securities regulators is facilitating investors' ability to make 
meaningful comparisons among issuers on the basis of publicly available information, 
regulators should be reasonably comfortable with mutual recognition in the GAAP-IFRS 
context, at least if securities are priced in a market that is fundamentally efficient. Investor 
judgments respecting investment opportunities are at a socially desirable level of acuity if 
investors can price securities accurately so that any disclosure lacunae of one issuer vis-a-vis 
another issuer are reflected in a heavier discounting of the price of the former over the latter. 
Importantly, under the assumption of fundamentally efficient capital markets, the amount of 
that discount will capture the disclosure risk posed by the lower disclosing firm accurately. 
Here we can see the strong similarity between the arguments in support of multiple 
disclosure standards and the longer-lasting debate regarding the social benefits of mandatory 
disclosure rules. Opponents of mandatory disclosure requirements have argued that 




 To such critics, the costs of mandatory disclosure rules are unnecessary because they 
believe investors in a laissez-faire environment can self-protect through discounting the 
returns of issuers based on the relative completeness and trustworthiness of their 
disclosures.
121
 It is also argued that those who advocate mandatory disclosure requirements 
ignore the incentives managers have to disclose information voluntarily. Most recently, the 
axis of this debate has shifted. Today, critics, while appearing to accept mandatory 
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disclosure, advocate that issuers should enjoy unrestrained choice of which disclosure regime 
they will employ to satisfy their disclosure obligations.
122
 Thus, we can see there is at best a 
slender divide between the arguments of those who question the mandatory disclosure rules 
and those who champion a multiple disclosure standards approach.
123
Such similarity is 
understandable, even predictable, since, if markets are fundamentally efficient, investors do 
not need the paternalism provided by the costly mandatory disclosure requirements to price 
securities appropriately.
124
 While the purpose here is not to review the debate on the 
necessity of mandatory disclosure requirements, it is relevant to place that debate within the 
context of multiple disclosure standards. 
 To be sure, in a market that is fundamentally efficient, if the goal is solely to facilitate 
comparability, the life of the securities regulator would be a quiet one.  The classic goal of 
facilitating informed investment decisions would reduce the regulator to the rather menial 
task of making sure that issuers disclosed enough information so that investors are aware of 
the nature of the disclosure differences among issuers. Thus, in evaluating issuers G, G', I, 
and I', the role of the securities regulator would be to assure that the disclosure differences 
among the four issuers were adequately discernible so that these pricing differences would 
occur. By so acting, the regulator can rest assured that at least one of the objectives of 
securities regulations has been satisfied. 
 These goals all involve enhancing the function of the securities markets. But the 
securities regulatory authorities in every regulated jurisdiction, however, also consider it to 
be their mission to be the protection of investors. Those goals are not the same and may not 
even be purely complementary. Market efficiency may be enhanced, for example, when 
investors' mistakes are punished by losses and investors have the opportunity to learn to 
invest more rationally or to stay out of the market and leave the decision-making to 
experts.
125
 Should securities regulations be designed with those investors in mind, or should 
securities regulatory authorities be concerned with protecting the non-diversified investor, 
who may be at greater risk?
126
 Also, regulation of different kinds of investments may be 
directed at different kinds of investors. Hedge fund investors, for example, tend to be wealthy 
and sophisticated, while mutual fund investors tend to be middle class and unsophisticated.
127
 
And, as discussed below, the relevant audience for most securities disclosure is not investors 
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at all, but informational and market intermediaries. In sum, the goal of providing information 
to investors is less straightforward than one might think. 
 
1.2.1 Enhancement of the Allocational Function of Capital Markets 
 The securities regulator contributes to allocation efficiency
128
 by mandating lines of 
business reporting.  Now consider the impact of the entry of I and I'. Their presence returns 
mispricing to the host market because, at least for these two securities, they either will be 
under-or over-priced.
129
 At the same time, both I and I' are riskier than G and G' since their 
expected value is the combination of their future potential outcomes, which have a greater 
variance than for G or G'. Investors will not shy away from purchasing either I or I', provided 
the expectation of accurately identifying which stock is I and reaping a US$1 gain is 
sufficient compensation for the risk involved in making that investment choice. 
 To illustrate the connection with allocational efficiency, assume that each of the four 
issuers will undertake a public offering of 50 million shares. The distribution will therefore 
result in I' receiving US$50 million more than its match, G'; and I receives US$50 million 
less than its match, G.
130
 The regulator will view the loser in this process as not solely I but 
the host country's investors who chose I' over the other three investment choices. The 
regulator has good cause to believe that if all issuers selling securities within its jurisdiction 
abided by its mandatory disclosure rules that there would have been more accurate pricing of 
the issued securities and investors could have better maximised their investment return. And, 
assuming that capital is not unlimited, some issuers may have been able to distribute more of 
their own securities if there had been a level disclosure field since factors disclosed per 
GAAP may reflect greater future risks for I and I' than for other capital-hungry issuers.
131
 
 Accurate securities prices also affect the disciplining effects of the market for control, 
which has its own impact on the role that securities markets play in the allocation of capital. 
Mandatory disclosure rules enhance the likelihood that managers who perform poorly by 
making suboptimal uses of the resources under their control will be displaced.  Those who 
replace them can be expected to better deploy the firm's resources. Thus, if the cause of 
differences between I and I' issuers is that I firms have talented managers and I' do not, the 
pricing of I firms so that they are indistinguishable from I' firms will mean I' managers will 
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continue to be immune from the disciplining effects of a takeover or proxy contest so that I' 
firms' resources will continue to be misallocated.
132
 
 Thus, under a mutual recognition-multiple standards approach, the well-meaning 
regulator loses its ability to influence the allocation of capital. Even G' Issuers may suffer 
because investors are attracted to the prospects of the rewards of identifying an I Issuer by 
the fifty percent odds of acquiring an IFRS reporting firm at US$ 21 that becomes a US$ 22 
security. Domestic issuers lose; indeed, all issuers lose if investment funds are diverted to 
lower disclosing firms. As developed above, the lower disclosing firms pose greater risk, but 
their greater risk will not prevent them from attracting capital if investors perceive the reward 
of accurately picking such class issuer.  And, the lower disclosing firms' managers also face a 
reduced likelihood of being disciplined by the market for control.
133
 Each effect interferes 
with the regulators' quest to enhance allocational efficiency in their market. 
 
 1.2.2 Regulating Unlawful Conduct 
 Further complicating the picture of the purpose of securities regulation are those who 
argue that the disclosure requirements of the securities acts are also intended to deter 
undesirable conduct. Commentators describing the origins of the disclosure requirements of 
the securities laws and rules frequently quote the American supreme court justice Louis 
Brandeis, that "[s]unlight is... the best of disinfectants."
134
According to Brandeis, if brokers' 
fees and commissions are unreasonable, investors will refuse to invest with them and the 
brokers will change their policies.
135
 
 The securities regulator's play two roles in deterring fraudulent offerings: ex ante 
through mandating disclosures that makes it impractical for these offerings to take place, and 
ex post by enforcing antifraud provisions that deter others from engaging in fraudulent 
securities offerings.
136
 Embracing dual reporting standards would not adversely impact the 
securities regulator's role of deterring fraudulent offerings through its enforcement of 
applicable antifraud provisions. It would seem that the sanctions to be applied would be those 
of the host country so one could expect that the sting of the enforcement efforts would not be 
diminished. However, on closer analysis, deterrence will be affected to the extent the 
principles-based approach of IFRS has the effect of making violations more difficult for 
regulators to both detect and prosecute successfully. Indeed, those who call for principles-
based regulation do so with an equally forceful call that regulation should be prudential, that 
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is, not enforcement oriented.
137
 Consequently, any substantive ambiguity or weaknesses in 
IFRS will carry forward to the enforcement actions by the host regulators and will weaken 
the deterrent effects of its enforcement actions. As a consequence, fraud will occur with 
greater frequency if issuers can opt for weaker disclosure standards so that the host country is 
hobbled in deterring the occurrence of fraud because the selected regime's laws provide 
weaker enforcement procedures and powers than do the host country's laws. 
 Moreover, the assumption that offerings will be priced efficiently does not protect 
investors from fraudulent offerings. This pricing assumption assumes disclosure of enough 
information so that investors can appropriately discount the purchased security by the 
disclosure risks it presents. Fraudulently offered securities by definition will be 
indistinguishable from other securities, except that securities opting for more rigorous 
disclosure regimes pose a lower risk of fraud than those securities choosing a less rigorous 
disclosure regime. To be sure, investors can be expected to impound in their pricing 
decisions the average risk of fraud for all securities. Such an averaging, however, is a tricky, 
and most likely indeterminate, calculation. Theoretically, investors should divide securities 
according to the disclosure regime each has opted to use and discount each security within 
the group by the average risk of fraud posed by all securities in that group. So viewed, this 
risk is systematic so that it cannot be diversified away; the larger and more diverse one's 
portfolio, the closer the portfolio's overall risk of holding fraudulent offering will be to the 
risk of fraud in the market as a whole. 
 The significance of the risk of a fraudulent offering not being a diversifiable risk is 
that when the well-diversified investor has the misfortune (statistically predictable though it 
is) to hold a fraudulently offered security that becomes worthless, or nearly so, the investor's 
loss is not recouped from the other securities in the investor's portfolio. Each of the 
remaining securities remain subject to the disclosure risks that were embedded in them when 
the investor acquired them and those disclosure risks will cause them to carry the same 
discount for their respective disclosure risks when resold by the investor. That is, the result of 
holding a diversified portfolio is not like squeezing a balloon, where pressure at one spot 
causes an equal expansion at another location.  
 This merely reflects the well-recognised principle that the presence of fraudulent 
offerings that cannot be detected ex ante through prevailing disclosure procedures lowers the 
value of all offerings. At the same time, the risk being systematic does lead to all investors 
expecting compensation for bearing this risk; thus, the expected return for investors is greater 
than if this risk were not present. Stated differently, much like the rising tide that lifts all 
boats, fraudulent offerings that cannot be identified ex ante raise the cost of capital for all 
issuers. This increases the cost of capital for all issuing companies; but when one considers 
that companies that raise capital by issuing securities compete with other investor 
opportunities that do not raise funds in securities markets and that involve no risk of 
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 The securities regulator seeking to prevent fraudulent securities offerings ex ante in a 
multiple disclosure standards approach faces a very circumscribed agenda. Powerless to 
regulate substantive disclosures of issuers opting to be governed by another disclosure 
regime, the most the regulator can hope to accomplish is to inform investors of the greater 
likelihood of fraud associated with the disclosure regime selected by an issuer. This course is 
similar to that discussed earlier in terms of the host regulator's task in facilitating the efficient 
pricing of securities so that differences in disclosure practices are impounded in the security's 
price. The most that can be accomplished through such generic warnings is to cause each 
purchased security to be priced at an amount that reflects the average risk of fraud among 
securities opting for that particular disclosure regime. But as seen above, even so discounted, 
if the investor experiences a loss from a fraudulent offering, the magnitude of that loss is not 




 1.2.2 The Empowerment of Stockholders Vis-a-Vis Firm Managers 
 Mandatory disclosure rules are also a central component of corporate governance. For 
example, proxy voting for public corporations is conditioned upon the proxy solicitor making 
extensive disclosure of information germane to shareholders exercising informed decisions 
when executing their proxies. Absent such disclosures, shareholders would be left to the 
vagaries of fiduciary-based disclosure duties of directors and controlling stockholders.
140
 
Governmental disclosure requirements overcome these weaknesses so that managers 
approach the proxy season with a healthy understanding that their stewardship in the prior 
fiscal period must be adequately disclosed in their proxy materials. Among the disclosures 
compelled by any meaningful filing requirement are detailed revelations regarding various 
self-dealing transactions between the corporation and its promoters, managers, or controlling 
stockholders, including extensive information regarding executive compensation. The 
securities laws' requirement that the annual financial statements be independently audited is a 
further effort to provide owners with a neutral perspective of management's stewardship. In 
this way, many of the disclosures required to accompany management's proxy solicitation 




 A major objective of periodic disclosure requirements is to overcome the fear that, 
absent such mandated disclosures, financially important information would not be released 
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until the managers had reaped for themselves the financial benefits of that information by 
trading in their company's securities before releasing the information. Without adequate 
disclosure of information bearing on the value of the firm, managers can, through self-
dealing transactions and going private transactions, abuse their insider positions by capturing 
a disproportionate share of any undisclosed future gains of the firm.
142
 To the extent that 
IFRS results in greater price inaccuracy than is the case for issuers complying with GAAP, 
does this necessarily compromise the securities regulator's role in addressing managerial 
opportunism? 
 Allowing issuers to report their financial performance and position in accordance 
with IFRS rather than GAAP would not obviate the extensive disclosures public companies 
must satisfy that are directed specifically toward transactions rife with opportunities for 
managerial opportunism. Not only would registrants still have to provide extensive 
information for various self-dealing transactions, but they would also have to comply with 
requirements for the company to have an independent auditor review the financial statements 
and under the watchful eye of an audit committee staffed with directors free of financial links 
to the firm's management. In combination, these requirements provide an important firewall 
between the firm's assets and temptations managers may have to appropriate to themselves 
any portion of the firm's value that is not otherwise known. Nonetheless, permitting 
managers to opt for disclosure standards understood to provide them with greater discretion 
in the timing of revenues and expenses and the measurement of assets and liabilities provides 
serious temptations for those inclined to act opportunistically. Simply stated, the greater the 
price inaccuracy permitted by a disclosure regime, the greater will be the temptations for 
managers to use the inaccuracies to their advantage.
143
 
 Finally, it is worth mentioning that transnational trading in securities has (since the 
mid-1980s) resulted in the development of international regulatory agencies working at 
achieving common standards in areas such as international equity offerings and international 
capital adequacy. The work of the International Organization of Securities Commissions 
(IOSCO), established in 1986 with its membership comprising official securities markets' 
regulators from developed and developing countries, has been a milestone in achieving the 
above objectives. In this respect, the IOSCO also strives to enhance the international 
integration (and harmonisation) of domestic securities markets, and to be a forum for 
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 This Chapter had indicated the Four Prime Objectives of securities market 
regulations, namely, (i) reducing informational asymmetries, (ii) enhancing the allocation 
function of capital markets, (iii) deterring fraudulent offerings of securities, and (iv) insuring 
that investors are not being taken advantage of by unscrupulous members of management of 
the companies in which they invest.  
 The next three chapters will give a practical overview of the regulatory systems in the 
three sample countries. The companies laws and their historical evolution to deal with 
contemporary issues will be laid out to detail the issue of stakeholders protection. The 
securities laws and financial markets and services acts will detail the issue of capital market 
allocational efficiency. Other relevant regulations will be discussed to develop the issue of 







The Regulatory Environment within the United Kingdom 
 
This Chapter traces the evolution of the legal framework concerning securities 
regulation in the UK and describes the aspects which are compared in later Chapters with the 
legal framework of KSA and the UAE markets.  
 
3.1  Regulation of Securities and Issuers by Law:  Historical Evolution. 
 1 .1 .2  The Companies Act of 1985. 
 The commencement of any discussion regarding the Companies Act of 1985 (the 
"1985 Act") must be prefaced with the observation that, for the most part, most portions of 
the 1985 Act have subsequently been repealed,
145
 and replaced by the Companies Act of 
2006 (the "2006 Act").
146
 The conversation which immediately follows should accordingly 
be read more in the light of being important because of the modifications to it which were 
brought about by the adoption and implementation of the 2006 Act, and relevant as a 
backdrop to how matters later developed in this area of the law, than it should as any sort of 
guide to the manner in which the regulatory scheme in this area formerly applied while the 
1985 Act remained in effect. The 1985 Act, which went into effect on 11 March 1985, was 
by its own terms "An Act to consolidate the greater part of the Companies Acts." 
147
 This 
referred to the fact that prior to the adoption of the 1985 Act; companies domiciled within the 
UK were subject to various other pieces of company legislation that had accumulated on the 
statute books over the years. 
 In light of the fact that the 1985 Act has, for the most part, been superseded by the 
provisions of the 2006 Act, the discussion which follows is structured in the form of an 
illustration which demonstrates what the former provisions of the 1985 Act were, and 
showcases their relative importance or unimportance by comparing and contrasting the 
changes which the 2006 Act brought into existence. The 2006 Act has the distinction of 
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 The discussion which follows will highlight the significant provisions of the former 
1985 Act by elaborating on the individual provisions of the 2006 Act which replaced and 
superseded them. 
 
 3.1.1.1  Changes Effective as of January, 2007 
 In the changes from the prior 1985 Act that came into effect as of January, 2007 
under the new 2006 Act, the following requirements and standards were imposed: 
 First, provisions in the 2006 Act which give effect to then-recent amendments to the 
First Company Law Directive came into force and effect. These changes were in large part 
designed to ensure increased facilities for e-communications with the national registrar of 
companies. Additionally, the following provisions linked to implementation of the 
Transparency Obligations Directive commenced: 
• Provisions on company communications to shareholders and others, which include 
provisions facilitating electronic communication; 
• Provisions concerning a public company's right to investigate who has an interest in 
its shares; 
• And, new Section 463, which sets out a statutory basis of directors' liability to the 
company in relation to the directors' report (including the business review), the 
directors' remuneration report, and any summary financial statement derived from 
such reports. 
Also, all powers to make orders or regulations by statutory instrument commenced 
with effect from 20 January 2007. Further, from 1 January 2007, the 1985 Act was amended 
in order to require the company's name of each company subject to the Act to appear legibly 
within: 
• All of its business letters; 
• All of its notices and other official publications; 
• On all of its Internet websites; 
• All bills of exchange, promissory notes, endorsements, cheques, and orders for 
money or goods purporting to be signed by or on behalf of the company; and 
• All bills of parcels, invoices, receipts, and letters of credit. 
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 In addition, the company's business letters, order forms, and Internet websites now, 
under the new 2006 Act, must include fuller particulars than had been required under the 
prior 1985 Act. More specifically, these additional items of information include: 
• The company's place of registration and the number with which it is registered; 
• The address of its registered office; 
• In the case of an investment company, the fact that it is such a company; and 
• In the case of a limited company exempt from the obligation to use the word 
"limited" as part of its name, the fact that it is a limited company. 
 
 All of these new requirements apply whether the document is in hard copy, 
electronic, or any other form. As can be readily discerned from the foregoing requirements, 
one of the seminal functions of the 2006 Act was to recognise the vast amount of 
transformation that the entire world has undergone due to the unrelenting march of 
technological innovation. Particularly new developments in the area of electronics and, more 
specifically, computerisation on a mass scale, which in turn have radically altered the manner 
in which people of all nations now communicate with one another (using such now-
commonplace mechanisms as commercial and personal e-mail), a breakthrough which, at the 




3.1.1.2.1 Changes Effective as of 6 April 2007 
 In the changes from the prior 1985 Act that came into effect as of 6 April 2007 under 
the new 2006 Act, the following requirements and standards were imposed: 
• New Section 1063 came into effect, which relates to fees payable to the registrar of 
companies; and 
• Section 1281 of the 2006 Act became effective, which amended Part 9 of the 
Enterprise Act 2002
150
 to give the Secretary of State the power to make an order 
enabling public authorities to disclose information to be used in civil proceedings or 
otherwise for the purpose of establishing, enforcing, or defending legal rights. 
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 3.1.1.3   Changes Effective as of 1 October 2007 
 Speaking in general, non-technical terms, these changes as promulgated through the 
mechanism of the 2006 Act effectively implemented two major, significant departures from 
the rules that had governed affected companies under the prior regime of the 1985 Act.  
These two most noteworthy modifications were: 
• For the first time, directors' responsibilities to their companies were specifically 
prescribed by statutory authority, rather than, as had been the prior practice, relying 
merely on English common law.
151
 English common law has ancient historical 
roots.
152
 The 2006 Act represented a hugely significant evolution in the area of 
directors' duties and responsibilities; and 
• Annual general meeting requirements were modified from the 1985 Act for publicly-
traded companies. Further, in recognition of the realities of daily life within the 
confines of small family businesses and closely-held corporations, the 2006 Act 
allows private companies to conduct most of their business without the necessity of 
holding a general meeting. 
 Viewed from a more technical, legalistic vantage point, the changes that became 




 3.1.1.4    Changes Effective as of 6 April 2008 
 In the changes from the prior 1985 Act that came into effect as of 6 April 2008 under 
the new 2006 Act, the following requirements and standards were either newly-imposed, or 
modified from what had been the requirements under the former 1985 Act. As in the 
foregoing discussion concerning changes that became effective as of 1 October 2007, the 
alterations implemented effective 6 April 2008 as a result of the enactment of the 2006 Act 
can be broken down into two separate categories, namely, substantively significant changes, 
and changes which are only of technical significance.
154
 But in the case of the 6 April 2008 
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 The Common law was established by the Normans and developed in the territories of Great Britain. 
Common law, also known as case law or precedent, is law developed by judges through decisions of courts and 
similar tribunals, as opposed to Civil (Codified/Continental) Law as established by statutes adopted through the 
legislative/parliamentary process and/or regulations issued by the executive branch on the basis of the 
parliamentary statutes. It is thus a 'judge-made' law. Generally, see Powel, E. J. & Mitchell, S. M. (2007) The 
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 In the late 800s, Alfred the Great assembled the Doom Book, which collected the existing laws of Kent, 
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dating back as far as the fifth century. Later English common law is traceable to this initial undertaking of some 
twelve hundred years ago. 
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 The above changes in the Companies Act of 2006 were related to the following parts: (9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 
29, 30 & 32).  
154
 This is not to necessarily say that all changes labeled in the discussion herein as being merely "technical" or 
"non-substantive" could not be of major importance given a particular company's individualised set of 
circumstances or transactions. New Part 27 of the 2006 Act, for example, which became effective 6 April 2008, 
deals with mergers and divisions of publicly-traded companies. Obviously, to a public company in the process 
of merging, or in the process of being divided through a "spin-off," "split-off," "split-up," or other form of a 
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changes, even those which can fairly be categorised as "substantive" are of relatively little 
import. On this front – the substantively significant changes -- the 6 April 2008 modifications 
introduced a total of three. These were: 
• Shareholders may, for the first time, agree to a limitation on the company's auditor's 
liability in connection with such auditor's services with respect to the certification of 
the company's accounts. Needless to say, as soon as this provision came into 
operation, virtually every accounting firm in the UK immediately tacked on an 
amendment to its standard engagement letter, and sought shareholder approval of the 
limitation on liability that it contained at the earliest opportunity.
155
 
• The period for filing accounts was reduced from the previous ten months down to 
nine months; and 
• The position of Company Secretary became an optional appointment, whereas 
previously, it had been a mandatory position. 
 The nature of these changes, and the ability to call them "substantive," merely 
highlights the fact that the balance of the changes which became effective as of 6 April 2008 




 3.1.1.5   Changes Effective as of 1 October 2009 
 Finally, in the changes from the prior 1985 Act that came into effect as of 1 October 
2009 under the new 2006 Act, there were both key, substantively important modifications 
from the prior law as well as new requirements and standards of a technical nature. The key, 
or substantive, changes effective 1 October 2009 – that can more properly be categorised into 
the "technical" column- included the following: 
• An easier, much more "user-friendly" approach to the formation and administration of 
new companies. 
• The concept of authorised share capital was abolished. 
• Company directors were allowed to file a "service address" in lieu of their personal 
home address with the company regulatory authority. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
corporate division transaction, new Part 27 of the 2006 Act could prove to be both highly relevant as well as 
potentially highly significant. Those transactions that are discussed herein as falling into the category of 
"substantive" are so articulated because they fall into one or both of the following descriptions: They are 
applicable to every company, irrespective of circumstances, governed by the new 2006 Act, and/or they 
represent a departure from prior law as it had been codified under the 1985 Act. 
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 In practice shareholders declined to give approval and this was a very contentious step introduced through 
the back door after very heavy lobbying by auditors. There has subsequently been a major revision at the 
European level of the regulation of auditors in which liability did not feature because the backdrop was more 
hostile to them, namely their failure to spot and react to the forces that led to the banking crisis. 
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 Some examples of such technical changes included the following part (21) Company secretaries, (21) 
Accounts and reports, (23) Company audits, and (12) Private and public companies. 
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• A right to challenge company names was set out; and 
• A company is now, for the first time, permitted to lend financial assistance in 
connection with the purchase and acquisition of its own shares. 
 In practical terms, the 1985 Act has, in nearly every respect, been wiped out from the 
UK legal history, since virtually all of its provisions have been effectively amended and 
superseded by the terms of the 2006 Act. The adoption by Parliament of the 2006 Act 
represented recognition by the framers of that legislation that since the time of promulgation 
of the 1985 Act, the whole world had changed, and changed drastically, and an effort to bring 
modern UK company law into conformity with the realities of this newly-changed, and 
globalised economy. 
 
 2.1.1 Financial Services Act of 1986. 
 As in the case of the 1985 Act, the Financial Services Act of 1986 (the "1986 Act") is 
now largely of only historic interest, since it was extensively amended, and effectively 
superseded, by later legislation.
157
 Nevertheless, a brief discussion of the 1986 Act should be 
useful in order to put later developments in market regulation into proper background 
context. 
 The 1986 Act concerned the regulation of investment markets. The objectives of the 
Act were to regulate the conduct of the business of investment, as well as to increase 
customer confidence as well as the level of competition within these markets. The 1986 Act 
used a combination of governmental regulation combined together with self-regulation by 
various "players" within the investment industry. Among other things, the 1986 Act 
established an investor compensation fund for aggrieved investors who had lost money in the 
markets as a consequence of misfeasance or malfeasance on the part of certain other market 
participants.  It also established the Securities and Investments Board (the "SIB")
158
for the 
purpose of regulating all investment markets (except Lloyds of London) through the 
mechanism of self-regulatory organisations (SROs).
159
 
 The 1986 Act was, at the time of its adoption, referred to by many within the 
investment industry and the ancillary service industries which acted to assist and advise this 
industry (e.g., law firms and accounting firms) as an "emasculated Gower," or sometimes as 
"Gower Lite." The reasons underlying these characterisations referred to the fact that 
Professor LCB Gower
160
 had been asked to produce a report on financial regulations, 
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 From midnight of 30 November 2001, the date commonly known within the UK investment industry as 'N2', 
the Financial Services Authority ("FSA") adopted the full powers given to it by the passing of the Financial 
Services and Markets Act of 2000 ("FSMA"). 
158
 The SIB was subsequently replaced by the Financial Services Authority. 
159
 Some of  the SROs that were established under the 1986 Act included: the Securities and Futures Authority 
(SFA); and the Investment Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO). 
160
 Cassel Professor of Commercial Law at the University of London and sometime visiting Professor at 
Harvard University. He is best known for his work in UK company law, where he authored the leading treatise, 
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followed by a draft bill. He tended to personally favor a strict, enhanced regulatory scheme 
with a substantial role for government far in excess of the role accorded SROs. The Margaret 
Thatcher government, in power at the time adoption of the 1986 Act was under active 
consideration, became frustrated with the extended debate that Professor Gower's proposals 
had engendered, and actively advocated in favor of an alternative, second proposed Act, the 
contents of which adopted many of Professor Gower's ideas, but which placed substantially 
more emphasis on self-regulation over outright governmental intervention.
161
 Although the 
degree to which trans-Atlantic political winds may have had some effect on the way the 1986 
Act ultimately favored self-regulation over regulatory intervention by UK governmental 
authorities is debatable, it has been observed by at least one commentator that the relatively 
light emphasis on government regulation vis-à-vis industry self-regulation – an indisputable 
fact when the 1986 Act is considered on the whole – this approach to regulation did in fact 
follow a similar trend that was simultaneously taking place in America under the 




 3.1.3 Financial Services and Markets Act of 2000 (FSMA).
163
 
 As previously indicated, the 1986 Act was replaced and superseded by the later 
adoption of the FSMA, which received Royal Assent on 14 June 2000, following which 
FSMA was brought into force at midnight on 30 November 2001, commonly known at the 
time as N2.
164
 As in the case of the prior discussions relating to the 1985 Act and the 1986 
Act, it is important to note at the outset that the discourse which follows has now become 
largely academic, and is principally of interest only for its historical value as well as for the 
background perspective that it lends for the purpose of analysing later, superseding 
legislative developments. More particularly, FSMA has now been largely superseded and 
replaced by the newly-minted provisions of the Financial Services Act of 2012 (the "2012 
Act"), most of the effective provisions of which only recently came into effect and operation 
as of 1 April 2013. 
 The express purpose of the FSMA was to provide a statutory framework within which 
a single governmental regulatory authority for the financial services industry, the FSA, would 
operate. It provided the FSA with a full range of statutory powers, and created the Financial 
Services and Markets Tribunal (FSMT). The FSMA also established the framework for the 
existence of a single ombudsman, as well as compensation programs to provide further 
protection for aggrieved consumers who, through the fault of one or more other market 
participants, had suffered investment losses. 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
now taken over by Davies, P. & Worthington, S. (eds.) (2008) Gower and Davies: Principles of Modern 
Company Law. 8th Ed. United Kingdom: Sweet & Maxwell. 
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 Rider, B., Chaikin, D. & Abrams, C. (1987) Guide to the Financial Service Act 1986. United Kingdom: 
Commerce Clearing House. 
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 Krugman, P. (2009) Reagan Did It. New York Times. 31 May 2009. [Online] available from: 
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 Legislation.gov.uk (2000) Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. [Online] available from: 
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 Under the FSMA, the jurisdiction of the FSA was made to extend to various and 
wide-ranging aspects of the businesses of investment, banking, insurance, and even a micro-
issue as small as the manner in which pensions are to be divided in cases involving marital 
dissolution. Thus, in comparison with the regulatory schemes that had preceded it, the 
adoption of FSMA created a new primary regulator – FSA – with a substantially enhanced 
reach in terms of the areas of business over which it was conferred jurisdiction.
165
 
 The goals and objectives of the FSA as specified under FSMA have already been 
previously discussed. The effect of FSMA has been to establish the FSA as a sort of "super-
regulator," intended to completely replace the previously-established SROs (which were each 
abolished as of the effective date of FSMA).  Further, FSMA replaced the former two-tier 
regulatory scheme – which consisted of some governmental regulation, mixed in with some 
industry self-regulation – as established under the 1986 Act with a single, integrated regime 
together with a single regulator, namely, the FSA. During its first phase of implementation, 
FSMA reproduced and updated the then-existing rulebook for regulation, and during the 
subsequent second phase, the agency introduced a completely new set of regulatory features. 
 FSMA further created the market abuse administration that applied to members of the 
public as well as to regulated individuals.  In addition to establishing the FSMT, the FSA also 
created a financial promotion framework under which prohibitions on persons from 
communicating the details of certain financial activities were imposed. Also under FSMA, 
the FSA appointed individuals within regulated firms to be registered with the FSA as 
"approved persons." Unlike under the previously-existing regulatory scheme that had been in 
place under the 1986 Act, FSMA replaced and updated that approach to provide that 
professional firms that carry on mainstream financial activity would be regulated directly by 
the FSA (rather than by the previously-existing SROs). "Mainstream financial activity" was 
defined to include direct advice to clients on the choice of investment products, discretionary 




 For regulated activity under the FSMA, a professional firm wishing to provide 
mainstream financial services was required to achieve authorisation from the FSA.  
Subsequent to its receipt of such authorisation, the firm would be regulated by the FSA and 
would be required to comply with the FSA's Handbook of Rules and Guidance. FSMA for 
the first time introduced the concept of Regulated Activities Orders (RAOs). An RAO 
contained a list of regulated activities, and was promulgated using guidance provided by the 
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 The Bank of England Act 1998 transferred its responsibilities for supervising the banking system to the FSA. 
See Deutche, B. (2006) Securities Market Regulation: International Approaches. Monthly Report of the 
Deutsche Bundesbank. Volume 58. Issue 1. 44. 
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 If a professional firm did not conduct mainstream financial activity they could, under Section 327 of FSMA, 
be designated an exempt professional firm and could then be supervised and regulated by a designated 
professional body (DPB) rather than by the FSA. However, they were required to comply with their appropriate, 
applicable DPB restricted activities rules, the exemptions within the regulated activities order, and the non-
exempt activities order as promulgated by HM Treasury. 
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definitive list of regulated activities that was contained in the Regulated Activities Order
167
 
as specified by the HM Treasury.
168
 
 Within the RAO there were a number of exclusions and activities carried on within 
the foregoing parameters that were not considered to be regulated activity.  Thus, exempt 
professional firms, as with other firms that were not authorised, were able to carry on 
business within the terms of the exclusions without breaching the general prohibition. Under 
Section 19 of the FSMA, there existed a general prohibition providing that no person could 
carry on a regulated activity within the UK, or purport to do so, unless he was either an 
"authorised person" or an "exempt person." 
169
 
 Under Section 24(1) of the FSMA, it constituted a criminal offence for a person to 
describe himself or herself as an authorised person if he was in point of fact not such a 
person. The disclosure rules thus required an exempt professional firm to avoid any 
representation to its clients that it was authorised by the FSA or that the regulatory protection 
offered by the FSMA would apply. 
 
2.2 The New Frontier: The Financial Services Act of 2012.
170
 
 2.1.1 The Reasons for Adoption of the 2012 Act and the UK Shift from  
  "Integrated" to "Twin Peaks" system. 
 The Financial Services Act of 2012 (the "2012 Act") is one of the most significant, 
far-reaching items of securities regulatory legislation to ever successfully pass through the 
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 As the worst global recession since the Great Depression of the 1930s, which 
officially kicked off in December, 2007 and the effects of which are still being acutely felt 
even today throughout many parts of the world, brought along with it many clarion calls for 
reform:  Reform of banks, many of which had to be bailed out by their host governments at 
vast expense to the taxpayer; reform of society in general, in what began in the United States 
as the "Occupy Wall Street" movement and then proceeded to spread into many other 
sectors; reform of political systems, as in the "Arab Spring" that saw successful revolts 
against national governments in Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt, along with the outbreak of civil 
war within Syria; and finally, reform within the securities markets, which had of late featured 
literally dozens of scandals, from the Barnard Madoff Ponzi scheme and the meltdown of 
Enron Corporation within the United States; to the PPI (payment protection insurance), 
LIBOR rigging,
172
 Standard Chartered breach of US sanctions against Iran, HSBC's 
conviction for money laundering in Mexico, and scandals around sales of interest rate 
hedging products by several UK banks. 
 Of the many calls for reform, one that was heard loud and clear by the UK Parliament 
was for reorganisation of the way in which the UK securities markets are regulated – despite 
the fact that the legislation that had originally founded the FSA was barely a dozen years old. 
Therefore, this mood was picked up after the 2010 election by the new coalition government, 
so that in June 2010, the Treasury announced that the FSA will be divided and its activities 
assumed by the two new authorities: 
a) The Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA),
173
 is an operationally independent 
subsidiary of the Bank of England (the Bank), responsible for the micro-prudential 
regulation of banks, insurers and other prudentially significant firms. 
b) The Financial Conduct Authority (FCA),
174
 the current FSA legal entity renamed, is 
responsible for regulating conduct in retail, as well as wholesale financial markets, 
and the infrastructure that supports those markets. The FCA has responsibility for the 
prudential regulation of firms that do not fall under the PRA's scope.  
C) The government has also established the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)
175
 which 
will be a committee of the Bank of England. The FCP's responsibilities are to deliver 
systemic financial stability. 
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 This clear shift from an integrated regulatory regime to a "Twin Peaks" approach, 
similar to that practiced in the Netherlands and Australia, is a direct result of the difficulties 
faced by the UK financial markets as a result of the financial crisis. The UK's integrated 
"tripartite" regulatory approach, namely; the BOE, the FSA and the Treasury were 
collectively responsible for the financial stability of the UK capital markets and this system 
apparently failed to effectively identify the issues that were building in the financial system 
as well as to take steps to mitigate these issues.
176
 
 These failures occurred because the tripartite system vis-à-vis the "Twin Peaks" 
approach places responsibility for all financial regulation in the hands of a single financial 
regulator, in this case the FSA. The FSA was not able to effectively deal with all matters 
ranging from safety of the largest investment banks to the customer practices of the small 
financial advisers.
177
 Similarly, the BOE did not have the tools or levers to carry out its role 
effectively as primary provider of financial stability, whilst the UK Treasury has overall 
responsibility for maintaining the legal and institutional framework but empowered with no 




 The shift to Twin Peaks therefore necessitated a strong focus on two key areas, 
prudential regulation and conduct-of-business/consumer protection and markets regulation. 
There is now a dedicated focus on macro-prudential oversight to ensure that any future risks 
developing across the financial system are quickly identified and responded to. That is why 
the UK Government has established the FPC whose role is to maintain financial stability. 
Twin Peaks allows the macro-prudential regulation of the financial system to be coordinated 
with the prudential regulation of individual firms. It is for this reason the UK Government 
transferred operational responsibility for prudential regulation from the FSA (now the FCA) 
to a new subsidiary of the Bank of England called the PRA which is responsible for all 
prudential regulation of all deposit-taking institutions, insurers and investment banks in the 
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UK. The utility of the Twin Peaks system is evident in that by placing firm specific 
prudential regulation under the BOE, the government has brought together responsibility for 
both micro and macro prudential regulation under one roof. This means that regulatory 
powers will be certain and there will be no gaps in the system. 
 Meanwhile, regulation of conduct of business within the financial system which 
includes the conduct of firms to their retail customers falls under the remit of the FCA which, 
as stated earlier plays a vital role in enhancing consumer confidence in the UK's financial 
systems whilst simultaneously securing consumer protection. The FCA is empowered to 
regulate conduct-of-business for all financial firms including prudentially significant firms, 
deposit takers, insurance, investment firms and other financial providers. 
 The advantages of the Twin Peaks approach is really based upon the principle of 
regulation by objective and deals with the separation of regulatory functions between two 
regulators; namely the PRA and the FCA. One regulator performs the safety and financial 
stability supervision function whilst the other focuses on conduct-of-business. The Twin 
Peaks Approach may also be the best means of ensuring that issues of transparency, market 
integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority. The approach is designed to 
ensure that sales practice protections apply uniformly across all financial products, regardless 




 2.2. .1  The Scope and Breadth of the 2012 Act. 
 The 2012 Act, which came into force on 1 April 2013, contains the UK government's 
reforms of the UK financial services regulatory structure and creates a new regulatory 
framework for the supervision and management of the UK's banking and financial services 
industry. The Act gives the Bank of England macro-prudential responsibility for oversight of 
the financial system and day-to-day prudential supervision of financial services firms 
managing significant balance-sheet risk. Three new bodies have been formed under the Act: 
the FPC, the PRA and the FCA. While the Act mainly contains the core provisions for the 
UK government's structural reforms and will therefore make extensive changes to Financial 
Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA), as well as to the Bank of England Act 1998 and the 
Banking Act 2009, it also includes freestanding provisions in Part 3 ('mutual societies'), Part 
4 ('collaboration between Treasury and Bank of England, FCA or PRA'), Part 5 ('inquiries 
and investigations'), Part 6 ('investigation of complaints against regulators') and Part 7 
('offences relating to financial services'). 
 The strategic objective differs from the original proposed objective in the draft 
Financial Services Bill (the "Bill"), which was expressed as being the protection and 
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enhancement of confidence in the UK financial system.
180
 The "relevant markets" are defined 
as: 
• The financial markets (although this term itself is not defined in the 2012 Act); 
• Markets for regulated financial services (as defined in a new Section 1(H)(2) of 
FSMA); and 
• The markets for services that are provided by unauthorised persons in carrying on 
regulated activities without contravening the general prohibition. 
 
 The FCA has three operational objectives: 
• To secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (the consumer protection 
objective) (new Section 1C, FSMA(; 
• To protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system (the integrity 
objective) (new Section 1D, FSMA); and 
• To promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets for 
regulated financial services and services provided by recognised investment 
exchanges in carrying on certain regulated activities (the competition objective) (new 
Section 1E, FSMA). 
 
 Matters to which the FCA must have regard when considering the consumer 
protection objective include factors such as the differing expectations that consumers may 
have in relation to different kinds of investment or other transactions. The competition 
objective replaces the third objective set out in the Bill, which was the promotion of 
efficiency and choice in the market for certain types of services (referred to then as the 
"efficiency and choice objective"). Following a recommendation in the Independent 
Commission on Banking's final report,
181
 the UK Government decided to recast the 
efficiency and choice objective in terms of promoting effective competition in the interests of 
consumers. 
 Separate from the competition objective, the FCA is also be obliged to discharge its 
general functions in a way that promotes competition in the interests of consumers (new 
Section 1B(4), FSMA). While this general obligation was included in the Bill, the final 
provision in the Act includes additional wording requiring the promotion of competition in 
"the interests of the consumer."
182
 The scope of the FCA's activities includes: 
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 Independent Commission on Banking (2011) Final Report Recommendations. [Online] available from: 
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• Conduct of business regulation for all firms in both retail and wholesale markets. The 
FCA will be responsible for the conduct of business regulation of all regulated firms, 
including PRA-authorised firms and firms "passporting" their way into the UK. 
• Acting as the lead regulator for those firms currently regulated by the FSA other than 
PRA-authorised firms, including in respect of prudential supervision. The Act refers 
to these firms as FCA-authorised firms. 
• The FCA has inherited the former FSA's existing roles relating to markets regulation 
under Part XVIII of FSMA, with the exception of the FSA's current responsibilities 
for settlement systems and recognised clearing houses ("RCHs"), which the FSA will 
transfer to the Bank of England. Institutions that provide both exchange services and 
central counterparty clearing services are regulated by the BOE with respect to their 
activities as RCHs and by the FCA as RIEs. 
• The FCA has inherited the former FSA's responsibilities for the regulatory oversight 
of client assets and countering financial crime. 
• The FCA has taken on most of the former FSA's market regulatory functions, 
including the FSA's acting as the UK Listing Authority ("UKLA"). 
• The FCA will also inherit the FSA's existing responsibilities for certain institutions 
operating outside the FSMA regulatory perimeter, including: 
-  E-money firms; 
-    Payment service providers; and 
-    Mutual societies. 
 
 In its October, 2012 paper entitled "Journey to the FCA,"
183
 the FSA stated that the 
FCA will be the conduct supervisor for approximately 26,000 firms across all industry 
sectors and the prudential supervisor for approximately 23,000 firms not regulated by the 
PRA. Following the September 2012 Wheatley Report
184
 into the regulation of the London 
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Inter-Bank Offered Rate (LIBOR), the government decided to amend the Bill to bring certain 
activities relating to the setting of benchmarks within the regulatory scope of FSMA, and 
these are set out in Section 7 of the Act. The HM Treasury intends to amend the FSMA 
(Regulated Activities) Order 2001 (SI 2001/544) ("RAO") to create two new activities: 




 The FCA is not responsible for:
186
 
• Preventing all conduct or prudential failure; 
• Handling individual complaints on financial services (this will remain the 
responsibility of the Financial Ombudsman Service (FOS); 
• Acting as an economic or price regulator, such as the Office of Communications 
(Ofcom) or other utility regulators in the sense of prescribing returns for financial 
products or services; however, in performing its new competition role, it will be 
interested in prices because prices and margins are key indicators of whether a market 
is competitive; 
• Intervening in areas where it does not have a statutory responsibility; the FCA does 
not intend to provide kite-marking or product approval for financial services products, 
although it will have additional product intervention powers; or 
• Setting social policy, which will be a matter for the government, rather than the FCA. 
 
 2.2.3 Other Amendments to FSMA by the 2012 Act. 
 In addition to the foregoing major regulatory overhauls, other key amendments to the 
FSMA brought about under the 2012 Act include each of the following:
187
 
• As well as integrating the UKLA into the new FCA, applying the general FCA 
objectives to the listing regime; 
• Extending the powers of the FCA to impose sanctions on sponsors for breaches of 
UKLA rules and requirements imposed on sponsors (Section 18 of the Act). This will 
include the ability to impose financial penalties and to suspend a person's approval as 
a sponsor or restrict their activities; such sanctions will be subject to the normal 
enforcement and appeal mechanisms in FSMA; 
• Extending the limitation period for taking action for breaches of Part 6 of FSMA 
(relating to listings) from two to three years (Section 20 of the Act); 
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• Giving the FCA power to regulate primary information providers (PIPs) 
(organisations which channel information from issuers to the UKLA and announce 
information to the market) (Section 19 of the Act); the Act amends the FSMA to give 
the UKLA powers in relation to PIPs' continuing obligations, their supervision and to 
impose sanctions on them; 
• Giving the FCA power to direct a firm to withdraw a financial promotion that the 
FCA considers is likely to breach its rules concerning financial promotion, subject to 
certain safeguards; 
• Allowing the FCA to discontinue or suspend a listing at the request of an issuer 
without following the warning notice and decision notice procedure (Section 17); the 
UK government regards the warning notice and decision notice requirements as 
onerous and unnecessary when the FCA is agreeing to an issuer's request; and 
• Giving the FCA power to disclose the fact that a warning notice has been issued in 
relation to proposed disciplinary action against a firm or individual. 
 
 The UK Government believes that credible and effective enforcement action should 
remain a key focus for the FCA. It therefore expects the FCA to continue the former FSA's 
existing credible deterrence policy. The UK government's view is that the existing 
arrangements in FSMA relating to enforcement action have worked well to date, and 
accordingly the Act does not make significant amendments to those arrangements (other than 
the change relating to the publication of information about warning notices). In its October, 
2012 paper, "Journey to the FCA," 
188
 the FSA confirmed that the FCA would retain the 
FSA's existing Regulatory Decisions Committee (RDC), which makes decisions on contested 
enforcement and certain supervisory and authorisation matters on behalf of the FSA. The 
FCA will retain the FSA's current allocation of decision making between the RDC and senior 
executive, and any decision to change the current procedures will be a matter for the future 
FCA Board following a public consultation. 
 In her speech, Tracey McDermott, the director of the FSA's Enforcement and 
Financial Crime Division, emphasised that the FCA will continue the FSA's policy of 
credible deterrence and also stated that the approach of the FCA's enforcement division 
would include the following:
189
 
• Focusing increasingly on those in senior management that fail to recognise and 
manage their firms' risks, that fail to control the way that products are sold and that 
fail to ensure that consumers' interests are prioritised when designing financial 
products. 
• Working in a more integrated way with supervisors and other FCA colleagues on 
thematic and firm-specific work. 
                                                          
188
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• Using existing tools such as own initiative variations of permission ("OIVoPs") 
190
 
more readily as well as new tools, such as product intervention powers. 
• Having a low tolerance for repeat offenders. The FCA will be more ready to take 





 The Act also contains a series of miscellaneous legislative changes, including 
provision that will enable the UK government to transfer consumer credit regulation to the 
FCA.
192
 The 2012 Act went into formal force and effect on 1 April 2013. It will be 
implemented through a panoply of enabling secondary legislation, a process that is now on-
going and which will undoubtedly continue to remain on-going for quite some time. 
 
2.2 Conclusion 
 Up until the promulgation of the 2012 Act, securities regulation within the UK had 
been relatively stable in terms of the established statutory scheme, regulations, and rules. 
Things had been that way for about a dozen years, since the adoption of FSMA back in 2000. 
But the global events over the past five years on many fronts – but particularly political and 
economic – have shaken up many institutions. Among the casualties of this sea-change in the 
way the world works has been the UK's once-entrenched system for the regulation of all-
things-securities, from securities markets, to securities underwriters, to securities dealers, to 
virtually all other market participants. It cannot yet be said with certainty to what exact extent 
regulation in each of these areas will change over the coming months and years: The pivotal 
2012 Act, that has unveil itself in terms of the many interpretations and applications to which 
it will eventually become subject.  
 Having laid the foundation of the securities and market as the benchmark of this 
thesis; the next two chapters will draw similar discussion of the relevant laws in both the 
KSA and the UAE. The capital market act, the securities and issuers regulations, market 
conduct and corporate governance rules will be used for the KSA case.  
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The Regulatory Environment within the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
 
This Chapter elaborates on the evolution of the institutional structure responsible for 
the regulation of securities markets in KSA as well as highlights the key aspects of its listing, 
disclosure, market conduct and corporate governance rules. 
 
2.1 Structure of Securities Markets in KSA 
 2.1.1 Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority (SAMA)
193
 
 SAMA is the Central Bank of the KSA and was established in 1952. It has been 
entrusted with performing many functions pursuant to several laws and regulations. The most 
important functions include: dealing with the banking affairs of the Government; minting and 
printing the national currency (the Saudi Riyal); managing the Kingdom's foreign exchange 
reserves; managing the monetary policy for maintaining the stability of prices and exchange 
rate; promoting the growth of the financial system and ensuring its soundness; supervising 
commercial banks and exchange dealers; supervising cooperative insurance companies and 
the self-employment professions relating to the insurance activity and finally supervising 
finance companies. Insurance and pensions also fall under the remit of SAMA. The 2003 
Law and 2004 Implementing Regulations provide broad powers and SAMA has established 
an effective supervisory function. Five important functional regulations (including risk 
management, reinsurance, and market conduct) have been issued since 2008.
194
 
 Since SAMA is the legislative body responsible for exercising regulatory and 
supervisory control over banks and money exchangers, issuing general rules and overseeing 
that all banks and money exchangers comply with and effectively implement the rules and 
regulations of KSA,
195
 it regards the adoption and implementation by all banks and money 
exchangers of effective policies, procedures and controls for the deterrence and prevention of 
money laundering, terrorist financing and other financial crimes as very vital. SAMA expects 
all banks and money exchangers and their employees to conduct business in accordance with 
these rules and all applicable laws by applying the highest ethical standards. 
 SAMA has a duty not only to ensure banks and money exchangers maintain high 
KYC standards to protect their own safety and soundness but also to protect the integrity of 
their national banking system. SAMA duties include monitoring that banks and money 
exchangers are applying sound KYC procedures and are sustaining ethical and professional 
                                                          
193
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standards on a continuous basis and ensuring that appropriate internal controls are in place 
and banks and money exchangers are in compliance with supervisory and regulatory 
requirements. SAMA examination will include review of banks and money exchanger's 
policies and procedures, customer files including sampling of some accounts, documentation 
related to accounts maintained and the analysis made to detect unusual or suspicious 
transactions including taking appropriate action against banks or money exchangers and their 





 2.1.2 The Capital Market Authority (CMA)
197
 
 KSA Capital Market has been in operation for many years with substantial trading 
since 1970 and is considered to be the largest in the GCC and certainly the deepest in terms 
of liquidity and volume.
198
 It was regulated by a ministerial committee comprising Ministry 
of Finance (MOF), Ministry of Commerce and Industry (MOCI), and the Saudi Arabian 
Monetary Authority (SAMA) but this changed when the Capital Market Law (CML) came 
into effect on February 25, 2004 and the CMA was established.
199
 The establishment of the 
CMA has contributed to the immense growth of KSA equity capital markets over the last 
decade. Some of the largest listed companies in the Middle East are on the Saudi Tadawul,
200
 




 The CMA is the only entity responsible for administering the primary securities law 
of KSA. The CMA was given rule-making authority and enforcement powers necessary to 
fulfill its objectives (the protection of investors, reduction of systemic risk, and the fairness, 
efficiency, and transparency of the capital market). The CMA's regulatory responsibilities are 
broad and include offers and issuance of securities, listing, trading and settlement on 
Tadawul, disclosure by issuers and governance, licensing, supervision and enforcement of its 
regulations, credit rating agencies, as well as the establishment, offering and management of 
funds including any OTC activity. The CMA also possesses both civil and criminal authority 
and may seek civil sanctions ranging from warnings to monetary penalties, property seizure, 
and license suspension or revocation.   
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 Under CML, the CMA has also general and broad powers for inspection and 
investigation and conducts full electronic surveillance of the market. An inspection program 
adopting a cycle of two to three years (risk and compliance-based) is conducted via on-site 
inspections and review of compliance with specific regulations and/or submits false or 
misleading information in any document filed with the CMA. In some cases, the period of 
this cycle may extend to four or five years depending on the situation and the reputation of 
the company in the market. 
 There are also general sanctions stipulated in the regulations which can be applied to 
any person who engages in or is about to engage in acts or practices that constitute a 
violation of the CML or its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
202
 The range of such 
sanctions includes bringing enforcement action seeking civil and criminal penalties and right 
to indemnity; issuing a warning to the concerned person or issuing a cease and/or desist 
order; requiring the person to take necessary steps to avert the violation; requiring the 
violator to pay to the CMA the gains realised as a consequence of the violation; suspending 
the trading in the security; barring the violator from acting as a broker, portfolio manager or 
investment adviser; issuing a travel ban and CMA has finally disciplinary action, revocation 
or suspension of licensing in the most extreme cases. The final word on a pending case 
relating to violations rests with the CMA and appeals committee supervised by it. 
 The CML also establishes standards of conduct designed to ensure the integrity and 
professionalism of the staff. Its employees are prohibited from engaging in any other job or 
profession and from providing advice to any company or private institution. On accepting 
employment, the CMA staff must disclose their securities holdings and the securities 
holdings of their relatives. Trading on Tadawul is strictly prohibited unless prior written 
confirmation and approval is given by the Authority. Any execution of trades must be 
conducted within a specified timeframe and duration. The CMA also has adopted rules of 
professional conduct which incorporates relevant provisions of the CML and establishes 
additional prohibitions and requirements designed to avoid conflicts of interest, protect 
confidentiality and personal information and assure the appropriate use of information.
203
 
 The CML defines the duties and powers of the CMA, Tadawul and the Securities 
Depositary Center. It also initiated special committees to deal with breaches of provisions 
and rules of its law. These committees are the Committee for the Resolution of Securities 
Disputes (CRSD), a special body with jurisdiction over all claims and matters falling under 
the CML and its rules and regulations, and the Appeal Committee for the Resolution of 
Securities Conflicts (ACRSC), which is the higher and appellate authority that has the final 
review of the decisions issued by the CRSD.
204
 
                                                          
202
 See Cma.org.sa (2013) Implementing Regulations. [Online] available from: http://cma.org.sa/En/Pages/ 
Implementing_Regulations.aspx. [Accessed: 11 May 2013]. 
203
 Article 19 of the Capital Market Law No. (M/30) of 2003, supra note 2. 
204
 For more details about the two committees, see Chapter Six, infra. 
11 
 
 The CMA is accountable to the President of the Council of Ministers and has by 
virtue of the CML
205
 access to a number of sources of funds, including fees, financial 
penalties, and funds provided by the government. Audited financial accounts of the CMA can 
be accessed from its website,
206
 however, those of Tadawul (wholly owned by the 
government via an investment company) are not published and therefore its financial details 
are hard to access. Clearly, the CMA is well funded, staffed and equipped and has markedly 
improved and invested in its technology infrastructure including state of the art market 
tracking surveillance software 
 The CMA rules and regulations have broadly reflected the changing market needs 
both from financial and from a regulatory perspective. The regulation of banks and insurers 
is the responsibility of SAMA except to the extent they have obligations as listed companies 
in respect of which they fall within the jurisdiction of the CML and therefore the CMA. 
There is historically a grey area of conflict between the two regulators which has contributed 
to a degree of confusion in the markets over the years especially with regards to the issuance 
of rules and regulations which sometimes appear to be in conflict with each other. However, 





 4.1.3 The Stock Exchange (Tadawul) 
208
 
 The objectives of the Saudi Tadawul are ensuring fair, efficient and transparent listing 
requirements, trading rules and technical mechanisms and information for securities listed on 
the Exchange as well as providing sound and rapid settlement and clearance rules and 
procedures through its Securities Depositary Center. Tadawul is also responsible for 
establishing and enforcing professional standards for brokers and their agents and ensuring 
the financial strength and soundness of brokers through the periodic review of their 
compliance with capital adequacy requirements, and setting such arrangements to protect the 
funds and securities in the custody of brokerage companies. 
 The Exchange is managed by a board of directors comprising nine members who are 
appointed by a Council of Ministers resolution upon nomination by the chairman of the 
Board of the Authority and who will choose from among them a chairman and a vice 
chairman. The membership of the board is to be composed of a representative of the Ministry 
of Finance, a representative of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, a representative of 
the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, four members representing licensed brokerage 
companies and two members representing the joint stock companies listed on the Exchange. 
 There are no SROs as Tadawul does not exercise regulatory powers although it is 
responsible for operationally running the market and the Depository.Tadawul operates the 
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only licensed market in KSA established as a joint stock company under the Companies 
Regulations,
209
 but regulated by the CMA as per the provisions of the CML. It conducts 
trading in equity securities and debt instruments (including sukuk) of listed companies, 
corporate bonds and Exchange Traded Funds (ETF's).
210
 
 Trading occurs on a time price priority basis via a central order book with one session 
per day. Mutual funds release information publicly via Tadawul, but the funds are not traded 
on market.
211
 Direct foreign participation in equities is only permitted via swaps entered into 
with Saudi members of Tadawul although direct foreign participation is permitted in funds 
and ETFs.
212
 A major drawback has been the lack of regulation permitting direct trading by 




 2.1. .2  The Securities Depository Centre 
214
 
 The board of directors of the Exchange have established a department to be known as 
the "Securities Depositary Center" which is be the sole entity in the Kingdom authorised to 
practice the operations of deposit, transfer, settlement, clearing and registering ownership of 
KSA securities traded on the exchange. The registration of ownership of Securities traded on 
the Exchange and the settlement and clearance of Securities are made by entries in the 
Depositary Center's records. Ownership of securities traded on the Exchange must be 
registered with the Depositary Center in order to be protected against third party claims. 
                                                          
209
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Furthermore, the Center is the sole entity to register all property rights in securities traded on 
the Exchange. 
 
4.2 Selective Regulations of Securities & Issuers 
 4.2.1 Offers of Securities Regulations 
215
 
 These regulations permit the issuing of securities as well as public invitation to 
subscribe to securities. Only a joint stock company in KSA may make an offer of securities. 
Offers of securities in KSA must comply with the Offers of Securities Regulations and the 
Listing Rules. The definition of "offer" is fairly broad, and includes the direct or indirect 
marketing of or any statement, announcement or communication that has the effect of selling, 
issuing or offering securities, but does not include preliminary negotiations or contracts 
entered into with or among underwriters. 
 Offers of securities are categorised as public offers or private placements. Public 
offers must comply with the Listing Rules. Similarly, securities offered by way of private 
placement must comply with the Offers of Securities Regulations and can be carried out by 
means of a limited offer to sophisticated investors. A limited offer is directed at no more than 
sixty offerees in KSA and the minimum amount to be paid by each offeree is not less than 
one million Saudi Riyals. An offer to sophisticated investors is directed at a number of 
potential investors including professional investors who fulfill at least two of the following 
criteria namely: having carried out at least ten transactions per quarter over the previous four 
quarters of a minimum total amount of forty million Saudi Riyals on securities markets, 
holds a  securities portfolio whose value exceeds ten million Saudi Riyals or works or has 
worked for at least one year in the financial sector in a professional position.
216
 
 Offers of Securities must be fully underwritten and must comply with the CMA's 
Prudential Rules,
217
 including any minimum capitalisation requirements they prescribe. An 
offeror must appoint a financial adviser when applying for the admission of securities to the 
official list, and the issue of securities which have not been previously admitted to the official 
list must be fully underwritten by an underwriter authorised by the CMA. The old Listing 
Rules required an underwriter to have a minimum net capital that was sufficient to meet any 
underwriting commitment. Alternatively, it could arrange financing or enter into sub-
underwriting agreements to meet the underwriting commitment or meet such minimum net 
capital requirements respectively. This flexibility has now been removed and underwriters 
can no longer effectively transfer underwriting risk to a third party. 
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 Section 62 of Prudential Rules. See Cma.org.sa (2013) Prudential Rules. 2013. [Online] available from: 




 In line with practice in other developed markets, the Rules now provide investors 
with a withdrawal right or a right to amend their subscription application where they have 
subscribed for securities prior to the publication of a supplementary prospectus related to the 
offering. However, these rights may only be exercised by investors prior to the end of the 
offering period and there is no express guidance as to whether an offering period would be 
extended in such circumstances. 
 
 4.2.2 Listing Rules
218
 
 The CMA has issued Listing Rules that need to be complied with by all companies 
seeking to list on Tadawul. The rules provide the key requirements that an issuer needs to 
follow pre and post the listing process, after the issuer's board has approved the listing of the 
securities of the company.The CMA requires the issuer to appoint an independent financial 
adviser who is licensed by the CMA to advise the company on various CMA related rules 
and regulations. There are specific requirements that the financial adviser needs to fulfill with 
respect to the listing process. An independent legal adviser licensed to practice in KSA must 
also be appointed. Both must be independent and satisfies an independence test set out in 
Rules. The Rules also require the two advisers to provide each a letter addressed to the CMA 
which includes certain confirmations (including as to the issuer's compliance with the Rules 
and their own independence). Some of these confirmations are fairly broad in scope, such as 
the requirement for the financial adviser to confirm that the directors of the issuer have 
established adequate procedures, controls and systems to comply with CMA rules.
219
 
 These appointments not only ensure that investor rights are protected but also serve to 
improve transparency and market confidence. An applicant for admission and listing must be 
a Saudi joint stock company, and must have been carrying on as its main activity, either by 
itself or through one or more of its subsidiaries as an independent business for at least three 
financial years. The CMA has the discretion to accept an application if it is satisfied that such 
admission will be in the interests of the applicant and of the investors. 
 To be admitted to the official list,
220
 an applicant for admission and listing must be a 
Saudi joint stock company, and must have been carrying on as its main activity, either by 
itself or through one or more of its subsidiaries as an independent business for at least three 
financial years. The Authority also has absolute discretion to reject an application in the 
event that the CMA considers the applicant as unsuitable for listing.
221
 Furthermore, on an 
application for the admission of securities to the official list, the financial adviser must 
satisfy itself, having conducted due diligence, that the issuer has satisfied all conditions 
required for admission of its securities stipulated in the Listing Rules. 
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 Moreover, there must be a sufficiently liquid and open market for the shares to trade, 
as well there must be at least 200 public shareholders and at least 30% of the shares should 
be owned by the public. The CMA may permit a lower number of public shareholders or a 
lower percentage of the class of shares if it considers that it is appropriate in view of the 
number of shares in the same class and the distribution to the public. However, approval is 
required from the regulator in order to do this.Listing Rules set out the extensive 
requirements as to the prospectus which must be submitted for application for the issue of 
securities by way of a public offering.
222
 
 The CMA may suspend or cancel a listing if it considers it necessary for the 
protection of investors or the maintenance of an orderly market.
223
 A listing may also be 
cancelled if an issuer fails, in a manner which the CMA considers material, to comply with 
the Listing Rules (including a failure to pay on time any fees or fines due to the CMA). 
Cancellation may also occur if there are insufficient securities of the issuer in the hands of 
the public to comply with the conditions or the CMA considers that the issuer does not have 
a sufficient level of operations or sufficient assets to warrant the continued trading of its 
securities on the Exchange. 
 There are specific restrictions on certain shareholdings.
224
 A person or group shown 
in the prospectus to own a controlling interest in the issuer is not allowed to dispose of the 
securities of the issuer during the six months following the first date of trading. For the 
purposes of this provision a person or group owns a controlling interest in the issuer either 
where he owns, individually or together with his relatives or affiliates, directly or indirectly, 
a minimum of 5% of a class of voting shares of the issuer. Such restriction is in place to 
ensure market transparency. 
 Listed companies are required to comply with the listing rules and regulations on an 
on-going basis to ensure continuity of their status as a listed company.
225
 Some of the key 
obligations include requirements relating to disclosure of material developments and 
financial information in accordance with the prescribed time lines, announcements, 
publications, duties of the board of directors, notification relating to securities, payments of 
fees, etc. All disclosures made by an issuer to the public and to the Authority must be clear, 
fair and not misleading. A lengthy description of the disclosure regime will follow.  
 In line with the CMA's current practice, applications for listing to the CMA must be 
accompanied by additional supporting documents, including a working capital report, 
financial and legal due diligence reports, a presentation on the corporate structure of the 
issuer's group and market studies detailing industry information and market trends mentioned 
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 4.2.3 Market Conduct Regulations
227
 
 Market conduct regulation as per the CMA relate to prohibitions of market 
manipulation, insider trading regulations and authorised persons' conduct. Market Conduct 
Regulations define the standard code of conduct for all participants to ensure the smooth 
functioning of the market and provide various rules to be followed by all market participants. 
Some of the provisions and contents of the market conduct regulations from a broader 
perspective are: 
 
 2.2.3.1    Prohibition of Manipulation and Deceptive Acts
228
 
 Any person or organisation is prohibited from engaging in any activity relating to 
manipulation of the market or any acts of deception in connection with an order placed or 
transaction in a security. No person or company is allowed to directly or indirectly place an 
order or execute a transaction to give a false or misleading impression of trading activities or 
influence the market to create an artificial bid, price or trade price for any security. Any 
actions, including making a fictitious trade or affecting a trade in a security that involves no 
change in its beneficial ownership, will be considered as manipulative or deceptive. Entering 
an order(s) for the sale/purchase of a security with the prior knowledge that an order(s) of 
substantially the same size, time and price for the sale/purchase of that security, has or will 
be entered is prohibited. 
 
 2.2.3.2     Insider Trading & Prohibition of Disclosure of Inside Information
229
 
 An insider is prohibited from disclosing any inside information to any other person 
when he knows or should have known possible that such other person may trade in the 
security related to the inside information. A person who is not insider is prohibited from 
disclosing to any other person any inside information obtained from an insider, when he 
knows or should have known that it is possible that such other person to whom the disclosure 
has been made may trade in the security related to the inside information. 
 
 4.2.3.3     Record Keeping and Reporting of Manipulation
230
 
 An authorised person (AP) or a registered person must not accept or execute a client 
order if any of them has reasonable grounds to believe that the client is engaging in market 
manipulation or insider trading or if the client would be considered in breach of the law, 
regulations or rules applicable in the relevant market. 
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 Of equal importance, where an AP or registered person has decided not to accept or 
execute an order which he suspects may be willful manipulation of the market then he is 
obliged by the rules to document the circumstances of and reasons for his decision in writing 
and the AP must notify the Authority of the decision within three days. An AP must retain 
the records in relation to any decision for ten years from the date of the decision. 
 
 4.2.4 Corporate Governance Regulations (CGRs) 
231
 
 4.2.4.1    The CMA Corporate Governance Framework 
 From a regulatory perspective the CMA regulation consists of three sets of rules. The 
first set focuses on the rights of shareholders, covering general rights, meeting, and 
distribution rights. The second wave of rules relates to disclosure and transparency which 
sets out policies and procedures for information disclosure and disclosure in board reports 
and financial statement reporting. The third set of rules covers guidelines specific to the 
board structure and responsibilities which focuses on setting out the basic functions of the 
board, its responsibilities and composition, and the role and responsibility of other 
committees such as the audit and remuneration committee.The followings are the disclosure 
requirements under the above CGRs: 
 
 4.2.4.2    Obligation to Disclose Material Developments 
232
 
 Transactions, events or announcements are considered to be a material development if 
any such activity is of a nature that would influence investment decisions by current or 
prospective stakeholders. Any changes in the composition of the board of directors or to 
CEO's position of the issuer are also considered material developments and must be 
immediately disclosed. Other material developments include legal proceedings involving 
value equal to or greater than 5% of net assets; related party transactions or any interruption 
in the principal activities of the issuer or its subsidiaries. 
 
 4.2.4.3    Disclosure of Financial Information 
233
 
 Keeping investors periodically updated with the financial performance and financial 
position of the company is critical from an investor's point of view. Therefore, it is 
mandatory for listed companies to provide certain information. Prior to publication the 
interim and annual financial statements of an issuer must be approved by the directors and 
signed by a director, CEO and CFO. Furthermore, the board of director's report must be filed 
with the Authority immediately upon approval by the directors. The issuer will announce to 
the exchange through the electronic applications its interim and annual financial statements 
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prior to being published to the shareholders or third parties. Provision of interim financials to 
the CMA and announcement to public must not be later than 15 days after the end of the 
interim financial period. 
 
 2.2.4.4    Disclosure Related to Securities 
234
 
 The issuer of securities is required to disclose the following events without any delay 
to the CMA and the public including any change in persons holding more than 5% of the 
issued shares or convertible debt instruments of the company or of any significant changes in 
the holdings of such persons; any proposed change in the capital of the company as well as a 
decision to pay/declare or not to pay/declare dividend; alteration in rights to shareholders or 
debt holders as well as a  decision to buy back securities along with the recommended price. 
 
 4.2.4.5    Accounting standards 
235
 
 Financial statements relating to listed companies disclosed in offering documents and 
on a continuing basis are subject to accounting and auditing standards established by the 
SOCPA,
236
 a professional organisation that operates under the supervision of the MOCI. 
Audit reports of listed companies must be prepared by a certified independent accountant. 
Also, interim financial statements included in offering materials and the interim accounts of a 
listed company must be reviewed in accordance with standards established by the SOCPA. 
 
 4.2.5  CMA Prudential Rules 
237
 
 The Prudential rules outline key financial requirements that AP's and firms must 
maintain. The rules also stipulate that an AP must continuously possess a capital base which 
corresponds to not less than the total of the minimum capital requirements. The capital base 
of an AP must comply with specific Tier-1 and Tier-2 capital requirements of the CMA 
Capital requirement regulations which are, of course, dependent on the size of the firm. All 
authorised trading firms must ensure sufficient capital to cover any eventualities including 
counterparty and settlement risks for trading book exposures; market risk for trading book 
operations (price movement volatility) and any foreign exchange (FX) risks. An AP or firm 
is required to develop and firmly implement a written policy that shows which financial 
instruments/commodities or portfolios of such financial instruments/commodities are to be 
assigned to the trading book and non-trading activities respectively.Furthermore, authorised 
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firms must have a written trading strategy for positions held as well as have clear procedures 
for the management of trading book positions and for monitoring risk-taking activities 
 
2.3 Conclusion 
 This Chapter examined the development of the financial markets of KSA. SAMA, the 
CMA, Tadawul, and the Securities Depository Centre are developed institutions and function 
independently of each other with their respective roles. Their rights and obligations have 
been laid out in the respective laws with the CML being the overarching law dealing with 
formation and structuring of CMA itself. The CML also provides for the creation of an 
independent 2-tier structure for dispute resolution related to securities dealings. They are the 
Committee for the Resolution of Securities Disputes (CRSD), which has jurisdiction over the 
disputes related to securities under the CML and the Appeals Committee for the Resolution 
of Securities Conflicts (ACRSC), which is the higher and appellate authority. Regulations 
take care of financial reporting obligations of public companies as well as create the 
infrastructure for cross-border cooperation as. With its status of being the largest market, 
KSA financial market is well positioned to lead the markets of the region and take the leap to 
the next stage of development. 
 The following Chapter will draw paralleled discussion of the topics outlined in the 
goals and policies mentioned earlier, however due to the different approach by the regulator 
in the UAE, a different set of laws and regulations will be used to arrive at this end. A 
detailed examination of the securities markets regulations will serve this purpose along with 
an enhanced scrutiny of the disclosure related provisions and the proposed twin peaks 









The Regulatory Environment Within the United Arab Emirates 
 
This Chapter defines the financial market regulatory landscape prevalent in the UAE. 
It begins by briefly tracing the history of economic development of the UAE resulting in the 
beginning and development of the securities markets. Subsequent paragraphs layout the role 
of the different regulatory institutions in the UAE. Towards the end, selective securities 
regulations which deal with similar matters as those described for the UK and KSA earlier, 
are defined so that an appropriate comparative analysis can be performed in the Chapters to 
follow. 
 
2.1 General background. 
 The UAE is a civil law jurisdiction and follows the civil law system, as such, the 
primary source of the law is a statutory code. The law in the UAE has also naturally been 
influenced by Islamic law codified in Shari'a and embodied in the UAE Civil and 
Commercial law. Once the UAE Federation was set up, the seven emirates 
238
 agreed on a 
provisional constitution (the Constitution) which provided the legal framework for the 
federation and apportioned powers between the federal government (based in Abu Dhabi) 
and the seven emirates. The Constitution came into effect in December 1971 and was 
permanently accepted in May 1996. It refers to the UAE as the 'Union.' The Constitution 
established the creation of the Supreme Federal Council, the Council of Ministers (as the 
Executive Branch of the federation), the National Assembly and the Judiciary of the Union.In 
addition to the Supreme Federal Council, the Federal Government includes the Council of 
Ministers. This Council is appointed by the President of the UAE and is responsible to the 
Supreme Council for the Union's general internal and external policy. There is also a Federal 
National Council which is responsible, under the Constitution, for examining proposed 
federal legislation. 
 The UAE's capital market is relatively young compared with regional and 
international peers. Historically, development of the UAE capital market had been slow, as 
most enterprises in the UAE were either government or family owned. The UAE has 
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embraced some carefully calibrated structural and regulatory changes in the recent past, 
which have accelerated development and bolstered the future prospects of the country's 
capital market. The historical development of the UAE's capital markets can be examined 
into four broad phases which include the creation of the Central Bank of the UAE; the 
Ministry of Economy, the UAE Securities & Commodities Authority; and the Dubai 
Financial Services Authority. 
 The UAE's open door policy as well as foreign investment policies have contributed 
to the huge increase of direct foreign investment in the country in the past two decades. As an 
example, Jebel Ali Free Zone (Jafza) is one of the largest ports and container shipping 
terminals in the world. In its past years of operation, Jafza has posted more than 320 times 
growth in its number of companies growing from 19 in 1985 to over 6402 in 2009.
239 
 The UAE has made significant strides in economic development over the last few 
years. This was primarily due to the UAE government's provision of an enabling regulatory 
environment. It is expected that services will play a larger role in the UAE economy over the 
medium to long run, with rapid increases in niche sectors such as air and maritime 
transportation, logistics, medical tourism, pharmaceuticals and information technology. The 
vision of the government of the UAE is to transform the country into a global hub for 
entrepreneurship in several industrial and service spheres. To achieve that vision, the 
Government is committed to maintaining laissez faire policies and an effective public-private 
partnership.  
 The nation is currently going through a huge expansionary period namely in 
construction and real estate. This has been an on-going economic activity for at least a 
decade and has brought in a large influx of foreigners to the country. With continued forecast 
expected as a direct result of such large commercial activities like EXPO as well as the Dubai 
Airshow, the UAE is a premier destination for large conglomerates, multinationals as well as 
major financial institutions.  
 The government continues to focus primarily on transforming the nation into a 
diversified self-sustaining market driven economy. Property laws have recently been 
reviewed as has the UAE Commercial Companies law. Foreign ownership regulations 
relating specifically to company ownership has impacted volume turnover on the stock 
exchanges. As a result of this, the role the financial regulator has had to play grows in 
prominence. Constant evolution of the economic landscape means the introduction of new 
rules and regulations by the financial regulator in order to keep up with and oversee the 
change. This increased volume has led to the introduction of several regulations especially in 
2012 namely: liquidity providers and market making regulations, investment funds, short 
selling as well as securities lending and borrowing. For that, the Morgan Stanley Capital 
International Index (MSCI) ranking for the country was upgraded from that of a "Frontier 
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market" to "Emerging." This achievement in itself is hugely important and is a key milestone 




2.1 The Roles of the Primary Securities & Markets Regulators 
 2.1.1 The UAE Central Bank (CBUAE)
241
 
 The Central Bank of the UAE was established, under the name of the UAE Currency 
Board on 19 May 1973. Its objective was to issue a national currency that would replace the 
Bahraini Dinar and the Qatari and Dubai Riyal. The UAE dirham was put in circulation on 
19 May 1973. A total of 12.9 million Dinars and 131 million Riyals were replaced by 260 
million Dirhams in circulation.
242
 On 10 December 1980, the Federal Law No. (10) of 1980 
was issued concerning the Central Bank, the monetary system and organisation of banking,
243
 
through which the Currency Board was changed into the Central Bank of the UAE. 
 This Law empowered the CBUAE with far ranging powers which include 
organisation of the monetary, credit and banking policy as well as supervision of its 
implementation. The UAE government began the establishment of an industrially-based 
economy during the 1980's. However, the financing of these industrial projects required a 
new approach, which included the private sector.  In view of the huge economic development 




 The Law also authorised the CBUAE to issue currency as per the provisions of the 
law; ensure support for UAE dirham and its stability inside and outside the UAE as well as 
its free convertibility into foreign currencies. The CBUAE must also develop a credit policy 
that helps in achieving balanced growth of the UAE economy and also organise and develop 
banking as well as monitor the efficiency of the banking system, as per the provisions of the 
law.In addition. it licenses and regulates number of financial institutions such as local and 
foreign commercial and investment banks, financial investment companies, moneychangers, 
finance companies, monetary intermediation institutions (except brokerage firms) and 
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representative offices of foreign banks. It acts as the Bank of the government of the UAE 
including monetary and financial advice to the government of the UAE.
245
 
 Successive developments in the economy of the UAE, and the adoption of free 
market policies and regulations, have led to impressive growth rates and a trend towards 
sustainable and diversified development. The UAE Government has successfully pursued a 
strategy to create an enabling business and financial environment that is conducive to 
economic growth. This has contributed to the world-renowned status of the UAE as an 
international center for trade, finance and services and has attracted reputable global 
companies. The UAE has always focused on strengthening its stance as a hub for business. 
Hence, it demonstrates an exemplary model to be emulated in all patterns of economic 
development and modernisation. The pegging of the UAE Dirham to the US dollar has 
introduced a stability in the currency which has not changed over some time. The Fiscal 
policy of the UAE at both the federal and Emirates level remains prudent. Substantial 
progress has been made in implementing fiscal management reform. 
 However, the CBUAE as well as other regulators and policy makers had to deal with 
the aftermath of the financial crisis systematically to avoid any further systemic 
meltdowns.
246
Although the UAE was not directly involved in the financial crisis, regulators 
have learnt to be very cautious. They had to address the high debt burdens and eroded 
balance sheets of sovereign as well as major financial institutions
247
 Therefore, post-financial 
crisis, the UAE's economy started to recover in 2010 benefiting from higher oil prices and a 
strong demand from traditional trading partners. Total public revenue had increased from 
US$68.1 billion in 2009 to US$85.7 billion in 2010 and was estimated to be US$121.8 
billion in 2011. This is primarily due to the increase in oil and gas earnings. While public 
earning has increased in 2009, public expenditure and grants have decreased from US$102.2 
billion in 2009 to US$89.6 billion in 2010. It is estimated to be around US$99.5 billion in 
2011. As a result of the prudent management of public revenue, the public deficit has 
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 2.1.1 The Ministry of Economy (MOE) 
249
 
 Upon its establishment in 1970 until 2007 the Ministry was in charge of 
implementing companies law and corporate governance provisions. It also supervises the 
formation of all types of companies that are regulated under the Federal Law of 1984 
Concerning Commercial Companies, as well it regulates IPOs.
250
 When the SCA was 
established in 2000 to act as the supervisory authority over the financial markets, it was 
apparent that there was an overlap between the responsibilities of the two formerly existing 
regulators, CBUAE, the MOE; and the SCA. Not to mention that when there was a transition 
from informal to formal financial markets, there should have been a delegation of the 
necessary powers from the CBUAE and the MOE to the SCA. For that and in order to 
maintain a sound regulatory system, the SCA should have been specifically delegated the 
powers of licensing and supervising financial intermediaries and investment companies as 
well as the IPOs by Public Joint Stock Companies. 
 Accordingly, by the end of the year 2006, the CBUAE Board, transferred the 
authority to register and supervise brokers from the CBUAE to the SCA. This transfer of 
authority was intended to give the SCA more powers to supervise trading in the markets. 
Furthermore, the Ministerial Council of Services, in its Decision No. 3/3 of 2007 (2/5/2007), 
transferred the authority of incorporation and supervision of Public Joint Stock Companies 




 2.1.2 The Securities & Commodities Authority (SCA( 
252
 
 The SCA was established on 29 January 2000 under a Federal Law, with the 
objective of improving the efficiency of the financial markets and protecting investors from 
unfair and incorrect practices, which had developed during the late 1990s. Before the SCA 
was set up, there was little price transparency and public disclosure by public companies, 
which encouraged bad business practices such as insider dealing activities. Prior to the 
creation of the SCA, the CBUAE assumed the responsibility for securities regulation. 
Subsequently, this has now been transferred to the SCA as a securities regulator.
253
 
Moreover, although the Insurance Authority regulates the insurance companies, the SCA 
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 The main functions of the SCA are to propose and issue regulations; supervise two 
securities exchanges and one commodities exchange; license the markets and brokers; 
authorise the listing of securities and commodities derivatives for trading; supervise and 
regulate the brokers; financial advisors; custodian; market makers; regulate and monitor the 
disclosure of information relating to securities; and determine, in consultation with the 
markets, the fees. The SCA has regulatory oversight of publicly listed UAE companies listed 
on the two securities exchange as well as the sale of foreign securities onshore in the UAE. 
The SCA has comprehensive laws and regulations that ensure that it is enabled to undertake 
the necessary steps to improve the efficiency of the UAE's financial markets and to protect 
the integrity of those markets and defend the interests of all classes of investors. It also has 
the ability to be in contact with international markets in order to obtain and exchange 
information and expertise, and to join relevant Arab and international organisations and 
federations. In the event that it is required, the SCA can also halt trading temporarily in the 
securities market in exceptional circumstances or in an event which threatens the proper and 
regular working of the market. It can also freeze, suspend or bring back into force any rules 
and regulations relating to the market or any of its operations; compel natural or juristic 
persons having a connection with activities in securities to make public disclosure and submit 
any information related to their activities.
255 
 Through a combination of rotational on site visits and remote electronic transaction 
monitoring both the exchanges' regulators and the SCA are able to satisfy themselves that the 
firms and other market participants are complying with the relevant laws and regulations. 
Besides the trading surveillance departments at the securities exchanges, the SCA has its own 
trading surveillance department to make sure that trading activity falls within proper 
parameters. Along that line, the SCA has signed a Memorandum of Understanding with 




 2.1.2 The Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) 
257
 
 The UAE's many approaches to further diversify away from the oil and gas industry 
took place in 2004 through the creation of the first financial free zone in the UAE with a 
regulatory structure modeled on best practices followed in major international markets such 
as New York, London, Singapore and Australia. Therefore, one of the Supreme Federal 
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Council's decision making powers was the creation of the Dubai International Financial 
Centre (DIFC)
258
 and the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA).
259
 Creating the DIFC 
and the DFSA required a unique legal and regulatory framework, made possible through a 
synthesis of Federal and Dubai law.
260
 
 The DFSA is the independent regulator of all financial and ancillary services 
conducted through the DIFC, a purpose-built free-zone in Dubai. The DFSA's regulatory 
mandate covers asset management, banking and credit services, securities, collective 
investment funds, custody and trust services, commodities futures trading, Islamic finance, 
insurance, an international equities exchange and an international commodities derivatives 
exchange. The DFSA is also responsible for the regulation and supervision of persons in the 
DIFC in relation to anti-money laundering, counter-terrorist financing and sanctions 
compliance. The DFSA's stated approach is to be a risk-based regulator and to avoid 
unnecessary regulatory burden. Regulation is being directed to the mitigation of risks that 
would otherwise be unacceptable. Compliance obligations should be proportionate to the 
mitigation of those risks within a framework that enables regulated entities to effectively and 
efficiently meet their compliance obligations.In fulfilling its mandate as the sole independent 
financial services regulator for the DIFC, the DFSA performs a number of functions 
including policy, rulemaking, authorisation, supervision and enforcement. The FSA had 
signed an MOU with the SCA on 2005 for mutual cooperation, assistance, training purposes, 





2.2 The Markets Regulated by the SCA and the DFSA 
 Relatively speaking, the financial markets in the UAE are at a nascent stage of their 





 The Dubai Gold & Commodities Exchange (DGCX)
264
 is a company majority 
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owned by Dubai Multi Commodities Centre (DMCC)
265
 a free zone authority and strategic 
initiative of the government of Dubai. Although the DGCX is established as a free zone 
company, to be located within the DMCC free zone which is beyond the legal jurisdiction of 
the SCA, it chose voluntary to be licensed and regulated as a commodities derivatives 
exchange by the SCA through signing an MOU for that purpose.
266
 Its mandate to enhance 
commodity trade flows through the Emirate by providing the appropriate physical, market, 
financial infrastructure and services required. The DGCX commenced trading in November 
2005 as the regions first commodity derivatives exchange. The Management team of DGCX 
comprises senior personnel from the commodities, securities and financial services industries 
bringing a wealth of experience and expertise to ensure the success of DGCX.  
 Another exchange that is located in the DIFC is Nasdaq Dubai, an exchange that is 
regulated by the DFSA as an Authorised Market Institution (AMI) under the DIFC 
Regulatory Law. Nasdaq Dubai is the international financial exchange in the Middle East.
267
 
However, following the DFM's announcement in December 2009 of its intention to fully 
acquire Nasdaq Dubai, the DFM commenced an outsourcing agreement with Nasdaq Dubai, 
in which the trading, clearing, settlement and custody of Nasdaq Dubai securities will operate 
through the trading platform of DFM, the majority shareholder of Nasdaq Dubai.
268
 Although 
securities on DFM are quoted, traded, cleared and settled in UAE Dirham, Nasdaq Dubai 
securities are quoted, traded, cleared and settled in US Dollars. Despite the above 
arrangement between the two markets, Nasdaq Dubai remains subjected to the laws and 
regulation of the DFSA. 
 
2.2 Selective Regulations of Securities Markets 
 The SCA issued many rules and regulations that it considers necessary and prudent 
for the running of a functional and safe equity market.
269
 These include the regulations as to 
the listing of securities on the exchanges, as to the trading of commodities and commodities 
contracts, as to the functioning of the securities & commodities authority, as to brokers, as to 
membership of the market, as to disclosure and transparency, as to the arbitration of disputes 
arising from the trading of securities and commodities, as to trading, clearing, settlement, 
transfer of ownership and custody of securities, as to the functioning of the market, as to the 
listing of foreign companies, as to the listing of Islamic bonds and debt securities, as to safe 
custody activities, as to rules and accounts separation mechanism at the brokerage firms, as 
to margin trading, as to dual listing, as to financial consultancy & financial analysis, as to 
custody activities, as to delivery vs. payment (DVP) mechanism, as to market maker, as to 
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securities lending and borrowing, as to securities short selling, and as to liquidity 
provision.
270
 With the introduction of the new legislation of the SCA Board Decision No. 
(37) of 2012 concerning the regulations of mutual funds, the SCA became the licensing 
authority for investment funds, which were historically regulated by the CBUAE.
271
 The 
rules would enhance transparency and oversight of funds for the mass market in the UAE.
272 
 
 5.4.1 The Regulations of Disclosure and Insider Dealing 
 The disclosure rules applicable to the UAE markets have two primary sources. The 
first is a statute, namely, the Federal Law of 2000 under Chapter Five, which is entitled 
"Disclosure and Transparency." 
273
 The SCA had been endowed with a variety of regulatory 
and enforcement responsibilities, including the ability to compel virtually anyone connected 
with the UAE securities markets to produce any information that the SCA believes may be 
relevant to carrying out these responsibilities. The SCA also has investigatory authority over 
the markets and market participants. 
 The Law requires that all companies with listed securities in the UAE markets 
promptly notify the market of any developments or information that may affect the prices at 
which their securities are traded. The market has the ability to require that any company with 
listed securities make public, and publish, any explanatory information relating to the 
company's activities. It may also, in its discretion and depending on what it perceives to be 
the needs of the marketplace, publish any information that it receives in the local press and 
other media. Requests are generally made to companies under the provision of the Federal 
Law when the SCA perceives that the markets are not behaving rationally, and that the 
underlying problem stems from confusion about some event or circumstance affecting a 
given company that investors either do not know about, or cannot analyse because they do 
not have sufficiently complete information. It is unlawful for a listed company to respond by 
furnishing false or misleading information that could affect stock prices, or the decision by 
investors about whether or not to invest.
274
 
 As the above Law set forth the broad parameters of disclosure and transparency, the 
second detailed source that covers the same subject matter area is the SCA own Regulations 
as to Disclosure and Transparency No (3) of 2000.
275
 The Regulations seek to cover various 
pre-listing matters, post-listing matters, and also certain aspects of the conduct of the 
securities brokerage business. The aim of the Regulations is "to secure the integrity and 
accuracy of transactions...," and so forth. The shorter version is that the Regulations seek to 
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make certain that all of the players in the securities markets have the benefit of the proverbial 
level playing field, so that everyone who is interested has access to the same information as 
everyone else. The other word for this is "transparency." 
 The SCA's Regulations establish various required pre-listing disclosures to which 
companies must adhere as a condition to obtaining the SCA's required approval for the listing 
of their securities on the public trading exchanges. Once such approval is obtained and the 
securities become listed, the Regulations also establish various post-listing requirements. 
These are primarily reporting requirements that are ongoing obligations of the company for 
so long as its shares remain listed, in order to enable the SCA to better monitor developments 
in the markets and to ensure full transparency. One of the post-listing Regulations which is of 
very great interest to actual and prospective investors deals with the disclosure of who really 
owns and controls the issuer company. Anyone who directly or indirectly owns 5% or more 
of the shares of a company must immediately notify the market on which the shares are 
traded of this fact. The same requirement exists as to parent, subsidiary, affiliate, and allied 
companies of the issuer, except that the disclosure requirement is not triggered until the 
percentage of ownership reaches 10%.
276
 
 The SCA's Regulations are also designed to detect early possible developing takeover 
attempts of publicly-traded companies by requiring the owners of 10% or more of an issuer 
to first notify the relevant market authority if they desire to increase their ownership to 20% 
or more. The market authority may prohibit the transaction if it would tend to prejudice 'the 
interests of the national economy.' Also, the CBUAE must approve the acquisition of 5% or 
more of the shares of any publicly traded bank.
277
 The SCA also has the lawful authority to 
inspect the records and operations of 'Market Members,' either by itself or in cooperation 
with the particular market's overseeing authority, in order to make certain that issuer 




 The SCA itself is not immune from its own Regulations. It is prohibited from 
carrying on any commercial activities for its own benefit, and it cannot own, hold, or issue 
any securities. The members who comprise the SCA's board of directors are permitted to 
trade in the securities markets, but must immediately disclose upon assuming office the full 
nature of their securities holdings, whether these holdings are in their own names or are held 
indirectly, such as through a spouse or minor child. Upon taking office, any future 
transactions that result in changes in a board member's holdings must be fully disclosed and 
reported to the SCA within a period of one week. Any board member of the SCA who is 
either convicted of an 'offence of dishonor' or who commits a breach of trust, or who declares 
bankruptcy, is automatically removed from the board.
279
 Provisions such as this, along with 
the previously-discussed constraints on the activities of the SCA directors, are designed to 
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assure investors and the general public of the agency's absolute integrity. This is especially 
important given the SCA's broad powers.   
 The SCA has the power to suspend the listing of a company's securities under a broad 
array of circumstances. Three common scenarios that typically bring about a suspension of 
trading are when a company's general assembly decides to reduce the company's capital, 
where the company fails to issue the periodic reports regarding its activities and financial 
condition that are required by law and regulation, and where a general assembly decides to 
sell a substantial portion of the company's assets.
280
 None of these events usually represents 
good news for existing investors, and dictate at least the SCA to inquire into what exactly is 
really going on before trading can be allowed to resume. 
 The SCA can also cancel, rather than just suspend, a company's listing of its 
securities under certain extreme circumstances. Three that are regarded as being especially 
severe are when the company passes a resolution to dissolve and liquidate, or its listing 
remains suspended for six or more months, or where the company radically changes its 
primary business activity. The latter rule is designed to prevent situations that would enable 
companies to obtain listing permission 'by stealth.' In such a case, the considerations that first 
led to listing approval might very well not apply at all to the subsequently-announced, real 
nature of the business.
281
 Listing cancellation can also be brought about if the issuer 
discontinues its business activity, or if the company is merged under a structure that brings its 
'juristic personality' to an end. Under most merger structures, the companies involved end up 
being either a 'surviving corporation' or a 'disappearing corporation. 'Cancellation of 
previously-listed securities is almost always imposed when the issuer turns into a 
'disappearing corporation.' 
 It is also important to note that under the SCA's Regulations, it is not only issuer 
companies that are obligated to report significant information and events to the SCA; the 
markets themselves are also similarly obligated.
282
 The SCA's Regulations specify that the 
markets themselves are responsible to issue whatever press and media notices may be 
necessary in order to ensure transparency and the full disclosure of material information. 
Further, each market must furnish to the SCA, within one month from the close of its 
financial year, its balance sheet, profit and loss account, and annual audited financial 
statements. The SCA's periodic reporting requirements that are applicable to issuers of 
securities are likewise applicable to the individual markets themselves.  
 Those responsible for managing the markets themselves are also screened by 
applicable SCA Regulations in order to avoid conflicts of interest. Board members of joint 
stock companies, financial brokers, and representatives of financial brokers cannot 
simultaneously serve on the board of directors of any of the markets. The same disclosure 
and reporting requirements mentioned earlier as being applicable to members of SCA's own 
board are likewise applicable to members of the Boards of each of the markets, as well as 
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other managerial market 'insiders. 'Market board members are, just like the SCA's board 
members, automatically terminated upon conviction of an offence of dishonour, breach of 
trust, or the declaration of bankruptcy.
283
 
 Mid-month as well as monthly reports on trading activities are also required to be 
filed by each of the markets with the SCA. An extremely comprehensive annual report to the 
SCA is also mandatory. Besides their other reporting obligations, the markets are also 
obligated to furnish the SCA with what is known as a 'Daily Price Bulletin.' 
284
 This report is 
primarily devoted to reporting on securities prices and, more importantly, significant changes 
in prices during the course of the day. Such changes are often indicative of the beginning or 
end of particular trends, many of which relate to market stability and volatility, and are 
therefore of particular interest to the SCA as the markets' primary regulatory authority. 
 Because of their unique and significant role in the marketplace, securities brokers and 
their representatives have been made subject to special Regulations promulgated and 
overseen by the SCA. Like all other market participants, these parties are precluded from 
trading based on beneficial inside information, are restricted from becoming affiliated with 
securities issuers, and in general are subject to the same restraints on trading activities as are 
investors. The SCA Regulations further prescribe standards for matters such as capital 
adequacy, restrictions on foreign ownership, and the qualification of management members 
of brokers and their representatives.
285
 
 Both the Law first adopted in 2000 as well as the Regulations establish that a number 
of violations of the rules of the securities business can be treated as criminal offences. 
Penalties that can attach include imprisonment for up to three years per offence, fines of up 
to 1 million Dirhams, and combinations of prison terms and fines. Besides potential criminal 
penalties, the SCA may also, in the event of securities law or regulatory violations, impose 
administrative sanctions through the levying of monetary (civil) penalties as well as by 
barring any investor from trading in the marketplace for a period of up to one year. Both 
penalties may be imposed simultaneously.
286
 
 In its monitoring activities, the SCA compiles and publishes periodic data from all of 
the UAE markets, and makes available reports such as the 'Shares Proprietorship Ratio.' It 
also publishes news items that are of particular interest to securities market participants, and 
maintains a fairly extensive website on which laws, regulations, market developments, price 
information, and other matters of interest are disseminated.
287
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 The SCA endeavors to keep its finger on the pulse of the market by routinely 
analysing the numerous company and market reports and other sources of information that 
are filed with it or otherwise brought to its attention. It also interacts with other UAE 
governmental agencies and institutions, such as the CBUAE, in order to maintain a proper 
perspective on market activities and foster the free exchange of information between 
different agencies who have reasons to be interested in market events and conditions. 
 Broker and broker representatives oversight and monitoring is also one of the SCA's 
key missions. Trading and settlement procedures, as well as the responsibilities imposed on 
investors, are all subject to the SCA's continuous oversight and monitoring activities. In 
addition, previously unavailable information is now freely accessible by anyone via the 
Internet, including: disclosure of insider transactions; disclosure of statistics relating to 
majority shareholders; disclosure of trades by issuer directors and employees; and disclosure 
of relative ownership percentages by nationals versus foreign nationals.
288
 
 The regulation of timely disclosure in local financial markets in the UAE, falls under 
the SCA Federal Law
289
 and its Disclosure and Transparency Regulations.
290
 The 
Regulations consist of the three following articles. Article 33 indicates that the company or 
entity (i.e. the issuer) whose securities have been listed in the Market is obliged to notify the 
SCA and the market of "any significant developments affecting the prices of such securities 
upon learning of the same." It also used some non-exhaustive examples of events in which 
the issuer should make timely disclosure. The Article is also giving the market the right to 
publish any statement in respect of the disclosed information. 
 Additionally, Article 34 is directed to circumstances in which the issuer is requested, 
by the market, to publish any explanatory information or press announcement which relates 
to its circumstances and activities. This is to secure the integrity of transactions and the 
confidence of investors, especially when there is a need to answer rumours in the market. In 
contrast, Article 35 provides an exemption where issuers can delay disclosure of information 
to protect the business, and where there has not been, nor will be, any dealing in its shares by 
members of its board of directors and executive managers and their relatives to the first 
degree by members of its board of directors and executive managers and their relatives to the 
first degree on the basis of the information not announced to the public, provided that the 
company furnishes to the director of the Market such information and data specifying the 
persons aware of such information, and, requesting him to consider it confidential until the 
grounds which gave rise to that no longer subsist. However, the Market may, in coordination 
with the SCA, accede to such request or compel the company to announce the information 
and data if they consider that the revealing of such information will not affect the interests of 
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 Again, in regards to the regulation to the insider dealing, the Federal Law of 2000 
also addressed the prohibition of insider dealing as indicated below.
292
 
Article 37 defines inside information as: 
"The exploitation of undisclosed information which could affect prices of Securities in 
order to achieve personal benefits shall not be permitted. Any dealing effected in 
contravention of this shall be null and void." 
Article 39: 
"It shall not be permitted for  any  person to deal  in Securities on  the basis  of  
unpublicised  or undisclosed  information  he  acquired  by virtue of his position.It 
shall not be permitted for any person to spread rumours regarding the selling or 
buying of shares.Nor  shall  it  be  permitted  for  the  chairman  and  members  of  
any company's  management  or  its employees  to  exploit  their  inside information 
as to the company in the purchase of shares or the sale thereof in the Market.Any  
transaction  effected  by  any  person  in  contravention  of  the provisions of the two 
preceding  paragraphs shall be null and void." 
 
 Accordingly, the SCA Disclosure and Transparency Regulations of 2000 
implemented the above-mentioned Articles under the SCA Law, and stipulated the 




"1- Pursuant to Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 concerning the Emirates Securities & 
Commodities Authority and Market, any person shall be liable to imprisonment for a 
period of not less than three months and not more than three years and a fine of not 
less than one hundred thousand (100,000) Dirhams and not more than one million 
(1,000,000) Dirhams, or either of these penalties, if he: 
a. Furnishes any data, or proffers any declaration or information being untrue and 
such as to affect the market value of the securities and an investor's decision to invest 
or otherwise. 
b. Deals in securities on the basis of unpublicised or undisclosed information he 
acquired by virtue of his position. 
c. Spreads tendentious rumours regarding the selling or buying of shares. 
d. Exploits unpublicised information which could affect the prices of securities to 
achieve personal benefits. 
Any dealing or transaction effected on the basis of the preceding shall be null and 
void. 
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"The chairman and the members of the board of directors of a company whose 
securities are listed in the Market and its general manager and any of its employees 
shall be liable to imprisonment for a period of not more than three years and a fine of 
not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one million Dirhams, 
or to either of these penalties, if he effects dealings through himself or through others 
in any transaction in the securities of the company, before disclosing to the Market 
the purchase or sale transaction, the quantities and prices thereof, and any other 
information required by the Market, and the obtaining of the approval of the Market's 
board of directors for such transaction. Any transaction not effected pursuant to such 
disclosure shall be null and void." 
Article 39: 
"Any chairman and any of the members of the board of directors of any company or 
any of its employees who exploits his inside information as to the company in the 
purchase of shares or the sale thereof in the Market shall be liable to imprisonment 
for a period of not less than three months and not more than three years and a fine of 
not less than one hundred thousand Dirhams and not more than one million Dirhams, 
or either of these penalties. Any transaction so effected shall be null and void." 
 
 Moreover, the SCA has also prohibited certain transactions by company insiders by 
establishing time frame constraints during which such insiders may not trade in their 
company's listed securities. Specifically, in the 15-day periods that precede the holding of an 
issuer's general or extraordinary general assembly, or the announcement of information of a 
nature such that it would affect the company's share price either favorably or adversely, or 
the date of announcement of the company's annual or interim financial statements, trading by 
insiders in the issuer's stock or in the stock of its parents, subsidiaries, associates, or sister 
companies is prohibited. There is an unstated presumption that during these periods, any 





 5.4.2 The Regulations of Corporate governance 
295
 
 Generally, the UAE regulatory framework of corporate governance comprises of 
three components: Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 Concerning Commercial Companies; the SCA 
Decision concerning Disclosure and Transparency, and the Code of corporate governance. 
These components, collectively, provide a comprehensive account of the UAE corporate 
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 5.4.2.1     The obligation 'to disclose' when there is a conflict of interest 
 The Commercial Companies law requires each board member in the company who 
has a conflict interest with the company's interest in an operation presented to the Board of 
Directors for approval, to inform the board of so, and to register his acknowledgement in the 
minute of the meeting. This member may not participate in voting on the resolution issued 
regarding this process .
298
 
 However, the legislator wanted in the Code to expand on the commitment of the 
parties related to the disclosure. Among them, of course, the members of the board, where 
the Code does not only regulate their disclosures, according to Article 3(10),
299
 but it 
expanded the scope of disclosure and persons covered with his provisions, namely, the 
disclosure of related parties which will be discussed further below. 
 
 5.4.2.2     Disclosure of Related Parties 
 The Code defined the relevant parties as the "chairman and members of the board of 
directors and members of the senior executive management, and companies in which any of 
them have a controlling stake, parent companies or subsidiaries or sisterly or allies." 
300
 It 
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seems clear from this definition that the legislature in the Code wanted to distinguish 
between the related parties and the stakeholders, where the code defined the stakeholders as: 
every person who has an interest with the company, such as: shareholders, employees, 
creditors, customers, suppliers, and potential investors. It can be also seen that the definition 
of stakeholders came broadly, to include every person who has an interest with the company, 
including the member of the board. 
 Article 12 (bis/1) of the Code addressed the provisions relating to the related parties, 
as it stipulates that: 
301
 
1. If the related party had any dealing with the company, its parent company or any of its 
subsidiaries or sister companies, and if the value of such dealing is equal to 10% or more 
of the value of the assets of the company  – based on the latest annual or periodical 
financial statements of the company – such related party shall make immediate disclosure 
by way of a letter addressed to the board of directors of the nature of such trading, the 
conditions thereof and all material information in respect of his/its share or shareholding 
in the two companies involved in the trading or transaction and the extent of his/its 
interest or benefit, and the board of directors of the company shall make immediate 
disclosure thereof to the Market. The details of the trading referred to in Clause 2-hereof, 
the conditions thereof and the Conflict of Interest relating to the related party shall be 
recorded in the annual financial statements presented to the general assembly, and such 
financial statements shall be published on the website of both the Market and the 
company. 
2.  If the related party fails to disclose his/its transaction referred to in Clause -1 hereof, the 
board of directors of the company or any shareholder holding 5% or more of the shares of 
the company may bring a claim against the relevant member of the board of directors or 
the related party before a competent court requesting such court to suspend the relevant 
transaction and to compel and direct the member of the board of directors or the related 
party to pay to the company any profits or benefits realised by him/it. 
 
 It is required to comply with the disclosure in the case of the availability of the 
following conditions: 
1. The related party has to be the chairman  and  members  of  the  board  of  directors and 
members of the senior executive management of the company; companies where any of 
the aforesaid have a controlling share; and parent, subsidiary, sister or allied companies 
of the company. It includes the relatives of the chairman, a member of the board of 
directors or of the senior executive management up to the first degree. It also includes the  
natural  person  or  body  corporate  who/which  was during   the   year   preceding   that   
of   the   trading   a shareholder holding  10%  or  more  in  the  company  or  a member  
of  its  board  of  directors  or  of  its  parent  or subsidiary company. 
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2.  The related party should have an interest or benefit conflicts or may conflict with the 
company's interests in deal has been or may be between them. 
3.  The disclosure is to be immediate by a letter addressed to the board of directors 
informing about the nature of such trading, the conditions thereof and all material 
information in respect of his/its share or shareholding in the two companies involved in 
the trading or transaction and the extent of his/its interest or benefit, and the board of 
directors of the company shall make immediate disclosure thereof to the Market. 
 The impact of the obligation to disclose is that the financial report prepared by the 
auditor of the company should include details of this discrepancy and be presented to the 
ordinary general assembly meeting. Additionally, if the related party was a shareholder in the 
company, he cannot vote on the resolution issued by the general assembly on the transaction 
that belongs to him. Where is the impact of non-compliance with the obligation of disclosure 
is that the board of directors of the company or any shareholder can apply to the competent 
court to cease offending transaction and to oblige the related party to reimburse to the 
company any profit had been gained, and the court issues what it consider appropriate in this 
regard, taking into account not to harm the interests of bona fide of the third party, or 




2.2 The Twin Peaks Regulatory System in the UAE 
303
 
 2.2.1 The UAE Financial Structure as a result of Twin Peaks 
 In July 2012, there were media reports about the UAE moving towards a 'Twin Peaks' 
model of financial regulation. Such reports described that under this model, the role of the 
CBUAE will act as the "prudential regulator" of the entire financial system, while the SCA 
would take on the "Conduct of Business" role and be responsible for market conduct and 





 2.2.1 Prudential Regulation–The Role of the CBUAE 
 Under the 'Twin Peaks' model, the CBUAE will be responsible for prudential 
regulation of the financial system. It will focus purely on the prudential and systemic side of 
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the financial institutions, including entities active in the insurance and securities sectors. 
Prudential supervision will focus on the solidity of financial enterprises and their contribution 
to the stability of the financial sector. The CBUAE shall be required to exercise the 
prudential supervision of financial enterprises and to decide on the admission of financial 
enterprises to the financial markets. 
 
 2.2.2 Regulation of Conduct of Business (COB) -the Role of the SCA 
 Conduct of business supervision shall focus on orderly, transparent financial market 
processes, integrity in relations between market parties and due care in the provision of 
services to clients. The primary purpose of conduct of business rules is to set business 
standards for various aspects of a firm's relationships with their customers. The UAE's new 
financial structure will have a key role in delivering and supporting its consumer protection 
objectives by setting standards for firms dealing with customers in three main areas: fair 
dealing by firms when they advise customers or manage investments for them; information, 
so that customers can make informed choices; and protection, of customers money and 
assets. 
 Conduct of business rules bring needed transparency to the market and seek to ensure 
that customers in transactions are treated fairly. The standards are intended to establish a 
framework that protects investors and also promotes efficiency, competition, and capital 
formation. As a result of this new Twin Peaks structure, the SCA (which might be renamed 
as Emirates Financial Services Authority or EFSA) will be required to exercise the 
supervision of conduct of the financial markets and to decide on the admission of financial 
enterprises to those markets. It is also envisaged that the Insurance Authority will be 
abolished and that the prudential aspects of the regulation of the insurance companies will 
become the remit of the CBUAE whilst COB will be part of EFSA's job. However, currently, 
all rules and regulations relating to these changes are under draft and require approval from 
the government to proceed. 
 
 2.2.2 The Advantages of the Twin Peaks Approach to the UAE 
 The advantages to the UAE are of many folds and are primarily focused on 
"regulation by objective." The CBUAE's regulatory objective will be prudential supervision 
with the primary goal of safety and soundness and the SCA's (EFSA) goal will focus 
primarily on business conduct and consumer protection issues. This allows for clear focus. 
The Twin Peaks approach is also considered to ensure an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers, market integrity, and consumer protection receive sufficient priority. The model 
may help insulate prudential supervisors from an overly intrusive consumer-oriented 
approach. When safety and soundness mandates conflict with consumer protection issues, the 
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prudential supervisor may give precedence to safety and soundness mandates, because these 
are closely intertwined with financial stability. This promotes balance.
305
 
 This approach is designed to ensure that sales practice protections apply uniformly 
across all financial products, regardless of the legal status of the entity selling the product 
with emphasis on consumer protection issues, particularly for retail customers. Under this 
approach, each regulator can hire employees with appropriate expertise for their specific 
functions. Prudential regulators can employ persons with business and economic expertise 
while business conduct regulators focus on hiring enforcement oriented staffs. Having the 
twin peaks functions in separate entities can minimise conflicts between the two authorities 
and maximises economies of scale and improves accountability. It also allows rapid policy 
responses and ensures that regulatory frameworks keep pace with dramatic changes and 
innovations in financial markets. Twin Peaks also facilitates effective coordination among 
the regulatory agencies, the central banks, and finance ministries. 
 It is critical to maintain good contacts and interaction at all levels in the agencies, 
including at the principal level and the operational levels and allows for better monitoring of 
the financial system. It also reduces the chance of regulatory overlap or blind-spots thus 
improving information flow and companies can get on with doing business confident that the 
same rules apply to everybody. Furthermore, it facilitates financial services businesses to 
operate more profitably and efficiently, while treating customers honestly and fairly. Being in 
a well-regulated market may also help them do cross-border business whereby all market 





 It can be seen from the discussion in this chapter that the UAE's securities markets 
have evolved from a nascent stage to a more mature phase in a relatively short span of time. 
Over-the-counter trading gave way to trading in listed securities and markets gained depth 
and liquidity by the introduction of financial and market services like custody, (DVP) 
mechanism, market making margin trading, short selling and liquidity providers, etc. The 
financial market regulatory landscape developed in response to the market's needs, with 
banking and credit being the earlier activity to be supervised through the formation of the 
Central Bank and subsequently, as the financial services developed and the securities trading 
took off – the SCA was formed which matured as a fully functional and well diversified 
securities regulator. 
 In step with the international developments in the regulation of the financial markets, 
even the Twin Peaks model is being adopted which indicates the progressive nature and the 
developmental approach of the UAE Government whereby the experiments and 
developments in international best practices are keenly watched and where appropriate, 
swiftly adopted. However, as will be seen later, improvement is needed in the regulations 
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that deter insider dealing and enforce issuers to make timely disclosure on par with the 
international standards. 
 This chapter was the concluded the part of the thesis that is used to introduce the three 
jurisdictions especially in the areas of regulatory interest. The following chapter will plot the 
main goal of the thesis, which is to give a full description of the endemic problems in the 
very goals and objectives of sound regulations will be laid out; in particular, disclosure and 
transparency issues, systemic risk management, institutional investing and confidence, 
insider dealing, false accounting, and corporate governance. These issues will be analysed in 
both KSA and the UAE, then, they will be compared with similar issues in the UK for the 






Selected Problems common to the Securities  
Markets of the United Kingdom, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
and the United Arab Emirates 
 
Based on the discussions in the previous Chapters, this Chapter studies the issues 
faced by the securities markets and how this was dealt with in each of the three markets. The 
problems which are common to each market like transparency issues, insider dealing, 
systemic risk and governance issues are each dealt with independently. 
It is well recognised that stock markets perform at least three functions: a signaling 
mechanism to managers regarding investment, a source of finance, and a catalyst for 
corporate governance. It is the first function, however, that has attracted a lot of 
investigation, focusing on whether stock markets invariably encourage corporate managers to 
take a long-term view of investment rather than permit short term profits. The former 
perspective is particularly important for efficient investment in a developing country.
307
 
 It will be seen in this chapter that the markets of KSA and the UAE have shown some 
weakness in relation to the above as they are still largely closed and family-owned with a 
narrow concentration of ownership, so stock market developments can ultimately widen the 
investors' base, separate ownership from control, and in due time inject qualified 
management to run the affairs of these firms.
308
 This chapter addresses number of prominent 
problems in the two subjective jurisdictions on par with the third jurisdiction, the UK. 
 
1.1 The Problems Related to Disclosure and Transparency 
 Since making money is at the heart of all stock markets, the issue of transparency and 
disclosure comes hand in hand with financial gain and the securities markets. Individuals and 
organisations may become obsessed with inordinate needs for materialistic wealth and 
possessions and do not assume responsibility for maintaining a balance between the good and 
bad aspects of greed.
309
 Hence, the vital and central role of disclosure and transparency enters 
on-stage to assume, what we hope, would be a central role in minimising greed and 
improving disclosure as well as transparency and enforcement.
310
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 Unlike banking regulation, which primarily focuses on prudential aspects and 
systemic risk, securities regulation is more concerned with investor protection. In its attempts 
at protecting the investors, securities regulations should provide appropriate balance between 
"fairness" among market participants as well as at the same time promote the "efficiency" of 
securities markets.
311
 However, the concept of "fairness" in securities regulations can refer to 
various meanings that include creating a level playing field, protecting investors from 




 Hence securities regulation aims at remedying market imperfections, particularly 
correcting informational distortions caused by asymmetrical distribution of information. 
Here, the need for timely and adequate information accounts for disclosure being a main tool 
of securities regulation. However, disclosure is only one of many regulatory tools deployed 
to achieve investor protection along with other tools such as compensation schemes market 
monitoring, registration, authorisation, supervision of firms, and corporate governance. The 
debate in the literature has never been on whether or not information per se is useful to 
investors. For, no writer has ever contended against better-informed investors. The 
contention is on whether its provision should be mandated by positive law or be voluntarily 
left to market forces.
313
 However, the overwhelming majority of the literature accepts that 
when offering securities to the public, mandatory disclosure is by far the primary remedy to 
many of the shortcomings associated with voluntarily disclosure.
314
 
 The Secondary Market in the UK covers fixed income, warrants, structured products, 
ETF's, life insurance products as well as trading in shares on the main exchange, AIM and 
the OTC derivatives markets. Continuing obligations for listed entities is strict, as are the 
regulations that ensure licensed firms maintain high standards of disclosure when dealing 
with their clients and third parties. A Primary Listing on the LSE is considered to be a 
prestigious event. Admission to listing will potentially permit a company to tap into deep 
pools of capital both in the UK and Europe. This ability to access cash has huge implications 
for the companies cost of capital. Primary market listings are also prominent events which 
are often carefully followed by the media as well as the business community. Disclosure and 
transparency at a premium or standard listing on the LSE is therefore very strict. Companies 
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are obliged to disclose all manner of information to the FCA, (previously the UKLA) and to 
investors via a detailed and comprehensive prospectus.
315
 
 The rules are stringent and the FCA and the LSE have the right to reject an 
application if the company does not live up to the required standards. Some of the key 
disclosure and transparency requirements includes issuers ensuring that they do not provide 
any misleading, false or deceptive information to the market; any changes to capital structure 
without first informing the authorities as well as details relating to any changes in the board 
of directors and senior management and changes in shareholding structure too.
316
 
Furthermore, post-listing requirements on corporate governance, trading in insider 
information as well as continuing obligations are rigorous. 
 However, notably, that one of the objectives of the FSA under FSMA was to promote 
the UK marketplace. This proved controversial in the last few years because the FSA became 
very liberal regarding the quality of new issues on the Stock market with some resulting 
scandals. The problems created by the lack of (or minimal) regulation have been accentuated 
by the massive growth of the financial centre in London and the tendency that London's low 
levels of regulations have had to attract even more risky financial institutions. The key point 
is that regulators whose job is both to promote the market and regulate it face a conflict.
317
 
 On the other hand, policymakers often claim that transparency in financial disclosures 
is necessary to prevent sudden steep market declines. Also there were claim that improved 
financial disclosure results in a reduction in the frequency of market crises. In addition, 
several papers have examined the relation between financial disclosure and historical stock 
market crises. Previous research has also examined increases in financial disclosure to see if 
these increases are associated with reduced information asymmetry and improved stock 
performance.
318
 Overall, results provide some support for the hypothesis that increased 
information transparency and investor protection rights reduces market volatility and the 
frequency of large market increases and declines for the sample countries. 
 Since its inception in the early 17th Century 
319
 the LSE has faced more than its fair 
share of scandals and imbroglios. An example to that is the "South Sea Bubble" fever of the 
1720's. 
320
 The South Sea Company had been established almost a decade earlier and had 
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regularly underperformed much to the chagrin of its owners as well as the Government. In an 
effort then to breathe some fresh life into the firm, the Government issued shares to the 
public in the form of what would be referred to today as a primary listing which was then 
followed by a wildly fluctuating speculative period which, according to historical records, 
was mostly due to overenthusiastic stock brokers speculating and thus pushing up the share 




 Recent and interesting cases of listed entities facing major disclosure and 
transparency issues include Eurasian Natural Resources Corporation (ENRC) a mining 
company listed on the FTSE (de-listed as of November 2013) that has recently caused an 
uproar in the UK parliament amid allegations that its founders skimmed off profits, and that 
the company lied to investigators and paid off African presidents.
322
 Similarly, such notable 
companies as Shell and Eni are under investigation for payments to Nigeria of US$1.1 billion 
for offshore oil rights. Such blatant corruption and lack of transparency has been so serious 
that the British Prime Minister has called for a change in the transparency and disclosure 
regulations of listed entities to ensure that all "beneficial owners" are correctly identified in 
the company register. Currently, the beneficial owners of these large corporations can hide 




 Disclosure is improved ipso facto, after that as it is only once a financial faux pas or 
catastrophe has occurred and fallout has damaged enough reputations that governments and 
regulators furiously go about ensuring that the event never occurs again. Hence a flurry of 
regulation is passed which may or may not work towards the benefit of the market. The 
flurry of activity and legislative approvals needed to calm the markets in the 1720's are no 
different from the same feverish activity that consumed the UK Government and regulators 
during the global financial crisis beginning in 2008 with the crash of Northern Rock.
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 Information that investors needed to correctly assess the state of affairs of the markets 
and in particular financial institutions was not available. The internal mechanics of Northern 
Rocks precarious financial position were concealed and hidden. Disclosure was poor. Had 
there been transparency then the potential run on the bank may perhaps have been averted. In 




 Clearly, this debacle could very well have been one of London's recent  encounters with poor disclosure and 
lack of transparency since the government soon passed regulations to ensure that such a "bubble" did not 
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 Although Northern Rock was not a particularly large bank (it was at the time ranked 7th in terms of assets) it 
was nevertheless a significant retail bank and a substantial mortgage lender. See Bruni, F. & Llewellyn, D. T. 
(ed.) (2009) The Failure of Northern Rock: A Multi-Dimensional Case Study. The European Money and 
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2011, the Chancellor of the Exchequer,
325
 George Osborne, supported the proposed notion of 
"ring-fencing" 
326
 banks retail assets to ensure that they were fully protected in the event of 
another meltdown. Similarly, in the US, the Glass-Steagall law required complete separation 
of investment and commercial banking. 
327
 Costs will inevitably increase as banks lose the 
operational and financial efficiencies of being under one roof. Funding for the lending 
businesses will be used less efficiently and will be more expensive. Ultimately, the cost of 
credit will go up. 
 Northern Rock eventually was insolvent because it was hugely over exposed to the 
mortgage market. As a result of this exposure, individual high street retail customers were 
seriously affected by the liquidity crunch. Northern Rock was unable to summon sufficient 
liquidity to cover its deposits. Panic ensued. The run on the bank was the first in the UK in 
150 years. Northern Rocks' disclosure issues and lack of transparency were, without a doubt, 
the main precursor to its demise and subsequent forced takeover by the Government. 
328
 
 The investment and finance sectors in the UK have also been called to improve their 
own disclosure and transparency. The FCA role is to ensure that licensed individuals 
operating in licensed firms also conduct themselves in an open and fair manner. In its 
Handbook,
329
  the FCA states that UK disclosure rules are there to ensure implementation of 
Article 6 
330
 of the Market Abuse Directive, which specifically refers to the Directive of the 
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European Parliament and the E.U Council in 2003 on insider dealing and market 
manipulation (market abuse) and methods of combating and preventing such activity.
331
 
 The conduct of some members of the Board of Directors and senior management of 
Northern Rock in 2008 were questionable to say the least. They purposefully and with clear 
intent refrained from informing the public about certain financial matters that could affect the 
bank. Likewise, the owners of the South Sea Company in London in 1720, in collusion with 
the UK Government, refrained from disclosing key information on the performance of the 
company which eventually led to the share price collapsing.
332
 
 This event and others have led to lots of changes in the UK financial system. The 
FCA has now been tasked with overseeing market conduct of licensed firms whilst the PRA 
will concern itself with overall prudential and systemic risk issues. This departure from the 
old model to a twin-peak regulatory approach is hoped to increased disclosure and 
transparency and thus investor confidence. FCA regulations guiding market participants' 
conduct are outlined in detail in the Business Standards section of the FCA Handbook 
including conduct of business, client assets and market conduct which contains money 
laundering regulations and the prevention of insider dealing. 
 The Code of Market Conduct Handbook ensures that participants maintain open and 
transparent lines of communication both internally (from a firm perspective) and externally 
(rest of the market).
333
 This was most definitely not the situation in the case of Polly Peck, 
the once LSE listed textile firm run by Asil Nadir in the early 1980's. Having stolen millions 
of pounds undetected over the years, as well as being accused of massive insider dealing and 
manipulation of share prices, Polly Peck's stock finally plummeted in September 1990 as a 




 A complete lack of corporate governance, shareholder transparency as well as false 
and misleading interim financials caused one of the largest scandals in the history of the City. 
In a bid to avoid this type of manipulation of shareholder and public trust the FCA 
Handbooks serve as guides for member firms of the stock exchange and also include 
continuing obligations for listed entities to abide by once floated. 
 The KSA, Tadawul is the largest and most profitable equity capital market in the 
GCC.
335
As of 2012, the MSCI Index still classifies Tadawul as a 'standalone' market 
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although expectations that this will change to frontier in the near future are high.
336
 The 
market is characterised by robust corporate performance, high liquidity and share turnover as 
a result of elevated oil prices and a solid private non-oil sector. By the end of 2013 a total of 
163 companies were listed on Tadawul including such heavy weights as Saudi Aramco, 
Saudi Telecom, Sabic and Saudi Oger and by the end of 2014 that number reached 169.
337
 
 KSA disclosure rules meet the international standards of the IOSCO and the Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision and they are similar to the current rules of the LSE. 
However, when comparing KSA Listing Rules with the Listing Rules of LSE or any other 
developed market, it should be taken into account that the comparison is between the rules of 
two different types of markets; an emerging capital market that has started a few decades ago 
and has a different structure will have different problems than a mature open market. It can 
be said that KSA Listing Rules are, principally, a direct translation of the LSE Listing Rules. 
In order for this translation to suit the market conditions, they came with straightforward and 
easy language that can be understood by anyone no matter what his profession is. The 
straight forwardness in KSA rules might be due to the nature of investors in the market, as 




 Transparency and disclosure issues are closely related to MSCI's classification of 
Tadawul as a standalone market since it lacks clear and consistently coherent rules 
339
 and 
regulations with regard to openness to foreign ownership (current swap agreement with CMA 
is complicated and time consuming), foreign ownership level and foreign room level (which 
refers to the percentage of traded shares that can be owned by non-Saudi individuals or 
institutional investors) as well as ease of capital inflow and subsequent restrictions. As a 
result of Tadawul's isolation and the minimum role it plays on the global market place, it is 
rightly perceived by international investors and rating agencies as having significant 
transparency and disclosure issues. Oversight of Tadawul falls under the remit of the CMA, 
the financial regulator in the Kingdom. 
 Although larger by market capitalisation than any other GCC equity market it does 
not have the same reputation for corporate governance and transparency that the UAE has for 
example.
340
 Granted, the CMA has passed a number of rules and regulations 
341
 that address 
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key issues such as resolution of disputes, merger and acquisition regulations, investment 
funds regulations, the market code of conduct and corporate governance rules, but the 
application and adherence to some of these rules can be tenuous at times. 
 A key issue highlighted by the IMF relates to the lack of clarity and transparency 
surrounding the CMA's role relating to corporate governance and duties of directors of listed 
entities.
342
 For example, board sanctions of CMA Authorised Persons (AP's) are sometimes 
not published, in which case, board member names of certain listed entities (who have 
transgressed CGRs) are not publicly named, thus hampering the disclosure and transparency 
of the market and negatively impacting investor confidence. It should be taken into account 
that in KSA, political and social etiquette might be a factor when dealing with the Kingdoms' 
business affairs in which matters of transparency and disclosure play a less prominent role in 
the capital markets. Disclosure and transparency in enforcement also appear to be an issue.
343
  
Enforcement penalties are not exercised equally across all the listed entities on Tadawul with 
the result that the CMA has been unable to demonstrate a balanced, consistent and equitable 
track record in its regulatory actions.
344
 
 A potentially greater problem is posed by the approval and disclosure of related party 
transactions, especially those occurring between employees (and their families) of the listed 
entity and other third parties. KSA companies are required by law to disclose to the CMA 
any transactions between the company and connected persons and to publish such 
information. It would seem that the system currently in place governing the review, approval 
and disclosure of related party transactions requires further development and execution.
345
 
 In addition, KSA, unlike the UK, suffers from a weak secondary market which is a 
reflection of a narrow investor base, a short-term investment culture and the absence of 
investment banks and large foreign institutional investors. Due to a lack of a liquid secondary 
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market, portfolio and fund managers are also reluctant to invest. The market also lacks fixed 
income institutional investors and investment funds that usually play an important role in 
secondary market trading. We take note that the growth in KSA's primary market size is not a 
direct reflection of a liquid secondary market but has to do with the availability of adequate 




 In a similar vein to KSA, the UAE suffers from the same deficiencies related to the 
transparency and disclosure. The regulation of timely disclosure in local financial markets in 
the UAE consists of three articles under the SCA regulations as to Disclosure and 
Transparency.
347
 It should be noted, that discussing the problems of disclosure in more detail 
revealed that there are shortcomings in the regulations, and that the related articles are poorly 
drafted, as there are issues related to clarity of those articles that gives room to interpretation 
and creates difficulty in implementation.
348
 It is unclear when the effect of "any significant 
developments affecting the prices of such securities" that would trigger the disclosure by the 
issuer be 'probable' or 'definite.' Another shortcoming is that the time in which disclosure 
should be made is not indicated, as stating that "upon learning of the same" is not clearly 
determining the reasonable time in which disclosure is required. Moreover, not only that 
there is no mention of the issuer's liability in relation to "selective disclosure," but there is no 
clear obligation to protect the information from being used by employees, or from being 
disclosed to a third party other than relatives to the first degree. Therefore, the above 




 Hence, despite that UAE has more liberal economy than KSA but the same 
shortcomings of KSA market also exist in the UAE such as weakness of transparency and 
market infrastructure. It was noted that the lack of predictable immediacy, is a major 
weakness in the MENA market. If for example, there is an imbalance between buy and sell 
orders during a trading period, successive buy (sell) orders would get noted on the trading 
board without counter sell (buy) orders arriving at the market. Indeed, such imbalances 
would cause prices to move up or down in a volatile manner.
350
 
 The previous shortcomings encouraged market manipulation, which was one of the 
main reasons behind the collapse of February 2006. At that event, large speculators took 
advantage of having naive retail investors who traded in speculative shares as well as 
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inexperienced regulators. Another point worth mentioning is the small number of listed 
companies in KSA stock market and the UAE; there are 169 listed companies in the former 
market while there are 121 in the latter markets,
351
 compared with the average of 300 to 350 
companies in a normal emerging market. Adding the ownership structure to the latter point 
resulted in an excessively high proportion of the total trading volume in the secondary 
market. 
 This fact (Illiquid Securities) might have some serious impacts on the behavior of 
stock prices (Pricing Efficiency) and suggested that the number of listed companies should 
be higher. As a result of this low level of liquidity, due mainly to the fact that the 
overwhelming majority of stocks are concentrated in the hands of the government and major 
business families, the stock market has so far been dominated by a small number of dealers. 
In addition to that, the largest 20 or so companies are not listed on the stock exchange, either 
because they are family owned or the government owns them.
352
  
 The UAE financial regulator the SCA has yet to develop an efficient secondary 
market for bonds, sukuk and other financial instrument including derivatives. There is 
currently on-going research and discussion at the financial regulator to develop a framework 
for the expansion of a second market. Preliminary indications suggest that regulations for the 
launch of a dedicated second market are forthcoming in the next year or two.
353
 
 On deeper examination, the lack of efficient second markets appears to be a function 
of government apathy as well possible opposition from powerful commercial banks. In either 
case, authorities have come to accept that the development of the market for government 
securities as well as conventional bonds is vital for the overall development of the markets. 
Indeed the secondary market for government securities may act as a catalyst for wider fixed 
income securities markets development. As secondary markets develop, transaction costs are 




 In comparing the level of voluntary disclosure between KSA and UAE companies, it 
is noted that UAE companies have significantly higher disclosure scores than those in KSA 
especially in the category of general and financial information. The KSA Stock Market was 
established in 1985 and the UAE stock markets were not fully established until 2001; thus, 
the KSA stock market was expected to be more stable in disclosing information than the 
UAE stock markets. However, KSA companies disclose less information than UAE 
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companies. Thus, the authorities of the KSA stock market should issue regulations that 
require companies to disclose more information.
355
 
 However, generally, it is noted that the quality of reporting in both KSA and the UAE 
is at a low level. Thus, greater concern is required from both stock market authorities and 
companies to improve voluntary disclosure practices. In order for companies to earn the trust 
of investors, sufficient information is required to be provided on corporate governance 
practices as an acceptable control system. Disclosure of corporate governance practices is 
also another area that has to be improved on by companies, especially in regards to board of 
directors' information, board performance and ownership structure.
356
 
 Directors are the main key to good practices in the corporate governance system; 
however, the majority of the companies in both countries do not provide information on 
directors (qualification skills, training, and number of shares held), which reveals that 
companies are not concerned about the characteristics that directors should possess. 
However, it is important for the investors to have information on the level of qualifications 
and skills of the directors, and hence the selection of the directors may be affected by several 
factors, such as relatives as shareholders, family ownership and government ownership. 
These types of ownership have an interest in electing directors who represent them in the 
board regardless of the qualification and experience of these directors. Thus, both the 




 There are several additional important areas of disclosure that companies do not pay 
sufficient attention to in providing information, especially the items of environmental 
disclosure (environmental policies, environmental performance, environmental protection 
and product information). Thus, companies need to formulate environmental policies. In 





1.1 The Problems Related to Systemic Risk Management  
 A goal of financial supervision is to monitor the overall functioning of the financial 
system as a whole and to mitigate systemic risk. Financial systems cannot function 
effectively without confidence in the markets and financial institutions. A major disruption to 
the financial system can reduce confidence in the ability of markets to function, impair the 
availability of credit and equity, and adversely impact real economic activity. Liquidity is 
inevitably withdrawn and the fundamental mechanics of a robust market come to sudden halt. 
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 Systemic risk generally refers to impairment of the overall functioning of the 
financial system caused by the breakdown of one or more of the key market components.
359
 
Systemically important players would include, among others, large multinational banks, 
hedge funds, securities firms, and insurance companies. In addition, there are systemically 
important markets and infrastructures, in particular, the payments and clearance and 
settlement systems.
360
 The clearing systems used today, post financial crisis, are far more 
structured and regulated than they were pre-meltdown. 
 The 2008 financial crisis was a historical watershed event. It redefined the meaning of 
systemic risk and how to mitigate such risks. Other than Black Monday on October 19th 
1987 in which the LSE shed 29% in a few days, the UK equity capital markets had never 
witnessed such a severe paralysis of the financial and banking markets before. What went 
wrong?. Was this crisis caused by financial institution collapse or was this the result of an 
overall market failure?. Questions remain of course but most prevailing attitudes point out to 
the collapse of the mortgage market as the preliminary cause of the global financial crisis. 
The Lehman Brothers collapse was triggered by the implosion of the market for mortgage-




 In the UK, Northern Rock was the first victim of the financial tsunami, credit dried up 
overnight, money markets shut down, depositors ran on the banks, home prices stopped 
appreciating and borrowers (who had borrowed on the estimated and over inflated value of 
their homes prior to the crisis) defaulted on their loan and regulators over the world were 
shocked and shaken into action. The defaults caused by investors eventually led to an overall 
downgrading by global credit agencies of the institutions that held them on their books. The 
results were catastrophic. No one wanted to buy these securities anymore. Credit rating 
agencies that had hitherto rated institutions and transaction as "AAA" were now reversing 
their decision. Major firms were left holding worthless securities which had lost more than 
half their value. Defaults followed defaults. Firms collapsed. Jobs were lost.
362
 In the UK, the 
City of London witnessed slow death spirals as financial institutions had to write down losses 
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in billions as a result of the rules that require companies to account for shares on a mark-to-
market basis.
363
 Further panic ensued. 
 One of the clear lessons from the financial crisis was the lack of an adequate legal 
framework for crisis management of failing financial institutions in the UK.
364
 While the 
Bank of England was able to respond to market-wide demand for extra liquidity, the 
possibility of intervention in individual institutions by the regulatory authorities was limited 
by a lack of formal powers enabling them to take control of failing institutions. Meanwhile, 
the option of permitting insolvency was complicated by the absence of a special insolvency 
regime for banks, which meant that customer deposits and other claims could be frozen for a 
long period of time pending the working out of the insolvency procedure. Thus, it became 
clear over time that limited crisis management options were themselves a causal factor in 
determining the consequences of the crisis.
365
 
 Massive government bailouts had to be organised and negotiated both in the US and 
Europe.
366
 Worldwide, governments and regulators over the world began to take steps to 
address the failure in systemic risk procedures that allowed so many institutions to collapse 
like a house of cards. The primary focus of securities regulators traditionally has been on 
customer protection, with the safety and soundness of the institution being one means of 
furthering that goal. Safety and soundness regulation involves a mixture of conservative rules 
and more prudential review and appraisal, with an emphasis on persuasion rather than 
through enforcement action involving fines, penalties, or other sanctions. Laws and 
regulations were passed including the US Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 
367
 and the UK Financial 
Services Act.
368
 Matters related to disclosure of counterparty exposure were addressed. 
Today, as per the FCA, firms transacting over and above certain daily thresholds in the 
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derivatives and futures markets are obligated to inform the FCA.
369
 Obligatory requirements, 
with the emphasis on obligatory, have become the norm rather than the exception. 
 Unlike Europe and the US, KSA came through the financial crisis relatively 
unscathed.
370
 KSA banking and securities market sectors are generally well capitalised and 
insulated and has withstood any temporary shocks to date. Saudi investors and financial 
institutions also had minimum exposure to collateralised debt obligations and so emerged 
from the crisis in robust shape. SAMA, the KSA's Central Bank, is hugely funded and cash 
reserves
371
 are more than sufficient to ensure long term financial stability. The direct effects 
of the crisis were felt in KSA through tighter global financing conditions and weaker investor 
confidence, putting downward pressure on local equity markets.
372
 The indirect impact was 




 As a result the crisis also had only a modest impact on KSA financial system. At the 
onset of the crisis, banks' exposure to mortgage backed securities and other securitised assets 
amounted to only 3 percent of total assets.
374
 Nonetheless, global liquidity shortages did 
transmit to KSA interbank market, causing the spread between KSA interbank offered rate 
and the reverse repo rate to increase to over 200 basis points in October 2008. However, 
swift action by SAMA soon restored confidence in the market.
375
 
 The main impact on the financial system came through the banking sector's exposure 
to the defaults of two family conglomerates. Although the banks absorbed these losses, the 
two families in question, a Saudi holding company owned by the Al-Gosaibi family had 
defaulted on foreign exchange transactions, trade finance loans and swap agreements 
amounting to US$1 billion.
376
 The other, Sa'ad Al Sanea,
377
 is one of the world's richest men 
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whose company (unlisted) had assets of US$30 billion including over US$7 billion in cash 
which were eventually frozen by SAMA.This was followed a few days later by a downgrade 
in the company's investment grade rating by credit ratings' agency Standard and Poor's 
(S&P), before being withdrawn completely, in response to news that Sa'ad Group's 
management was suspending debt service payments in agreement with its creditors. Banks in 
KSA suffered significant balance sheet impairment and the events highlighted the urgent 
need for KSA to improve the transparency and disclosure in conglomerates as well as stricter 
guidelines for auditors. 
 In the UAE, the financial crisis had a clearly negative impact. Unlike KSA, whose 
market is closed to the outside world, the UAE's equity capital markets as well as banking 
system is relatively open to the influences of the external world.
378
 Throughout 2003 – 2008, 
the oil bomb in the UAE and the increased price of a barrel led to large fiscal surpluses. 
Abundant liquidity in the UAE fueled credit growth with banks' lending vast sums of money 
to institutions and individuals. In the UAE, credit growth went largely into construction and 




 Inflation took off and asset prices escalated as a result.
380
 Corporates became highly 
leveraged and an asset bubble developed around real estate and share prices. The end was 
inevitable. The boom came to an abrupt end in late 2008. De-leveraging took place on a large 
scale, oil prices fell, the UAE's external and fiscal surpluses declined markedly, stock and 
real estate prices plunged, credit default swaps spreads on UAE sovereign debt widened and 
the liquidity dried up overnight. Moreover, Dubai's two-largest mortgage lenders that were 
listed on DFM were suspended from trading.
381
 
 Decisive action by the CBUAE, the Ministry of Finance, the SCA and other 
responsible bodies helped to moderate the crisis. Infusion of liquidity into the markets by the 
deposit of long term government funds at banks, re-capitalisation of UAE banks and the 
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tightening of lending rules to the real estate and construction sectors occurred almost 
overnight. The financial crisis led to the SCA reviewing its licensing rules for brokerage 
houses with the subsequent shutting down of over 50 brokerage houses over a 2 year period 
after the onslaught of the financial crisis. 
 In fact, the severity of the threat to the UAE's systemic risk system prompted the 
UAE Authorities to consider a Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation, similar to that 
approach used by the Netherlands and Australia. The Benefits of the Twin Peaks system are 
well documented and will primarily allow the regulation of the UAE's capital market via a bi-
pronged approach whereby conduct of business regulations will primarily be the domain of 
the SCA and systemic risk the remit of the CBUAE. Notably, that the UAE has not, as of yet, 
adopted this approach to financial regulation even though discussions and research on the 
topic have been extensive. 
 
1.3 The Problems Related to the Shortage of Institutional Investors within the 
 Markets and the Investor Confidence 
 Clearly, the UK equity markets do not suffer from any lack of institutional investors 
and London has been a major financial hub and center of finance for well over one hundred 
years whereas KSA market has traditionally been dominated by small retail investors. In 
2010, retail investors accounted for 88% of transactions on Tadawul
382
 vis-à-vis market such 
as London and New York where institutional investors account for approximately 90% of 
transactions.
383
 The long-standing dominance of retail investors has led to considerable 
volatility over the years. Large institutional investors who were traditionally not permitted 
(although this has changed to a degree) and acted as long term anchors in other markets could 
not provide stability to Tadawul. The key to deepening KSA markets was increasing 
institutional participation, particularly from foreign entities who have the potential to reduce 
volatility by buying when valuations make sense.
384
 Foreign entities also promote more 
rigorous scrutiny of markets, hence their participation would certainly add to the overall 
transparency. As of 2005, SAMA had awarded several investment banking licenses to 
foreign banks who were also permitted to provide brokerage service. Although many of these 
banks provided research, it is debatable to what extent local KSA investors took advantage of 
such research to help them in making informed investment decisions.
385
 
 The UAE also has traditionally been dominated by small retail investors. The long-
standing dominance of retail investors has led to considerable volatility over the years 
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leading to a herd mentality
386
 of investing and divesting as well as an erroneous investor 
perception that the market as a one way gamble with a guaranteed pay-off. International 
institutional investors represent a small amount of daily, monthly and yearly volume on the 
DFM and the ADX.  Institutional investors represent about 22% of average monthly value of 
stocks traded. For example, in September 2013,
387
 DFM released its monthly trading 
statistics which revealed that of the total of 21 billion Dirhams value of shares bought by 
both institutions and individuals, 4.5 billion Dirhams
388
 or approximately 22% was purchased 
by institutions. Clearly, 'institutions' have room and financial ability to purchase a great deal 
more than 'individuals' so the disparity between the two reveals the lack of institutional 
investors in the market. 
 As previously indicated, the benefits of having a deeper market for institutional 
investors also promotes more rigorous scrutiny of markets, hence their participation would 
certainly add to the overall transparency. It is no secret that the UAE's capital markets scene 
needs to attract more institutional investors to ensure long-term growth prospects. Retail 
investors continue to dominate the bulk of trading activity and the authorities believe more 
investment is required from overseas to ensure healthy returns and long-term prosperity. To 
ensure this happens, authorities believe that investor education is vital towards increasing 
investors. 
 Additionally, not only London is one of the world premier listing destinations due to 
its deep liquid pools of cash, large and sophisticated institutional investors as well as a 
trustworthy and proven financial system policed by a world class regulator, but it's reputation 
speaks volumes for itself and there is no lack or shortage of investor confidence. However, 
the aftermath of the financial crisis in the UK did cause the regulators and financial bodies to 
question the logic and structure of their regulatory system.
389
 Investor confidence may well 
have been temporarily dented, especially as a result of the bail-out of Northern Rock, 
Barclays Bank and the Royal Bank of Scotland but it was not sufficient for investors to flee 
in masse from the market without ever wanting to return. Juxtaposed to this is investor 
perception and confidence in other less well developed markets including KSA and the UAE. 
 Problems of disclosure and the quality of assets are the backbone of the regulation of 
securities markets. The lack of incentive for management and issuers to provide the 
information needed to assess the quality of the assets may render price discovery in the 
markets unreliable. The rationale for having regulations is to protect investors from 
questionable practices and opportunistic behaviour by market participants whose activity 
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may undermine the integrity of the markets and as well as erode investor confidence in 
them.Accordingly, it is worthwhile for policymakers to introduce regulations that reduce 
informational disadvantages and maintain investor confidence. It follows that securities 
markets regulations could be categorised as regulations that aim to increase disclosure and to 
protect investors from malpractice. Regardless of what good regulations are introduced or 
what they aim to achieve, they are in themselves without any practical benefits. Regulations 
without enforcement are worthless.
390
  
 In light of this statement, a shortage of investor confidence in a financial regime is 
usually an indication of several factors, primarily that of a lack of trust in the underlying 
mechanics of the market. Lack of confidence denotes that the rules do not work very well. 
That is why it is imperative that the CMA adopts clear policies that are enforceable. Of equal 
importance, investors need to be able to see such enforcement taking place, hence the 
importance of disclosure and transparency by a financial regulator. The issue of disclosure 




 The primary responsibility of financial regulators is to ensure, amongst other things, 
that investor confidence remains high. There is no point in having detailed financial 
regulations and no investors. Lack of investor confidence can be a function of several factors. 
For example, restoring investor confidence in the local audit process as well as improving the 
reliability of audited financials issued by issuers would be integral towards maintaining 
investor confidence. Transparency of disclosure is a non-negotiable requirement of an 
effective and efficient market regulator. As of March 2014, 97.5% 
392
 of the listed entities in 
the UAE issued their audited financials as per IFRS and on time as per the requirements of 
the SCA. Adherence to these standards is expected to boost investor confidence no doubt. 
 In difference to KSA's CMA, the SCA does not publish its audited financials neither 
does it issue reports to the market in a comprehensive manner that outlines all the changes or 
proposed changes taking place in the UAE equity markets. By following KSA, the SCA 
would certainly be taking the step in the right directions towards transparency and regulatory 
disclosure. Why, one might ask, should the rules of disclosure apply to listed entities only? 
Shouldn't the rules of disclosure also apply to the SCA? Who regulates the regulator? 
 Furthermore, the CMA in KSA publishes relatively all names and penalties of 
violators of securities regulations in order to ensure investors that perpetrators are indeed 
being reprimanded. Once again and at odds with most sophisticated markets, the UAE sets no 
such precedence. The SCA regulated firms that are in breach of regulations may be 
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reprimanded as per the law but the imposition of such penalties is not placed in any public 
forum or newspaper or any other media outlet. 
 
1.2 The Problems Related to Insider Dealing  
 The extent to which the UK government has been struggling to introduce a thorough 
regime of market abuse containing insider dealing offences is surprising. The resulting 
confusion may be explained by the fact that the UK government did not compromise by 
abolishing criminal sanctions under CJA 1993.
393
 Retaining the criminal sanctions is 
probably an indication that the UK government considers insider dealing as a public wrong 
and there should be criminal sanctions against individuals who engage in insider dealing. It is 
also true that the UK government in retaining criminal sanctions intended to dedicate them to 
serious offences where administrative penalties do not seem to be deterrent. This is obvious 
in one of the following cases, which will be discussed shortly. 
 In 1980, the Companies Act 1980 
394
 made insider dealing a criminal offense for the 
first time.
395
 The Company Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985 
396
 re-enacted the insider 
dealing provisions of the Companies Act 1980. The Financial Services Act 1986 amended 
the 1985 Act and also created new powers to investigate and enforce insider dealing laws.
397
 
The FSA gained criminal prosecution powers in 2001, although the first successful 
prosecution was not secured until 2009.
398
 
 The FCA defines "inside information" in the FSMA 2000 as information that is not 
"generally available" and "relates directly or indirectly to one or more issuers…and would, if 
generally available, be likely have a significant effect on the price of the qualifying 
investment or on the price of the related investments."
399
 Inside information is therefore hard 
to come by, and knowledge of inside information places an individual or a firm at a distinct 
advantage over others when trading stocks. An insider is defined, as per the above Act, as a 
person who possesses inside information as a "result of having access to certain 
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 Access to the information is of course not criminal. It is the intent of the 
insider in the manner in which the said information will be used that matters. Armed with 
these definitions then, insider dealing as an offense is described in Section 52 of the CJA 
1993 as: 
"An individual who has information as an insider is also guilty of insider dealing if 
(a) he encourages another person to deal in securities that are price-affected securities 
in relation to the information, knowing or having reasonable cause to believe that the 
dealing would take place in the circumstances mentioned and (b) he discloses the 
information, otherwise than in the proper performance of the functions of his 
employment, office or profession, to another person."
401
 
 The definition also includes information that is not generally available to the public 
and is of the kind that, if it were generally available, a reasonable person would expect it to 
have a significant impact upon the price or value of a company's securities or its financial 
instruments. Hence, a regular user would be likely to consider such information to be 




 Traders who operate out of brokerage houses are extremely susceptible to insider 
dealing. The rules governing the conduct of traders in the City is therefore very strict and the 
implications of a trader being caught dealing with insider information are very serious 
indeed. In London, several prominent and recent cases have been exposed over the last few 
years and are punishable by hefty fines or up to seven years imprisonment. For example, in 
2010, an ex-hedge fund trader with a UK trading firm called AKO Capital LLP used his 
position as a trader to deal in 19 different securities. He was accused of conspiring with 
another person based on inside information he provided on those 19 securities.
403
 These 
dealing were to amass the hedge fund manager a sum of UK£131,000. By using his position 
as a trader at AKO to direct trades and commissions towards another associate who worked 
as a "cash equities broker," the defendant amassed a large amount of money and gifts. The 
amount paid to the hedge fund manager was proportionately equal to the amount of 
commission earned by his associate for trades placed. The exchange of information between 
parties is vital for there to be insider dealing. The perpetrator was sentenced to 10 months in 
prison as well as fined UK£50,000 for conspiracy to commit insider dealing.
404
 
 However there are some acts that could be misinterpreted as an insider dealings while 
they fall under different wrongful act. Some of the larger financial fiasco's committed in 
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recent times by such famous traders such as Nick Leeson of Barings,
405
 Jerome Kerviel of 
Societe Generale 
406
 and Kweku Adoboli of UBS 
407
 dealt in tens of billions of dollars but 
were not strictly speaking insider dealing. These traders all lost vast sums of money for their 
financial institutions primarily by placing wrong bets, misreading the arbitrage markets and 
by deliberately hiding losses from their superiors. Their conduct was certainly criminal but 
cannot be defined as insider dealing in its purest form. 
 The FCA's largest and most complex insider dealing case to date related to the arrest 
and subsequent conviction in 2012 of four individuals in what the FCA called "Operation 
Tabernula" 
408
 a long-running joint investigation between then the FSA and the Serious 
Organised Crime Agency (SOCA).
409
 Another equally prominent and longest case that the 
FCA has highlighted is "Operation Saturn." It was a sophisticated and complex scheme that 
took four years to conclude.
410
 
 The exploitation of confidential price-sensitive information otherwise called insider 
dealing is the most common form of market abuse and carries severe consequences if the 
perpetrators are apprehended. The market for corporate securities has been vulnerable to 
fraud and abuse from its inception. Maintaining and upholding fiduciary trust is integral to 
the overall success of markets. It is also vital for positive investor perception. A market 
which is subject to securities fraud without due punishment or retribution will quickly lose its 
reputation. It is in the interests of all parties involved in the value chain to ensure that 
securities fraud has correct mechanisms to identify, prevent and swiftly punish it in the event 
it takes place. Insider dealing is also referred to as a type of securities fraud. To ensure that 
trust remains a key component of a market, the breach of this trust must carry serious 
consequences. In other words, the punishment must fit the crime. To ensure an orderly 
market with minimum cases of securities fraud and insider dealing then the regulator must 
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apply strong enforcement measures that will sufficiently prevent people, firms and traders 
from breaking the law.
411
 
 As opposed to insider dealing, securities fraud is a deceptive practice in the stock or 
commodities markets that induces investors to make purchase or sale decisions on the basis 
of false information, frequently resulting in losses in violation of securities laws. More often 
than not, these securities are sold by "boiler rooms" or unregistered and unlicensed traders 
whose intent is to sell investors a non-existent or worthless stock for a financial 
consideration. The most common way is via telephone and this is called "cold calling" where 
a "trader" sells you the benefits of a share, stating that it is a good investment in return for the 
investor sending a cheque or divulging their credit card information over the phone. In either 
case, the fraudsters escape with substantial amounts of money. Investors have been conned 
out of their hard earned cash and have actually received nothing in return. 
 The UK Code of Market Conduct sets out types of conduct such as insider dealing 
and market manipulation that may be construed as market abuse  
412
 whilst the Price 
Stabilising Rules allow managers and their agents in financial institutions to support and 
correctly price the issues of securities by buying the securities in the secondary market 
(trading floor etc.) for a limited time after their issue. The rules relating to this provide a 




 Market abuse and manipulation is notoriously difficult to prosecute since 
investigations are often extremely onerous affairs. The role an Authority plays is vital in 
building investor confidence; too little regulation and the market becomes unruly, too much 
regulation and the market stagnates. Balance must be sought and maintained. Malpractice, 
primarily by market members/participants is a global phenomenon. Some markets, of course, 
trump others in the degree of malpractice conducted whilst other have a reputation for quiet 
adherence to all the rules. 
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 The Securities market in KSA has had its fair share of malfeasance and fraud, 
however, the CMA through the CML has attempted to install a semblance of control over the 
conduct of market players during the last few years. Dispute resolution and the ability of an 
investor to bring malpractice to light are key components in overseeing negligent conduct. As 
previously discussed, as a further measure to protect from malpractice in the securities 
market a further body within the CRSD was created,
414
 while the ACRSC 
415
 functions as 
backup to litigants who are unsatisfied with a sentence passed by the CRSD. Thus, the right 
of appeal exists in the event that a decision issued by the "First degree Court" CRSD is 
unsatisfactory in which the ACRSC is considered as the appellate (or second degree) court. 
These committees are quasi-judicial bodies; their decisions are regarded as judicial rather 
than administrative. Their final decisions cannot be appealed to any other judicial body. The 
independence of this judicial system for securities litigation is regarded as the collective or 




 Notably, as per Article 25 of the CML, both the CRSD and the ACRSC are fully 
independent of one another and have separate mandates within which to discharge their 
duties. 
417
 There are three types of securities cases that the CRSD has jurisdiction over: 
• Civil cases: Complaints between investors, the CMA and Tadawul. 
• Penal cases: Complaints brought forth by the CMA against specific violators of the 
CML. 
• Administrative cases: Review claims against the decisions made by the CMA or 
Tadawul. 
 
 As per the data exhibited on the CRSD website, in 2010 there were 114 cases 
presented of which 93 were dealt with via the civil suit; 11 cases dealt with via penal suit and 
10 cases through Administrative suit.
418
 The number of cases dealt with by the CRSD in 
2009 
419
 and 2008 
420
 were significantly higher (140 & 175 respectively) probably as a result 
of KSA market crash. The CRSD also publishes and announces its cases on its official 
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 as a means of promoting and enhancing transparency in the market as well as 
boosting investor confidence. 
 Notably, all cases brought before the CRSD to date only relate to KSA citizens and/or 
entities. Progression towards a body that will eventually deal with foreign investors is as yet 
unknown. Penalties are also stated for the public to view.
422
 For example, in 2009, KSA 
reported a high profile case where the prominent Chairman of a company was alleged to have 
abused his position on the Board of the company and used the information in his possession 
to profit from trading in the shares of the company. The chairman of Bishah Agricultural 
Development Co. was sentenced to three months in jail after he was found guilty of insider 
dealing. At that time, Reuters reported that market watchers said it was the first time stock 
market violations had led to a jail term.
423
 
 Despite the above, unusually, a majority of the CRSD sentences appear to be passed 
"in absentia," where the defendant has obviously run off without further communication and 
where the authorities are forced to pass sentence and disperse judgment via official gazette. 
Moreover, with regards to the issue of transparency, KSA institutions have been and perhaps 
may continue to be notoriously reticent in publishing information or judgments. Although the 
CRSD has posted their judgments online for the public to view, other cases, in particular 
involving the CMA, remain silent.
424
 The CMA's policy appears to be underpinned by 
concern that disciplinary outcomes, specifically the announcement of sanctions against AP's 
may affect the development of the local market by adversely affecting investor confidence in 
the market and investors willingness to continue to conduct business with the entity 
concerned.Although it is clear that substantial penalties have been levied by the CMA Board, 
the regulatory effect of these actions are not clearly understood by the investment community 
due to the lack of transparency relating to the violating conduct and the sanctions that have 
been imposed in respect of them. The policy of the CMA has traditionally been seen as 
discouraging regulated entities from proceeding to CRSD since anonymity may be more 
significant to them than obtaining a review of the efficacy of the CMA's findings.
425
 
 Generally speaking, therefore, the availability of public information can be difficult to 
access. Unfortunately, answering these questions is a matter of speculation, given the general 
tendency for courts and judicial tribunals in KSA not to publish their decisions. This 
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contributes to the persistence of uncertainty among both the general public and prospective 
foreign investors, given that practitioners may only obtain answers to such questions through 
their own litigation and not through recourse to any settled, clear and accessible legal 
principles. 
 These issues of uncertainty are in direct conflict with both the importance of certainty 
and clarity of the law for efficient securities markets and KSA public policy of attracting 
foreign investment for the purpose of job creation and economic growth. An essential 
requirement for the improvement of KSA's image is that decisions made be published which 
would help in determining the position of KSA law and would allow the development of 
general theories for KSA financial securities laws. 
 Unyielding enforcement of laws is as important as the strength of their drafting 
processes and the final write up of their provisions. This is in addition to the fact that 
adjudication of business disputes requires an effective and independent judiciary that ensures 
the rule of law. Stout enforcement of laws by courts is crucial to protecting investors and 
promoting investment in securities markets.
426
 Empirical works have shown that despite the 
fact that regulators hold the enforcement of the legal rights of investors as a matter of prime 
importance in KSA; the actual enforcement is shown to be humble at best.
427
 The KSA's 
CMA Law of 2003 establishes specialised securities courts that in securities market disputes. 
Such move was thought to develop an effective and fair mechanism for securities disputes, 
however; deficiencies in dispute resolution continue to be seen. Such deficiencies were 
blamed on ineffective enforcement of securities laws and, in particular, civil liability 
provisions. Other weaknesses were found by interested researchers; including but not limited 
to: insufficient number of securities courts, lack of experienced and efficient judges and 




 An example is the court remedial power of the account of profit.
429
 This can be 
brought by the CMA on behalf of investors, where the violator may be obliged 'to pay the 
CMA the gains realised as the result the violation.' 
430
 Therefore, the account of profit is 
available against persons who have made a profit based on a violation of the provisions of 
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CML of 2003 and the CMA rules and regulations. This remedy has been imposed by the 
CRSD in several cases, none of which concerned defective disclosures in a prospectus, or in 
continuous disclosure and periodic disclosures. The available cases are mostly associated 
with the violations concerning insider trading.
431
 
 The major weakness of this remedy that should be mentioned is that the sole plaintiff 
permitted is the CMA. As stated in Art 59(a)(4), the CMA alone is allowed to seek the 
remedy of  'account of profit' before the court. The practice in KSA differs to that in a 
number of common law countries in this regard, for while an account of profit is about taking 
away the gain, victims must be able to be recompensed for the loss and damages they suffer 
as a result of that illegal gain.
432
 Individuals must have the right to prevent violators from 
retaining gains made, based on a breach of the market laws, and the victims of such breaches 
should have the right to claim their loss after the gain is paid to the CMA's account.
433
 
 In addition, it has been argued that the protection of investors has been also weakened 
in KSA by the inefficient enforcement of securities laws. Thus, it is noted that improvements 
are required in order to achieve an effective judicial enforcement of securities laws and in 
view of the present situation, members of the securities courts lack accountability.
434
 There 
are no specific standards or requirements for the evaluation of the performance of the 
securities courts. The CRSD can issue civil, administrative and penal decisions, including 
imprisonment. Leaving its members without accountability may lead to undermining their 
performance.
435
 In KSA, therefore, lack of confidence in the judiciary precludes investors 
from going to law courts for judicial remedies. Investors are either reluctant or incapable of 
going to court for judicial remedies. Therefore, recently, Saudi stock exchange financial 
analysts deduced that the market conduct laws and regulations require reforms associated 
with fair trial and the need for transparency in dealings.
436
 
 The UAE legal system which regulates all of the UAE financial markets exhibits 
inadequacies under both the Federal Criminal Law No. 3 of 1987 and the Federal Law No. 8 
of 1984 Concerning Commercial Companies for dealing with market abuse practices. The 
Criminal Law does not encompass cases of financial crimes such as market abuse. In fact, 
insider dealing regulation in the UAE local financial markets only involves particular types 
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 Not only that the related articles contain no clear definition of inside information but 
to certain extent set some of it characteristics, such as 'affecting prices of securities' and 
'unpublicised or undisclosed information.' Moreover, the definition is insufficient, because it 
does not specify the magnitude of price fluctuation that may have been induced by 
information if released to the market or, conversely, whether this data is specific, precise, or 
factual.
438
 It is surprising that such poorly drafted articles are designed to deal with such a 
complex act as insider dealing. The matter is compounded by introducing criminal offences 
while the Law sets no clear definition of the punishable act. Moreover, neither of the terms 
'unpublicised' or 'undisclosed' information is defined or brought under guidelines. The two 
terms are not synonymous, since 'or' means that fulfilling one criterion is sufficient. These 
terms are rather eccentric, and cannot be compared to the definition of 'inside information' in 
recognised jurisdiction in order to reach a reasonable definition.
439
 
 Also the meaning of 'by virtue of his position' is not clear. It implies that only 
directors are liable, where the law should also include employees and people who have 
access to information because of their profession, such as lawyers and accountants. Article 
37 also provides no definition of 'exploits' and 'unpublicised information.' The scope of the 
prohibition in this Article is another shortcoming. It only prohibits exploiting inside 
information by dealing in securities; however, disclosing such information to a third party 
such as friends or relatives is not prohibited. Insiders may also seek indirect benefits by 
establishing networks to exchange inside information.
440
 
 While Article 39 of the SCA Disclosure and Transparency Regulations is clearer in 
determining liable insiders, as it provides a list of primary insiders; including the chairman, 
the members of the board of directors, the general manager and any of the employees of the 
company. However, the use of the term of 'inside information' in this Article also creates an 
ambiguity, since in the three articles of such Regulations that address inside dealing; different 
terms are used for the same concept. 
 The comparison of the SCA legislation to that in the UK's, certainly, has showed that 
the regulatory system may be deficient in some areas, such as the definition of inside 
information. Under the SCA Law there is an absence of a requirement that inside information 
should be precise or relevant to particular securities or to an issuer of securities.
441
 In 
contrast, these requirements are provided by the UK laws. In addition, the SCA Law 2000 
and respective Regulations did not provide a clear a definition of the act of insider dealing. It 
limited the scope of insider by providing that 'any person' must obtain the inside information 
by virtue of his or her position. The 'position' as a term made for a shortage of the law by not 
including secondary insiders and because it is based on the meaning of Arabic rather than it 
                                                          
438
 Al Shamisi, H. S. (2010) Investigation into Market Abuse in the UAE Financial Markets: A Comparative 
Legal Study. PhD Thesis. University of Exeter. 153. 
439
 Albelooshi (2008) 'The Regulation of Insider Dealing…,' supra note 251, at 85-87. 
440
 Ibid, 87. 
441
 See Alhamrani, S. R. (2011) Insider Dealing In the Stock Market Environment: A Comparative Study 
between American. British and Emirates laws. PhD Thesis. University of Leeds. See also Al Shamisi (2010) 





 This makes the SCA Law 2000 inadequate in covering all offences that come 
under market abuse. The Law prohibits only the exploitation of inside information, although 
it does not clarify what amounts to the exploitation of inside information.
443
 
 The UK used different approaches for prohibiting market manipulation. The law uses 
specific wording to cover a wide range of illegal practices of market manipulation. It 
prohibits any conduct that leads to deception of investors or actions that create an artificial 
impression, or cause the creation of an improper appearance relating to demand or the supply 
of, or the value of an investment. The UAE legislations are obviously lacking in terms of the 
extent of their prohibitions against some practices related to market manipulation. As will be 
seen later in the case of the DIB's shares, the SCA law 2000 does not encompass provisions 
applied to market manipulation such as matched orders and market cornering practices.
444
 
 Therefore, the above Law has not presented a comprehensive decision regarding the 
practice of insider dealing and market abuse and the related provisions to insider dealing are 
inadequate to safeguard market integrity and to protect investor interests.
445
 The practice of 
insider dealing cannot be addressed, controlled or prevented when the law is not sufficiently 
clear or when it has several shortcomings and legal loopholes. 
 Not only those provisions against insider dealing under the above law are not 
adequate, but also abiding by these provisions is not yet common practice.
446
The number of 
cases that have been brought before the national courts is not clear, but even this has not been 
enough to reduce the prevalence of these practices and to ensure that the provisions of the 
SCA Law of 2000 are applied.
447
 Despite the ambiguity in regards to the cases that were 
presented to the courts, the SCA announced that between 2007 and 2009, it detected 
approximately 721 cases of market manipulation,
448
 however none of these cases revealed 
insider dealing. 
 Since there are no reported cases on insider dealing, an examination of the outcomes 
of the first well-known case on market manipulation of 'Dubai Islamic Bank' can give 
insights to the deficiencies about the justice system in relation to market manipulation under 
the SCA Law 2000.
449
 In this case the Court of First Instance applied Article 41 of the above 
law and fined defendants 1,000,000 Dirhams, but the value of the transactions carried out by 
the defendants reached 9.34 billion Dirhams. The fine imposed should not be less than the 




 Ibid., 190.  
444
 Ibid., 260-61 
445
 Ibid.  See also Albelooshi (2008) 'The Regulation of Insider Dealing…,'supra note 251; and Alhamrani 
(2011) 'Insider Dealing In the Stock Market…', supra note 441, at 253-54. 
446
 Al Shamisi (2010) 'Investigation into Market Abuse in the UAE…', supra note 438, at 248. 
447
 Ibid., 153. 
448
 See the Annual reports of the SCA 2007, 2008 and 2009. See Sca.gov.ae (2014) SCA Annual Report (2007). 
[Online] available from: http://www.sca.gov.ae/Arabic/Publications/Pages/Reports.aspx. [Arabic]; and 
Sca.gov.ae (2014) SCA Annual Reports (2008-2013). [Online] available from: http://www.sca.gov.ae/English/ 
Publications/Pages/Reports.aspx. [Accessed: 10 October 2014]. 
449
 The case envisages three forms of market manipulation; matched orders, corner action and disseminating 
false information. For full examination of the case, see Al Shamisi (2010) 'Investigation into Market Abuse in 
the UAE…', supra note 438, at 248-56. 
313 
 
expected profits to be obtained or the loss to be avoided.
450
 In terms of regulation by the 
SCA, there appears to be an inability of the Authority to perform its natural role of 
controlling the mechanisms of the market or in reducing illegal practices engaged in the 
market. As there was a huge circulation of DIB shares on the DFM because of the 
manipulation of the market, this eroded public confidence in the markets and served as an 
example of the need for more supervision  .
451
 
 In this case, the court heavily relied on the experts' report, which significantly altered 
the court's opinion. Therefore, the Court of Appeal acquitted the defendants from the charges 
of market manipulation on the basis of the expert report alone. This raised the important issue 
of the influence of specialist courts or judges. It therefore supports the opinion that creating 
specialist judges for crimes relating to the financial market is necessary because regular 
judges are unable to understand technical matters relating to securities transactions. The lack 
of the judges' expertise gives a reasonable explanation as to why the Court leaned so heavily 
upon on the technical expertise of the expert report and why the Court of Appeal acquitted 
the defendants from the charge of market manipulation. It also introduced the concept of 
criminal reconciliation, and the need to publish offenders' names and proportional fines.
452
 
 Moreover, to be able to determine the civil and criminal consequences about the fate 
of the contract concluded as a result of using material non-public information in securities 
trading requires consideration of the legal approach in the comparative laws, which stipulate 
that the contract shall be void if it was concluded as the result of the commission of a crime 
or if it conflicts with the public order and morals as in most Arab countries, including KSA 
and the UAE. This rule was taken originally from classical Islamic law.
453
 Therefore, under 
the Law of 2000, violators are not required to disgorge illicit profits;
454
 however it is possible 
under KSA CML as previously indicated. 
 In addition, considering the view that insider dealing is a victimless crime;
455
 it is 
difficult to identify the contracting parties in the automated trading system in the securities 
market to enable one of them to seek the annulment of the contract. For that, the UAE 
legislation, like other GCC countries, does not set special rules for the civil liability resulting 
                                                          
450
 Ibid. However, compare with the case of DIFC v Shuaa Capital International Limited 2008 where Shuaa 
Capital, one the UAE's largest investment companies, was fined nearly 3.5 million Dirhams ($850,000 for the 
market manipulation, and $100,000 for the obstruction of the DFSA's investigation) in 2008 for manipulating 
the price of DP World's shares and then obstructing an investigation into the case. The DFSA indicated that 
Shuaa Capital had intentionally set about raising the closing price of DP World shares on March 31st 2008, so 
that it could mark up the book value of its proprietary portfolio in those shares for accounting purposes. 
Essentially, Shuaa Capital ended up closing its mark-to-market portfolio value at a massive premium to 
previous closing, thus boosting net profit (although this was not an actual cash gain). Shuaa did this by standing 
in the market during the closing minutes of trading with bid prices well above those at which the shares had 
been trading at that day. The penalty at the time imposed by the DFSA was significant. Dfsa.ae (2008) 
Enforceable Undertaking - Shuaa Capital. September 2008. [Online] available from: http://www.dfsa.ae/ 
Documents/EU%20-%20Shuaa%20Capital%20-%20September%202008.pdf.[Accessed: 3 October 2014]. 
451
 Al Shamisi (2010) 'Investigation into Market Abuse in the UAE…', supra note 438, at 135. 
452
 Ibid, 130-32, 135. 
453
 Comair-Obeid, N. (1996) Particularity of the Contract's Subject Matter in the Laws of the Arab Middle East. 
Arab Law Quarterly, Volume 11. 347, and in general, see 331-349. 
454
 Alhamrani (2011) 'Insider Dealing In the Stock Market…', supra note 441, at 251, 291.  
455
 Hetherington, J.A.C. (1967) Insider Trading and the Logic of the Law. Wisconsin Law Review. Issue 3, 720. 
310 
 
from trading. Hence, the legislations in above counties do not pay attention to the issue of 




 The UK legislator, however, provided the FCA to disgorge the profits obtained by 
insider dealing from the wrongdoer to the company in question, even if he was a secondary 
insider (tippee). Under the authorisation of Section 383 of the FSMA 2000, the FCA has the 
power to order, through the court, any offender to disgorge what he gained through illegal 
insider dealing to those injured by such dealing.
457
 Although, the UK Act of 1980 did not 
protect the victims of insider dealing with regard to civil accountability, yet, the common law 
was applied to address this shortcoming. The implementation of the common law was 
initially through two theories, fiduciary duty and breach of confidence. This situation was 
changed when the government introduced the FSMA 2000 that provides a civil remedy for a 
victim of insider dealing.
458
 
 In the UAE, if the offence of insider dealing is in connection with the management of 
a company, the SCA will not be able to disqualify company directors and officers who have 
been convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, the offence. The law does not empower the SCA to 
do so, but the law does leave this power to the courts. It is obvious, therefore, that the 
disqualification penalty is a valuable instrument in the developed markets, such as the UK, 
for deterring insider dealing.
459
 
 Although the offence of insider dealing can lead to criminal and civil penalties, it is 
subject to a number of defences. The legislature of the UK has realised that many persons 
who act in good faith can be affected by the generalisation of the prohibition of insider 
dealing. Accordingly, while the Emirati legislator has not provided any special defences to 
the charge of insider dealing, the UK regulations contain safe harbours against such a charge. 
The CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000 contain defences that can protect any person who possesses 
price sensitive information that are not generally available against the charge of insider 
dealing.
460
 Hence, the existence of a legitimate justification for trading in securities by 
someone who knows material non-public information opens the door widely to a successful 
defence against the charge of insider dealing. In contrast, in the UAE, no statutory defences 
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protect investors if the element of good faith is present. That could affect innocent 
individuals who, in good faith, traded while in possession of material nonpublic information 
or passed it on to others. 
 The recent trend in the regulation of insider dealing is to delegate to the regulator the 
power to enforce civil/administrative fines to deter insider dealing. This is not given to the 
SCA in the UAE, but it is apparent in the reforms in the UK. Combining more than one kind 
of penalty has been efficient in combating insider dealing. For a long time, the UK system 
depended on criminal sanctions. These were thought to be a main reason for the limited 
number of successful prosecutions of insider dealing. Therefore, the UK government adopted 
a civil/administrative regime through the FSMA 2000 as a more practical weapon to deter 
insider dealing. 
 In short, there are many deficiencies in the SCA regulations in respect to insider 
dealing. While the legislations the SCA have prohibited exploiting inside information but 
they did not characterise this information. There is no particular requirement that inside 
information should be specific or precise. The SCA regulations also did not require that 
inside information should be relevant to particular securities or to an issuer of securities. 
Both of these requirements (precise and relevant to) are omitted by the UAE Decision, which 
contrast to the UK laws.  
  Further, those regulations did not define the insider properly. Article 39 
defines an insider as 'any person,' but it limited the scope by providing that 'any person' must 
obtain the inside information by virtue of his or her position. In this sense this definition did 
not include secondary insiders under this Article. The term 'position' has a special meaning in 
the UAE culture as referring to one who is usually on the top of the hierarchy in entities. In 
fact, it is a different meaning in Arabic than it is in English. This creates a loophole in the 
legislation which may reflect the impracticality of successful prosecution.
461
 
 Moreover, it also did not criminalise three behaviours: 'leaking of inside information' 
to friends or others, 'procuring' or 'encouraging' another person to deal. Therefore, the SCA 
Regulations suffers from an inadequacy by not criminalising these behaviours. Moreover, the 
Decision does not criminalise the action of using inside information without requiring that 
the person should benefit from his action. As soon as the action is executed a crime has 
occurred and it is against the rule of equality and fairness between the investors with regard 
to access to inside information. It is opposed to the UK legislation which has criminalised the 
action without requiring the benefit. Accordingly, the UAE legislature should criminalise the 
use of inside information without requiring 'personal benefit.' 
462
 
 In addition, many judicial authorities rely on different legal systems, which lead to 
different approaches towards essential concepts that are used to provide definitions of market 
manipulation and the types of sanctions imposed. Even though the UK jurisprudence, does 
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not provide definition for market manipulation but it focused on behaviours which may 
amount to market manipulation practices. The SCA Regulations, on the other hand, lack the 
definition of such practices and have shortcomings in terms of prohibiting some practices 
related to market manipulation.  
 Although the SCA Law does not criminalise market manipulation such as matched 
order, wash trades and such other practices which mislead investors, however; it criminalises 
actions of fictitious transactions under Article 26(2) of the SCA Law of 2000, only if it is 
committed by brokers. Yet, this has been a drawback in the Law since the criminal 
responsibility for fictitious transactions has been fixed only against a broker whereas other 
market participants would go without a punishment. This deficiency should be remedied by 
criminalising any conduct that constitutes or creates an artificial price through false or 
misleading impression of trading.
463
 Furthermore, where the UK law imposes severe criminal 
punishment upon those who commit insider dealing that goes from seven years up to twenty 
years in prison. 
 In contrast, a prison term in the UAE is not less than three months and not to exceed 
three years. Moreover, not only there is no effective method to prevent the act of market 
manipulation from taking place in the financial markets, it is also difficult to prove whether 
transactions and trading in the market are manipulative or not. The main protection for 
investors and the market from such practices should be provided by the supervisory 
authorities of the CMA and the SCA. Therefore, certain steps are required to be taken by 
those authorities to avoid the above deficiencies. However, even if the SCA attempts to 
remedy these deficiencies by issuing further rules and regulations, the sanctions imposed by 




1.5 The Problems Related to False Accounting 
 The UK Serious Fraud Office states quite clearly that false accounting is the 
falsification, concealment or destruction of records and is mostly used to trick innocent 
investors or people into parting with money or other property or to cover up what has already 
been done by falsifying accounts.
465
 False accounting is an offence under the Theft Act 1968 
Section (17) and is punishable by prison sentence and/or fines. The intent of falsifying 
accounts is usually either to hide/omit a previous falsification or to deceive others for 
monetary gain. The Act defines false accounting as follows: 
"Where a person dishonestly, with a view to gain for himself or another or with intent 
to cause loss to another (a)destroys, defaces, conceals or falsifies any account or any 
record or document made or required for any accounting purpose; or (b)in furnishing 
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information for any purpose produces or makes use of any account, or any such 
record or document as aforesaid, which to his knowledge is or may be misleading, 
false or deceptive in a material particular; he shall, on conviction on indictment, be 




 Another definition is that false accounting is the concealment, falsification or 
destruction of records in order to mislead people and/or stakeholders into departing with 
money or assets.
467
 False accounting is also used to cover up or hide misrepresentations of 
fraudulent activity which has already taken place. 
 The impact of false accounting on the capital markets considered one of the systemic 
risks that threaten the markets' stability and causes serious harmful damages to the investors, 
which means that false accounting is directly related to the investors' protection principle, 
hence, it is one of the most regulatory challenges globally. The key reason behinds this 
consideration is the fact of the importance of presenting "fair" financial information to the 
investors as a part of investors' protection, and fair markets theory. Furthermore, the 
importance of presenting fair financial information is critical to the whole economy and the 
regulatory framework to prove that there are strong corporate governance principles in place 
and enforceable through sufficient legal system.
468
 
 Investors around the world require transparent and fair financial statements in order to 
take their investment decisions to become shareholders in any particular company, fund 
managers and financial advisors use these statements to build their investment strategies and 
provide their investment advices, which means that inappropriate financial statements will 
lead to inappropriate investment decisions and advices, therefore, inappropriate market's 
behavior and lack of rationality, all of this will results financial damages to the investors.
469
 
The importance of presenting "fair" and appropriate financial statements exceeds the scope of 
investors and the company's shareholders, as there are other parties that are concerned about 
these statements. These parties include the group of company's stakeholders such as: 
regulatory bodies, creditors and suppliers.  
 All these groups look for "fair" and appropriate financial statements to build their 
decisions on them. For instance, regulatory bodies will be concerned about the statements for 
the matters related to investors protection as mentioned above. Creditors like banks and 
bondholders are one critical group that will be examining the financial statements of 
company to assess its financial position and profitability in order to provide the company 
with any funds or loans. The same concept applies to the suppliers during the commercial 
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 Therefore, there are a set of principles and guidelines that are globally recognised to 
govern the matter of financial reporting and accounting treatments, these principles are the 
International Accounting Standards "IAS" and the International Financial Reporting Standard 
"IFRS." 
471
 Listed companies around the globe are obliged to prepare and present their 
financial statements based on these principles, hence, these companies are usually obliged to 
appoint external auditors whom responsibility is to ensure that these financial statements are 
prepared according to the IAS and IFRS and any other local regulatory requirements. The 
company's directors are responsible to provide the stakeholders, the investors and markets 
with "fair" and appropriate financial statements that represent the financial position of the 
company clearly and without any false information, which means that those directors are 
accountable for performing the cares duties to provide fair financial statements. 
 This concept plays a big role in solving the agency problems as owners of the 
company "shareholders" demanding the highest level of transparency and disclosure related 
to the financial performance of the company which is run by the management, therefore, 
false accounting can increase agency problems and result lack of trust in the markets. In other 
words, financial reporting and disclosure are potentially important means for management to 
communicate firm performance and governance to outside investors.
472
 
 Although the term false accounting is referring mainly to the matter of intention, there 
is another aspect that shall be considered which is the professional responsibility and the care 
duties – or what is called fiduciary duties – that the directors and the company have to 
perform. False accounting could be a result of insufficient internal controls or not performing 
professional cares duties, which is considered as negligence under the tort law in most of the 
legal systems.
473
 Therefore, false accounting concept could be extended to include all the 
case where proper cares duties aren't conducted by the company, as this may lead to lack of 
sufficient internal controls and weakness of policies and procedures that governs and 
supervise the process of preparing and auditing the financial statements of the companies, 
and as a result will increase the risk of false accounting either directly or indirectly. There are 
many cases of false accounting that have proven how much this matter could be harmful to 
the markets and investors, several cases from the UK, KSA and the UAE will be discussed. 
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 In the UK, the case of Micalizzi in 2010 
474
 is a good example of this type of crime. 
Between 1 October 2008 and 31 December 2008, an investment firm's master fund suffered 
catastrophic losses amounting to approximately 85% of its value in volatile market 
conditions following the collapse of Lehman Brothers. The defendant, the CEO of the firm, 
Alberto Micalizzi, knowingly and deliberately concealed these massive losses from investors 
whilst advising them that no losses had been made. To conceal his losses the CEO then went 
about concealing and falsifying accounts and records to cover up. The FSA had opened an 
investigation and then imposed a fine of UK£3,000,000 on him which made it one of the 
heaviest fines ever imposed by the FSA. 
475
 
 Of course, this neatly ties in with the large host of other issues primarily related to 
corporate governance, general duties and responsibilities of directors as well as financial 
reporting and accounting responsibility. No doubt, the FCA takes a very serious view of this 
type of fraud and the imposition of such a heavy fine as well as revocation of FCA granted 
license sends a strong message to the market participants that this type of behavior is 
unacceptable for those individuals deemed to be fit and proper. Thus, criminal liability is 
imposed for obtaining property or pecuniary advantage by deception and for false 
accounting. Where such an offence is committed by a company with the consent or 
connivance of a director or other officer, that person will be liable as well as the company. 
 Under KSA's legal system, the matter of negligence is implied as a part of the Islamic 
Law Shari'a system which is governing the whole legal system. One of the features of 
Islamic law is that the owner of an item bears the risk of loss or damage in relation to that 
particular item. Accordingly, it should be noted that risk of loss or damage cannot pass unless 
ownership passes. That said, risk could actually pass without ownership passing where either 
(i) a person is in the business of looking after/protecting/maintaining the asset left in his care; 
or (ii) the asset is lost or damaged by a negligent/wrongful act.
476
 
 Although, a direct reference to the term "false accounting" in KSA is unavailable in 
the CML, nonetheless, several references to falsification, concealment and fraud are made 
with regard to conduct of market participants in KSA equity capital markets. Additionally, 
penalties for the provision of false information are quite stringent. Persons who engage in 
dealing activities without authorisation or who violate prohibitions against market 
manipulation or insider trading may be subject to imprisonment.  
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 The CMA Board itself, under the power contained in the CML has the right to bring a 
legal action before the CRSD to seek an order for the appropriate sanction. The sanctions 
include many measures as well as imposing fines on any person who has violated the CML, 
or the regulations of Tadawul.
477
 The Board may also suspend or revoke the license of an AP 
who deliberately violates the CML or its Implementing Regulations and if submits false or 




 In addition, the CML refers to the CMA Board' rejection of any prospectus issued that 
attempts in any way to alter material information of a company or that provides false and 
misleading statements or information to the general public. Issuers that offer securities by 
way of public offer are subject to disclosure requirements including shareholder voting 
decisions and provisions for equality of treatment. Furthermore, prospectuses are approved 
by the CMA and may be rejected in the event a violation is detected. Reporting and 
disclosure by significant shareholders of listed companies and by persons who would seek 
control of a listed company are also required. Minimum information requirements for 
prospectuses require that the prospectus contain sufficient information to enable an investor 
to assess the issuer's activities, financial position, management and prospects as well as the 




 A recent regulatory case where accounting failures has a significant impact on the 
company financials is the KSA's giant telecommunication company Mobily.
480
 In November 
3, 2014, Mobily announced accounting errors that shall affect the company's profits for 2013 
and the first nine months of 2014! These errors forced the company to restate its profits from 
6.68 to 5.94 billion Riyals for 2013 and from 1.63 billion Riyals to 472 million Riyals for the 
first nine months of 2014.
481
 The CMA suspended the trading of the company shares and 
started an investigation 
482
 to determine any violations by the company to the CML, in 
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addition to that, Mobily's board of directors suspended its CEO from acting on his duty till 
the end of the internal investigations conducted by the company's audit committee.
483
 
 All listed companies in the UAE are required to submit financial statements annually 
and quarterly, these statements should be prepared in accordance with IAS as stated in the 
SCA Regulations.
484
 Hence, these companies are obliged to take the necessary processes and 
procedures to ensure that they conduct the cares duty to provide the investors and all 
stakeholders with fair and appropriate financial statements.  Similarly, in the UAE, false 
accounting is also used to cover up or hide misrepresentations of fraudulent activity which 
has already taken place. The boom and subsequent financial crisis saw a multitude of false 
accounting cases rise to the public notice. In fact, the authorities were attempting to make a 
direct point to the general population that cases of fraud and theft will not be tolerated in the 
least. Perhaps one of the most famous cases in the UAE of false accounting, fraud and 
misrepresentation relates the DIB embezzlement case of over 1.8 billion Dirhams.
485
 
 Such false accounting occurrences that wiped tremendous amount of shareholders' 
profits and equity illustrates how such practices could be harmful to the markets and effects 
the level of confidence among the investors. Therefore, regulatory bodies role in this regard 
shall be increased to ensure adopting an appropriate regulatory framework and strict financial 
monitoring on the markets, especially companies that are classified as Systemically 
Important Financial Institutions "SIFI's." 
486
 The next Chapter will propose some mechanisms 
to develop tools to manage false accounting. 
 
1.6 The Problems Related to Corporate Governance 
 Good corporate governance is generally supposed to add or increase the value of a 
firm. This will expected to be reflected in the stock price and in the buying pressure 
witnessed on a script throughout a trading day. The governance of firms has become and will 
continue to become an important issue for investors, foreign institutions and local 
corporations and is expected to play a central and important role in the further growth of any 
equity capital markets. Furthermore, it helps investors to identify and compare the corporate 
governance practices among different companies, and consequently, investors can chose the 
best alternative investment based on the level of corporate governance practice.
487
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 The first version of the UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code) 
488
 was produced 
in 1992 by the Cadbury Committee.  
489
 Its paragraph 2.5 is still the classic definition of the 
context of the Code: "Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed 
and controlled. Boards of directors are responsible for the governance of their companies. 
The shareholders' role in governance is to appoint the directors and the auditors and to satisfy 
themselves that an appropriate governance structure is in place. The responsibilities of the 
board include setting the company's strategic aims, providing the leadership to put them into 
effect, supervising the management of the business and reporting to shareholders on their 
stewardship. The board's actions are subject to laws, regulations and the shareholders in 
general meeting." Corporate governance is therefore about what the board of a company does 
and how it sets the values of the company, and is to be distinguished from the day to day 
operational management of the company by full-time executives. The Code is a guide to a 
number of key components of effective board practice. It is based on the underlying 
principles of all good governance: accountability, transparency, probity and focus on the 
sustainable success of an entity over the longer term.
490
 
 The Code rules are based on the "comply or explain" principle.
491
 The essence of the 
principle is that compliance with the codes is not mandatory, but what is compulsory is 
disclosing non-compliance.
492
 It applies to all companies with a Premium listing of equity 
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shares regardless of whether they are incorporated in the UK or elsewhere. Since the CGRs 
rules need to be complied by all UK licensed entities, rules usually set out what is the 
minimum acceptable standard. There is no doubt that this is important to establish basic 
benchmarks of appropriate behavior, however, as it will be outlined later, this approach was 
criticised for contributing to worsening the corporate governance culture and for not 
encouraging companies to do more than the minimum. 
 As per the continuing obligations on the LSE, all companies with a Premium Listing 
of equity shares in the UK are required under the (UKLA) Listing Rules to report on how 
they have applied the Corporate Governance Code in their annual report and accounts.
493
 As 
per the FCA's Disclosure and Transparency Rules (DTR)
494
 an issuer must ensure that it: 
• Monitors the financial reporting process. 
• Monitor the effectiveness of the issuer's internal control, internal audit where 
 applicable and risk management systems. 
• Monitor the statutory audit of the annual and consolidated accounts. 
• Review and monitor the independence of the statutory auditor. 
 
 The extent of a company's obligation to 'comply or explain' depends on the nature of 
the listing of that company's securities. Companies applying to admit securities to trading on 
the Main Market of the LSE must have their securities admitted to the UKLA Official List. 
The listing set out distinct listing obligations for specific security types and issuer types. 
Each category falls into one of two high-level 'segments,' Premium or Standard. 
 A Premium Listing is only available to equity shares issued by trading companies and 
by closed and open-ended investment entities. Standard Listings cover shares; global 
depositary receipts (GDRs), debt and securitised derivatives. In order to be eligible for the 
FTSE UK Index Series, which includes the FTSE 100 index, a company must have a 
Premium Listing. Companies with a Standard Listing must comply with EU minimum 
requirements on corporate governance disclosure, namely the Statutory Audit Directive
495
 
and the Company Reporting Directive.
496
 
 These directives were implemented in the UK through the DTR.
497
 Companies with 
Premium Listed equity shares are subject to more stringent UK disclosure standards in 
addition to the EU minimum requirements. For this reason, companies that do not wish to 
comply with stringent conditions may choose to list on AIM. Shareholders are of course 
made aware that certain corporate governance matters are not required under such a regime 
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and will therefore have no voice (at legal) in the event that a company is not abiding by 
certain corporate governance matters. 
 There is no 'comply or explain' obligation on companies admitted to AIM. However, 
the LSE's 'A Guide to AIM' states that companies seeking admission to the AIM must 
publish an admission document that includes a statement on whether or not the company 
complies with its home country's corporate governance regime, and if not, an explanation as 
to why. The guide goes on to state that compliance with the Code by AIM companies is 
widely regarded as good practice and has become expected of larger AIM companies. Many 
investing institutions expect their investee AIM companies to comply with the Code or set 
out the reasons for non-compliance in much the same way as Main Market companies.
498
 
 Even though the corporate governance requirements are less stringent than a standard 
or premium listing on the LSE, AIM has taken precautions to ensure "accountability." In 
order to list on AIM, a company must appoint a "Nominated Advisor" often referred to as a 
"NOMAD." 
499
 A NOMAD is a financial adviser appointed by AIM to assist a company 
through the listing process on AIM. To be appointed as NOMAD the adviser must abide by 
strict condition which he must adhere to in order to remain a bona fide adviser on AIM. 
 This method of ensuring accountability as well as fostering AIM's reputation has 
proven quite beneficial. NOMADS are reluctant to advise companies to list on AIM that do 
not or cannot live up to the corporate governance requirements. Since a NOMADS "bread- 
and-butter" as it were depends upon ensuring that companies taken through an AIM 
floatation are reputable, it is unlikely that they will promote or support companies that do not 
measure up to the standards.
500
 In preparing for admission to listing, a company is advised 
that the appointment of non-executive directors will add tremendous kudos to its admission. 
The issue of appointing non-executive directors to a board is crucial and is one of the 
conditions that NOMADS seek to ensure from their prospective clients. Non-executive 




 Historically, Tadawul in KSA has relatively considered not very transparent simply 
because it was closed to international foreign investors. Technically speaking it still remains 
closed although nearby initiatives indicate that this may change. Over the years, KSA has 
implemented several rules and regulations to address the issue of corporate governance and 
in 1985 the MOCI approved the Disclosure and Transparency Standard. However, in 2006 
the CMA Board issued the Corporate Governance Regulations in which it applies to listed 
companies. For that, corporate governance in KSA falls, somewhat confusingly, under the 
remit of both the MOCI and the CMA.
502
 This confusion is problematic since external parties 
and investors are uncertain as to which body holds legal sway over corporate governance 
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issues. For example, the IMF review of KSA's implementation of IOSCO principles relating 
to corporate governance stated that key documentation issued by the CMA and the MOCI is 
in Arabic only and is, therefore, very difficult to understand.
503
 There is a lack of clarity 
around the jurisdiction of the MOCI and the CMA especially with regard to corporate 
governance issues which are supposedly under the CMA, and as a result, it seems that some 
governance regulations would be difficult to enforce. 
 In KSA, both the CMA and Tadawul are tasked with building their credibility on the 
global and local stage in coordination with other important KSA Authorities.  However, the 
CMA and SAMA need to work closely together in order to build awareness of the 
importance of corporate governance amongst companies, shareholders and stakeholders 
especially focusing on the development of director training programs and to disclose that in 
order to build qualified and ethically motivated directors.
504
 Also compliance with certain 
existing non-financial disclosure requirements is considered to be weak by market 
participants in particular with respect to corporate governance-related information. Although 
companies are required to disclose in the board report their corporate objectives, their 
dividend policies, and the board composition, disclosure in other areas remains haphazard, in 
particular the disclosure of information related to beneficial ownership, board member 
qualifications, and nomination procedures.
505
 Furthermore, the definition of independence is 




 The above also applies to the UAECGRs of 2009.
507
 Not only that banks and foreign 
listed companies are exempted from applying it. Moreover, banks being listed companies 
abide by the CBUAE guidance rules which resulted in confusion as well as the weakening of 
the SCA role as the primary regulator of the financial markets. The Red Flag Group,
508
 
conducted the 'Corporate Governance, Compliance and Code of Conduct Study 2013,' on the 
UAE listed companies. With transparency as the essence of the report, it provided a detailed 
insight into the publicised approaches to corporate governance and compliance. Each was 
judged on eight criteria, including whether they had a publically available code of conduct, a 
whistle-blower policy and if they have a designated and experienced chief compliance 
officer. All of these factors were analysed and companies were scored out of a possible, 
perfect score of 32.0. The sample group of the study was comprised of companies listed on 
the DFM and ADX. Company statistics were gathered and each of the companies was 
subsequently ranked from largest to smallest in terms of market capitalisation. 
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 The study is divided into two parts with a detailed set of criteria under each; (a) 
Analysis of overall approaches to corporate governance and compliance. (b) Analysis of 
publically-available codes of conduct. The study revealed the following: 
1. The average score for companies from the UAE is a mere 5.5 out of 32.0. London and 
Singapore outperformed the region with higher average scores of 12.6 and 18.2. The 
study indicated that the UAE companies had not fully complied with the Corporate 
Governance Code of 2009. While the companies appointed Compliance Officers, they 
were not very senior, lacked clarity on their roles and responsibilities, and for some of 
them compliance was all about ticking the boxes. 
2. Only 9 of the 123 companies make their codes of conduct publically available, which 
demonstrates a significant lack of transparency and best practices in the area of 
compliance – thus, exposing most UAE companies to risk. 
3. Most sectors score similarly between Dubai and Abu Dhabi, but there are notable 
differences within a few, with the latter scoring significantly higher in the consumer 
products and engineering sectors; and the former scoring notably higher in the 
telecommunications, transportation and banking sectors.
509
 
 The report also revealed that some analysts indicated that companies which remain 
under the direct control of a strong chairman struggle to set up independent risk management 
mechanisms. As global banks reduced staff count amidst low business some years ago, 
domestic markets, dominated by retail investors, have seen a reduction in the number of 
company analysts publishing corporate reports. This trend is reversing now. However, with 
the upgrade of the UAE markets to emerging market status by major international Index 
providers like MSCI,
510
 large foreign financial institutions and investment funds are now 
investing in UAE listed companies, which is leading to the strengthening of the Corporate 
Governance culture in the UAE based companies. More corporate scandals over the recent 
past have come to light in the more stringently regulated world of the DIFC. Some of the 





 for alleged market manipulation on Nasdaq Dubai. 
 The report further makes out a case for companies seeking global capital stating that 
they should display a commitment to higher corporate governance standards, use compliance 
as a competitive advantage and build ethics into their corporate culture as something which 
has great tangible value. The UAE companies are now implementing a robust compliance 
culture with greater seriousness, the report states; thereby becoming more proactive and less 
reactive in responding to regulatory issues. Other business intelligence firms also say demand 




 MSCI Market Classification, supra note 79. 
511
 DFSA v Damas 2010. Dfsa.ae (2010) Enforceable Undertaking - Damas International Limited - The 
Abdullah Brothers. March 2010. [Online]  available from: http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/Enforceable%20 
Undertakings%202010/Abdullah%20Brothers%20EU.pdf. [Accessed: 3 October 2014]. 
512
 DFSA v Shuaa Capital International Limited 2008. Dfsa.ae (2008) Enforceable Undertaking - Shuaa 
Capital. September 2008. [Online] available from: http://www.dfsa.ae/Documents/EU%20-%20Shuaa%20 
Capital%20-%20September%202008.pdf. [Accessed: 3 October 2014]. 
311 
 
for background checks on potential partners and suppliers in the Middle East have risen since 
the global financial crisis.
513
 
 Overall, the corporate governance compliance in the UAE is mandatory while in the 
UK and KSA, is designed to provide flexibility so that a company may achieve the outcome 
intended by the principles whilst taking into account the nature, scale and complexity of its 
business. Notably, there are also differing requirements between the related jurisdictions, 
such as the number of independent directors on a board. While the UK Code requires that at 
least half the board, should comprise independent directors, and that smaller company should 
have at least two independent directors. The UAECGRs require that at least one third of the 
directors be independent. In KSA two board members or at least one-third of the board 





 This Chapter indicates that KSA and the UAE regulatory systems have shortfalls in 
the areas of systemic risk management, the lack of institutional investors within the markets, 
shortages of investor confidence, insider dealing, fraud and malpractice within the securities 
markets, false accounting, and problems relating to corporate governance. It seems that 
regulations as well as enforcement need to be improved as the current regulations do not 
appear to constitute an efficient system which will deter insider dealing and enforce issuers to 
make timely disclosure.  
 Based on the history of financial markets, it is also assumed, that rigorous regulation 
is the main method in maintaining an informative, transparent and efficient market. With 
regards to the deficits in the rules relating to the above, the final chapter will examine the 
attempts and possible approaches and methods aimed at providing a solution to these 
problems.  
 The next chapter will analyse sound practices in the UK along with academic and 
practitioners works and publications to build the case to offer a set of suggested solutions to 
the afore mentioned endemic problems.   
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Suggested Approaches to Selected Problems Common 
To the Securities Markets of the United Kingdom, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia 
And the United Arab Emirates 
 
 As seen from the previous Chapter, KSA and the UAE need their respective stock 
markets to better allocate their investments. Instances of past stock markets liberalisations in 
many countries have proven to enhance investment by lowering the cost of capital that arises 
from revaluation of stock prices.
515
 In this sense, stock market development will effectively 
complement the financial services provided by the bank-based financial system. To obtain 
this desired outcome, liberalisation has to be accompanied by the requisite legal and 
regulatory reforms that enhance the institutional environment for investors as the absence of 
these reforms denies the stock market from having great impact on investment. Emphasis 
then should be on stock market developments with the appropriate institutional 
infrastructures, because not only that could increase investment but, perhaps more 
importantly, its efficiency too.
516
 The following Chapter therefore puts forward various 
solutions for the problems examined previously. 
 
1.1 Suggested Approaches to Disclosure & Transparency. 
 At the heart of disclosure and transparency issues is the equitable distribution of 
information. Properly informed members of public are able to make informed financial 
decisions. A company accused of non-disclosure and ambiguity will not garner high investor 
confidence and it is likely that this will be reflected in its share price.
517
 Successful global 
equity markets all share key characteristics, foremost of which is that they are all considered 
to be transparent and fair. Proponents argue that transparency makes capital markets 
accessible to both retail and institutional clients, enhances market integrity and stability, and 
provides regulators greater ability to monitor activity. They reason that with the introduction 
of transparency, price discovery and the bargaining power of previously uninformed 
participants improves. Thus, a new or uninformed investor is able to access the same type of 
information as an investor who has been vested in the market for some time. Timely and 
equitable dissemination of information is the crux of the matter.
518
 
 A transparent market also disseminates timely post-trade information. In today's fast 
paced and interconnected world it would seem very strange indeed if investors were unable 
to access corporate, price and trading information of any given listed stock but instead had to 
rely on a limited set of options including telephone calls with broker dealers or consultations 
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with other third party specialist who would provide such information for a fee. For example, 
in the US, the debt and corporate bond markets underwent significant changes in July 2002. 
Information on prices and volumes of completed transactions were required to be (once 
again) publicly disclosed. It was primarily through the efforts of the National Association of 
Securities Dealers (NASD),
519
 now FINRA, that post trade data was collated via the Trade 
Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) program.
520
 
 Similarly, in the UK and as per both the MiFID and the FCA regulation, all EU 
regulated market securities (including all the UK securities) are supported by a pan-European 
trade reporting service.
521
 The provision of detailed and pertinent information to investors 
reached it ascendency in the UK in 2007 with the conclusion of what the EU referred to as 
the Transparency Directive which took effect in the UK on 20 January 2007.
522
 This 
Directive details the EU's requirements on transparency in relation to information about 
issuers who are listed on regulated markets. It created a framework for companies across 
Europe to adopt similar standards around information disclosure. The Directive requires 
companies to disclose information at regular intervals through specific channels and, in that 
way, it bears many similarities to the existing UK regime. 
 In essence, the Transparency Directive covers the content and regularity with which 
companies should report financial information and the way in which these information 
should be relayed to the market. It should be noted that the new Transparency Directive that 
was issued in 2013 closes an existing gap in the notification requirements by requiring 
disclosure of major holdings of all financial instruments that could be used to acquire 
economic interest in listed companies. A second major change is the fact that the requirement 
to publish quarterly financial information was abolished. This aims at reducing the 
administrative burden and encouraging long term investment. Finally country-by-country 
reporting disclosure requirements have been incorporated in the new Transparency Directive. 
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Companies are also obliged to disclose regulated information on a fast and a web portal 
serving as a European electronic access point. Companies already use regulatory information 
services, such as RNS, 
523
 to disseminate information widely and speedily. 
 On a stock exchange as prestigious as London, it is imperative that investors have no 
doubt in their minds that corporate and financial information will be released in a timely and 
efficient manner. Furthermore, the content of this information must be detailed and pertinent 
and investors need to be certain that the authorities (in this case the FCA and the UKLA) 
have vetted all the said information to ascertain its veracity. As a result, investors have high 
confidence in the UK's financial authorities as well as the LSE. In fact, the LSE is one of the 
world's most respected exchanges and companies listed on it must subscribe to a stringent set 
of admission and disclosure standards ensuring high quality and simultaneously providing 
deep pools of capital.
524
 
 The UK financial Authorities are constantly examining ways to improve 
dissemination of information. The FCA's DTR 
525
 are regularly adapting to changes in the 
financial and regulatory environment. These rules cover corporate governance; disclosure 
and control of inside information by issuers, transactions discharged by senior employees of 
the issuers as well as connected persons, financial reporting and its associated requirements, 




 Investors, stakeholders, issuers, and other related third parties are invited to discuss 
and make suggestions regarding rules and regulations and in this manner they are constantly 
adapting to the financial regime. It is through regular discussions and panel participation that 
all stakeholders are able to come to some form of agreement as to what is best for all 
concerned. Furthermore, the FCA's prospectus rules outline in detail what firms must 
disclose thus adding to the significant transparency and disclosure requirements.
527
 
 The UK's approach in ameliorating disclosure and transparency is, in the researcher's 
opinion, significantly pre-emptive. In other words, lessons learnt from the carnage of the 
financial crisis include taking action before an event takes place. It is therefore pro-active 
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rather than passive. For example, the FCA regularly involves itself in what it refers to as 
"feedback" sessions. The outcome of discussions, views, opinions, and suggestions of 
stakeholders are formulated and published in order to achieve some form of all round 
consensus on matter being discussed.
528
 
 The FCA takes its own transparency very seriously too and it is this key issue that, in 
the researcher's opinion, differentiates itself from both KSA and the UAE regulators. The 
open forum for discussion and the FCA's willingness to ensure that its own procedures are 
transparent to all other stakeholders who include firms in the market, business operators and 
other third parties cements the investor confidence in the UK equity markets. Are their open 
forums to discuss the transparency of the Saudi Capital Market Authority? Or the Emirates 
Securities and Commodities Authority? 
 Government laws and regulations ensure transparency and disclosure requirements 
are diligently followed through. In the UK, the authorities are not at all shy in imposing 
penalties on those who do not abide by the rules. The FCA Fines Tables for 2014
529
 is a key 
reminder of just how often the FCA punishes transgressors. The fines levied for 2013 and 
published in March 2014 are a staggering UK£86 million!
530
 Notably, the Spanish bank, 
Santander contributed the amount of UK£12 million
531
 to this total by explicitly misleading 
consumers and not adhering to correct transparency rules and it is precisely this commitment 
to the law and transparency that sets the UK financial markets apart. No one, no matter who 
they are, can get away with breaking the rules within London's stringent equity capital 
markets. Now, conversely, let us examine the solutions to the weakness of transparency and 
disclosure in KSA and the UAE, as noted in the previous Chapter. 
 The Morgan Stanley Consumer Index (MSCI)
532
 classifies the UK as a developed 
market. It also classifies KSA as a 'standalone' market and the UAE as 'emerging' (up from 
frontier in 2013).
533
 The MSCI index alone is sufficient evidence to measure a nation's 
adherence to transparency. KSA's 'standalone' ranking informs investors that transparency 
and disclosure issues are significantly lacking whereas the UAE's ranking of 'emerging' 
suggests the exact opposite. An emerging market, at least in MSCI's opinion, has taken 
significant steps towards positively addressing matters of transparency. Similarly, an 
emerging market status also indicates that financial authorities have worked hard at 
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improving and retaining investor confidence and that they are committed to doing whatever 
is necessary to further this cause. 
 The KSA CMA and the UAE SCA lays down the rules and regulations for 
transparency and disclosure in their respected jurisdictions. As noted previously, 
transparency and disclosure issues are closely related to MSCI's 'standalone' ranking. 
Openness to foreign ownership is a matter of controversy and this fact alone has often stood 
in the way of international investor's negative perception of the country. Are the rules poor or 
is it the imposition of the rules by the market regulator that are deficient? One would suggest 
that the actual rules for transparency and disclosure are sufficient but here is a general lack of 
follow through when it comes to enforcement. 
 There is no doubt that a plethora of regulations have been passed including 
investment fund regulations, market code of conduct as well corporate governance which 
have indeed provided a clearer framework for companies and individuals to use.
534
 However, 
it is the application of these rules that has given cause for concern. Disclosure and 
transparency in enforcement also appear to be an issue as there is no point in having detailed 
regulations if there is no one to enforce these rules. Enforcement penalties are not exercised 
equally across all the listed entities with the result that the two regulators have been unable to 
demonstrate a balanced, consistent and equitable track record in their regulatory actions.
535
 
 As mentioned before, rules mean nothing without strong policing. The current 
disclosure and transparency rules with regard to all corporate governance issues, particularly 
with respect to disclosure of information related to beneficial ownership, board of director 
qualifications and nominations procedures still remain haphazard and unreliable.
536
 However, 
Tadawul has attempted to correct this key concern by undertaking an initiative to publish 
ownership data online as well as publishing the violators names. Clearly, the CMA and 
Tadawul need to continue to develop the process to ensure that company disclosure is in 
compliance with applicable rules and it should also enforce disclosure of compliance equally 
across all offending entities without exception. 
 This 'naming and shaming' approach is similar to the FCA's regime and clearly has 
benefits towards improving transparency in the country. Ensuring that violators are named 
and shamed is certainly not an easy matter, in KSA and the UAE, where business and social 
affairs are usually kept secret. There is a deep cultural aversion towards airing faults and 
displaying violations in public and it is this cultural variation that leads to such disparity in 
investor perception. This must be changed. A financial regime that allows the breach of law 
is inefficient and impractical and will only serve to damage the reputation of the market in 
the long run. 
 Not only such high level of disclosure and transparency appears in the UK stock 
markets, but it also appears in the debt market. The LSE Professional Securities Market 
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 specialises in the listing of all types of debt including corporate debt, Eurobonds, 
ABS's 
538
 and convertibles. A redeeming characteristic of this market is that debt can be listed 
in practically any denomination that the issuer wishes. The PSM has stringent disclosure and 
transparency regulations that all issuers are required to adhere to. Both the FCA and LSE's 
commitment to transparency are maintained in the PSM. 
 What makes London's capital market much more superior to most other global 
markets is the variety of choice and depth available. The development of a huge secondary 
market in debt, fixed income and bond trading is staggering. The PSM provides a more 
flexible alternative to the requirements regarding denomination and financial information 
compared to other markets regulated in the context of the EU directives, and it is aimed at 
issuers targeting professional investors. There are currently more than 550 
539
 debt securities 
admitted to this market. 
 On the PSM, debt securities, regardless of the denomination, can be admitted under a 
wholesale regime. By following this route to listing, companies are able to admit any type of 
debt security. There are a wide range of benefits for issuers, including a less onerous listing 
process; the ability to submit listing particulars as defined in Chapter 4 of the UKLA's 
Listing Rules;
540
 also, issuers do not need to submit accounts according to International 
Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS); instead, local GAAP suffices. Clearly the rules are 
less stringent than a premium listing on the primary market. Admission and disclosure 
standards 
541
 are certainly less onerous than the primary market but are no less exacting. 
Companies seeking to list debt on the PSM must still disclose key financial information, as 
well as (when required) a prospectus which will be subject to the rules of the competent EU 
home regulator. Similarly, issuers wishing to transfer from London's main market to the PSM 
are required to follow correct procedure such as make the appropriate announcements 
through the 'Regulated Information Service' (RIS) stating the issuers intent to move.
542
 Such 
clarity of information by issuers to the public serves to highlights London's commitment to 
transparency and disclosure. 
 Needless to say, continuing obligations on the PSM ensure that continuous price 
sensitive information is provided to investors and market participants. The Exchange has a 
responsibility to ensure that it operates proper and orderly markets. In order to achieve this, it 
is essential that companies publish price-sensitive information on a timely basis and in 
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accordance with the rules of their securities regulator, which impose a general obligation on 
companies whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market or prescribed 
market to release information of this type. The timely publication of information benefits 
companies by allowing the market in their securities to function properly and benefits 
investors by ensuring that all participants are operating on an equal basis. 
 The standards relating to disclosure of information to the Exchange are outlined in 
'Continuing Obligations,' 
543
 and include a requirement for an issuer to inform the Exchange 
of the timetable for any corporate action affecting the rights of existing shareholders. It is 
vital that compliance with the standards is enforced for the benefit of all companies and the 
market as a whole. Compliance with the standards is important to ensure that the exchange 
continues to operate high-quality and orderly markets and that there is suitable protection for 
all market participants, including companies and investors. As far as possible, when a breach 
is detected, action is taken on a timely basis. 
 The Order book for Retail Bonds (ORB)
544
 offers electronic trading in gilts and retail-
size corporate bonds, i.e. those which are tradable in smaller, more manageable 
denominations of UK£1,000 or similar. These include some of the UK's most well-known 
companies such as Vodafone, GlaxoSmithKline, BT and Marks & Spencer. It also provides 
corporate issuers with an efficient mechanism for distributing bonds to private investors – 
helping to stimulate new issues of bonds that are tradable in smaller denominations and 
providing private investors with wider investment opportunities. The new order book brings 
transparency to the bond market in three ways: all participants simultaneously access 
executable prices and have equal opportunity to trade at the best available price; can see the 
price discovery process through data feeds; and all trading is monitored by experienced 
market surveillance teams and the regulator. 
 What makes a secondary market transparent? There are many questions to ask in this 
regard. Is the current level of transparency optimal? Or should it be raised? Will such a 
change emerge spontaneously from market forces, or is regulatory intervention necessary? 
There are at least two types of transparency. Markets are ex-ante (or pre-trade) transparent 
when investors have access to quote information before trading. Ex-post (or post-trade) 
transparency refers to the dissemination of information about trades to market participants 
(after the trade). These broad categories themselves must be refined. For example, ex-ante 
transparency is greater if the observable quotes are firm, or if the identity of the agent posting 
the quote is known, or if all orders are visible (as opposed to hidden). No doubt the greater 
the population of investors observing ex-ante quotes or ex-post-trades information, the 
greater the level of transparency. So there appear to be several forms of pre-trade 
transparency. Do investors request that before trading at a price, this price should be 
announced to all market participants? In that case, are investors required to announce the size 
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of the deal and the participants in the trade? If someone has a better offer, would they be 
allowed to step in? 
 Similarly, there are several degrees of post-trade transparency, depending on a 
number of variables. What is reported? – Just the transaction price (or rather the yield spread 
relative to Treasury)? What about the quantity traded? Is there at least an indication of the 
size of the trade, e.g., below 500,000, or above one million? Should the direction of the trade 
also be reported? And with what delay should the information be disseminated? 
 Clearly, there are other instruments other than bonds that contribute to London's pre-
eminent position in global secondary markets including warrants and OTC derivatives. 
Transparency drives this desire to constantly grow the second market in the UK. It is the 
transparency that investors crave that makes London such a special place. On a further note, 
the LSE is constantly adapting to global investor demand and appetite and has recognised the 
world's vast hunger for investing in corporate debt markets. In a nod to this hunger, the LSE 
is one of a number of major stock exchanges looking to build its bond-trading activity. 
 Recently, the LSE agreed a US$15 million deal to buy Bonds.com, a platform for US 
corporate and emerging market bonds.
545
 The growth of the secondary bond market is a 
reflection, in the researchers' opinion, of the importance transparency is awarded in the UK 
capital markets. Had the effort and focus on disclosure and transparency not been as 
aggressive or as all-consuming then it is doubtful that the bond market would have grown to 
such an extent. In a way, one of the ways that London seems to ameliorate transparency is 
not just by passing rules and ensuring strict enforcement but also by actively investing 
(purchasing) in secondary market platforms that will help further expand London's 
supremacy over the global bond markets. 
 Juxtaposed to the vast size that is the UK's bond market, we turn now to the 
practically non-existent secondary markets (for bonds and other structured products) in the 
UAE and KSA. How can such a vast difference exist? Surely the complete lack of secondary 
markets in either the UAE or KSA would indicate weak primary market activity?. Weak 
primary market activity is certainly the case especially post financial crisis. Listings and 
IPO's have been few and far between. Volumes on the markets have been poor up until now. 
It is only recently (2013 and after) that the UAE equity capital markets have begun to soar 
again.
546
 The growth of volume on the exchanges in the GCC in general has not been 
accompanied by a growth in the secondary markets. 
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 An efficient secondary market does not exist in KSA even though Tadawul is the 
largest (by volume turnover) Arab stock exchange.
547
 The existence of efficient secondary 
markets for government securities, debt and other financial instruments barely exist in KSA 
even though Tadawul launched a secondary platform for the trading of sukuk in 2009. 
However, turnover was so low and trading so thin that this can hardly be called an efficient 
secondary market. The country suffers from a weak secondary market which is a reflection of 
a narrow investor base, a short-term investment culture and the absence of investment banks 
and large foreign institutional investors. Due to a lack of a liquid secondary market, portfolio 
and fund managers are also reluctant to invest. The market also lacks fixed income 




 Clearly, the outlook is not as rosy as one would have imagined. There does appear to 
be hope and the KSA Authorities have suggested that one of the ways that they can begin to 
ameliorate disclosure and transparency issues is to allow foreign investors to actively and 
directly invest in KSA equity markets. Clearly, introduction of foreigners into the market will 
not directly improve transparency and disclosure but will certainly help persuade market 
participants that if foreign capital is to remain in the country then serious transparency and 
disclosure measures will have to be taken. 
 KSA nationals have generally represented the majority of investors on Tadawul. 
Needless to say, this isolation from the rest of the world has not caused negative liquidity 
problems in the country. On the contrary, KSA Tadawul is the largest Arab stock exchange 
in the world with an annual value of shares traded in 2011 of SR 1.09 trillion and SR 1.92 
trillion in 2012. 
549
 The current limitations for foreigners trading on the exchange have been a 
function of KSA's isolation to the rest of the world, a fact which, in hind sight, is liable to 
keep trillions of US dollars away from the ever growing KSA market. Traditionally, since no 
foreigners were permitted to trade they could, as of 1999, invest in Tadawul by purchasing 
and sale of government approved mutual funds. Currently the standard swap agreement has 
replaced the mutual fund investment. Today, swap agreements allow an authorised local firm 
to trade on behalf of the foreign investor. 
 In January 2014, the CMA reported that it is finalising a regulatory framework which 
will allow foreign investors to directly own stocks without the need for swap agreements.
550
 
Due to the size of KSA market, foreign appetite is strong and authorities are keen to deepen 
the market and improve transparency as well as gradually build investor confidence in the 
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Saudi capital market. If this regulation is approved then the change to KSA financial 
landscape will be significant.  
 In a similar vein to KSA, the UAE has yet to develop an efficient secondary market 
for bonds, sukuk or any other financial instrument including derivatives. Indeed, regulation is 
in place for the issuance of listed debt and bonds as well as Islamic sukuk and yet the market 
has never really taken off like it has in Malaysia or Singapore. There is no doubt that the 
UAE should develop a bond market to open a new investment channel for banks to tap their 
liquidity following a period of stagnation in lending because of the global fiscal crisis and 
indeed any other future financial meltdown. The lack of diversity in financial instruments 
will serve to hamper future development of the UAE equity capital markets. The Financial 
regulator, the SCA, is also working on a number of new rules that, is believed, will develop 
the markets further including regulations for 'covered bonds' as well as "Trading of Stocks of 
Private Companies" otherwise called the "Second Market." The development of secondary 
markets must be attractive to issuers, provide financial development and growth as well as 
support local employment. 
 On deeper examination, in order for the second markets to be efficient in KSA and 
the UAE, the government intervention would be needed to boost such market as well 
aligning with the powerful commercial banks in the two countries. In either case, authorities 
have come to accept that the development of the market for government securities as well as 
conventional bonds is vital for the overall development of the markets.
551
 Indeed the 
secondary market for government securities may act as a catalyst for wider fixed income 
securities markets development. As secondary markets develop, transaction costs are lowered 
and liquidity increases, so investors gain the confidence needed to invest in long-term 
government securities. The recent announcement by the Prime Minister of the UAE Sheikh 
Mohammed Bin Rashid establishing Dubai as a global Islamic finance hub
552
 over the next 
few years is a stepping stone towards the establishment of secondary market trading 
platforms. The strong governmental interest on the development of the Islamic sector will 
contribute significantly to the development of the Islamic sukuk market. However, although 
the UAE has had a history of issuing sukuk, an active trading market is still under developed. 
Now that the UAE has been officially upgraded to emerging status by MSCI there is no 
longer any excuse to remain on the sidelines. In order to ensure transparency as well as keep 
foreign investors interested, the UAE will have to simultaneously develop the secondary 
market whilst keeping a close eye on matters of transparency as well as ensuring that 
punitive measures and penalties are carried out to the letter in the event of a breach. 
 A financial regulator must be empowered to penalise violators in order to send a 
strong message to the market. It is hoped that financial regulators in the future will be more 
prone to issuing punishments for violations. Both the UAE and KSA capital market 
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Authorities must be seen to penalise offenders at a higher rate since currently, in the view of 
the researcher, there is a perception in the market that offences, especially some forms of 
market abuse, can be committed with impunity. Transparency and market confidence suffer 
immeasurable damage when market participants see that offenders are not punished and will 
contribute towards the lack of international investors. When transparency is not guaranteed 
and punishment of violators depends on who the perpetrators are or aren't, then it is unlikely 
that investors will take a positive view of transparency in the country. 
 However, one must give credit to the UAE financial Authority which has certainly 
worked diligently with all other parties to ensure that transparency (especially post financial 
crisis) has vastly improved. The SCA has issued a revised version of regulations related to 
the issuance of debt as well as Islamic Sukuk instruments  
553
 which aimed to lay a firm 
foundation for the development of the secondary markets in the UAE. Furthermore, the SCA 
has only recently passed and approved several other regulations which, it is hoped, will add 
to the overall volume of trading on the UAE's exchanges. Regulations on warrants, covered 
bonds, short selling, market making and securities borrowing and lending were all issued in 
the last two years. By attracting greater numbers of foreign investors the SCA will also have 
to focus more of its attention of the disclosure and transparency needs of investors and 
companies under a more complex market structure where a combination of financial 
instruments (other than just equities) are used in the market place. 
 The DFM operates an order driven system whereby buying and selling orders are 
automatically matched on a first come first served basis. Both local and international 
investors can place buy/sell orders via DFM approved brokers who then place the orders in 
the automated trading system. As the GCC's only listed stock exchange, the DFM holds a 
unique position within the Arab world. Having been listed just at the beginning of the 
financial crisis, the DFM stock experienced significant downturns throughout the financial 
crisis and has only recently swung to a third-quarter net profit as a result of higher trading 
volumes, improved stock prices and a more bullish investor sentiment as a result of the 
improved economic climate. 
 As one would expect, improved trading volumes has come hand in hand with 
increased local and international investor confidence which has, no doubt, increased the 
pressure on the UAE capital markets to improve matters of transparency, an issue that the 
SCA has taken very seriously indeed. There is no doubt that the re-classification of the 
UAE's equity capital markets by the MSCI from frontier to emerging is a direct reflection of 
the improvement efforts done by the UAE financial regulators; the SCA, and other 
government bodies over the last three years. An upgrade of this type indicates increased 
investor confidence in transparency and disclosure. For example, in the MSCI Global Market 
Accessibility Review, June 2013 several key issues were highlighted including the matter of 
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equal rights to foreign investors and the perception by international players that foreign 
investors are limited as a result of the stringent foreign ownership limits.
554
 
 Indeed, there have been instances where transparency has been in the lowest level. In 
the first two months of 2012, one of the UAE's largest listed construction companies, Arabtec 
had its share price increase 128% on unsubstantiated rumours. Shares price escalation was so 
serious that trading had to be temporarily stopped and an investigation ensued. Speculation 
was rife in the market and investors believed that the company was about to win several very 
important infrastructure contracts. The Arabtec situation is not an isolated case with 
numerous other listed companies witnessing an influx of cash. Penny stocks — including 
Tabreed, Deyaar and Dubai Investments — have been among the main beneficiaries of the 
bull-run despite an absence of solid information, and analysts say a lack of transparency in 
UAE markets has long been a contentious issue for local traders.
555
 
 For that, the SCA should draft clear rules relating to timely disclosure. It should apply 
more rigid controls on issuers breaching timely disclosure rules. It should also introduce 
realistic methods of measuring the time issuers take in meeting the obligations of timely 
disclosure. The real challenge is in obligating issuers to meet their continuous obligations, 
especially those of making the timely disclosure of any material non-public information.
556
 
 Furthermore, the SCA Regulations No. 3 of 2000 
557
 obliges all issuers whose 
securities have been listed in the markets to inform the SCA and each of the markets of 'any 
significant developments affecting the prices of such securities.' But the problem is that it is 
not clear whether 'affecting' is likely or definite, which left a grey area without a definite 
decision from the SCA. Significant matters must affect the prices of securities. Otherwise, 
there is no obligation on the issuer to disclose the information. Accordingly, it should be 




 Moreover, a great hindrance to the proper enforcement of the disclosure rules is the 
weak penalties that are available in the Federal Law No. 4 of 2000 in the case of breach of 
these rules. Article 43 indicates that any person who contravenes any other provision of this 
Law and the regulations issued pursuant thereto shall be liable to imprisonment (for a period 
of not less than three months and not more than three years) and a fine (of not less than one 
hundred thousand (100,000) Dirhams and not more than one million (1,000,000) Dirhams, or 
to either of these penalties.
559
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 In contrast, in the UK, the FCA is authorised to levy unlimited fines on wrongdoers, 
payable to the agency.
560
 Therefore, there is no maximum stipulated for fines imposed by the 
regulator. In addition, the profits that the offender gained or the losses that he avoided and 
the damages caused by him should be taken into account when deciding the appropriate 
penalty. 
561
 The law should authorise the SCA to order the payment of civil penalties as well 
as disgorgement, as is done in the UK framework. 
562
 
 To be fair though, the UAE government has now changed track on this and has come 
down hard on perpetrators who commit fraud. However, instances of massive share price 
appreciation have occasionally happened, primarily as a result of the powerful rumor mill 
that exists in the UAE's markets and lack of measures to ensure these instances are not 
repeated. It is possible that the rumor mill in the UAE has the upper hand due to the lack of 
sophistication of retail investors. Most investors are not especially financially savvy and tend 
to buy on word of mouth rather than strong fundamentals. It has been intimated that such 
sharp increased are instigated by majority shareholders interested in share price 
manipulation. 
 However, in the UAE, in an effort to boost transparency and investor confidence, the 
SCA in 2011, signed an agreement with DFM and ADX Markets to start implementing 
eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) 
563
 for listed companies, making the UAE 
the first MENA country to require XBRL reporting.
564
 The promotion of transparency and 
disclosure is a key requirement for stock exchanges, considering their interest in attracting 
investors and the absolute need to guarantee said investors with market integrity. Given their 
role as information gateways, the UAE's exchanges often play a greater role in facilitating 
company disclosure than promoting other governance issues. Dissemination of information 
in the UAE equity markets is relatively easy given the small size of the market. Company 
disclosure of audited financials is currently at 99%,
565
 a huge improvement over previous 
years. 
 Other significant attempts at improving transparency and disclosure was in May 2013 
where certain addition to the existing regulations were introduced in order to regulate the 
conflict of interest, upgrade investor protection and shareholder liability rules, and review 
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and overhaul related party transactions and their impact on transparency.
566
 Moreover, the 
SCA has, as of March 2014, made it compulsory for all listed companies to establish a 
dedicated investor relations department. Furthermore, investors are to be kept abreast of 




 Notably, providing quality reports creates greater confidence in users to effectively 
participate in the efficiency of financial markets performance. Emerging markets such as the 
Arab markets have an exigent need to provide quality reports in order to be able to secure a 
foothold in the global market and attract more investment. Providing voluntary disclosure is 
the main key to providing a quality report. Using this method of measuring voluntary 
disclosure has the benefit of giving more detailed information for each item on the voluntary 
disclosure index. By giving details of information for each item, the quality of disclosure will 




1.1 Suggested Approaches to Systemic Risk Management. 
 Traditionally, in the UK the FSA has had all-encompassing powers to oversee the 
conduct of business and prudential regulation, with the BOE having minimal market conduct 
regulatory authority. Therefore, oversight of systemic risk rests with the FSA. At the time of 
the crisis, the FSA was the body tasked with policing the financial system, however, it was 
accused of being far too slow in responding to the Northern Rock affair.
569
 In the pre-
financial crisis period building up to 2007 & 2008, no one imagined the depth of the looming 
carnage that was about to take place in the UK's markets. The entire systemic and prudential 
risk management of the nation were shaken. Theoretically, a single person, a single firm, 
government, market or policy or event can trigger massive financial instability. In a well-
oiled system, all the parts are functioning well. However, the build up to the financial crisis 
in the UK saw one of those well-oiled parts, namely, Northern Rock Bank, stop functioning. 
Northern Rock's collapse, exacerbated by the US mortgage crisis,
570
 posed massive systemic 
risk to the UK's financial system because it had contracts, third party agreements and 
relationships (and obligations) with other parts of the system. A single entity might, 
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therefore, pose systemic risk because relationships with others can spread and magnify 
shocks to the financial system as a domino effect.
571
 
 Thus, the first key legislative act that was to ameliorate both systemic and prudential 
risk and entirely re-structure the UK financial system was adopted in 2012, namely, the 
Financial Services Act of 2012.
572
 The Bank of England and the Treasury have passed 
through legislation that moved the regulatory framework towards a Twin Peaks model with 
prudential regulation of banks separated from oversight of consumer protection and market 
conduct. The FSA has been gradually phased out to become the FCA as of mid-2013 and the 
government has set up the Prudential Regulation Authority (PRA) as a subsidiary of the BOE 
to conduct prudential regulation of financial sector. A new Consumer Protection & Markets 
Authority (CPMA) will be separate from BOE and will regulate conduct of all financial firms 
including those prudentially regulated by the PRA. 
 Notably, that the UK move towards a Twin Peaks regulatory system was a response 
to the need to address several key systemic issues, and that by introducing the Twin Peaks 
approach, the UK regulatory bodies would now have more time and personnel to focus on 
important aspects of systemic risk vis-à-vis the integrated approach (which more often major 
issues are not allowed to slip through the regulatory cracks). The Twin Peaks Approach to 
financial supervision is designed to garner all the benefits and efficiencies of the Integrated 
Approach, while at the same time addressing the conflicts between the objectives of safety 
and soundness regulation and consumer protection and transparency. It has been referred to 
as "regulation by objective," whereby one agency's regulatory objective is prudential 
supervision with the primary goal of safety and soundness and the second agency's goal is to 
focus primarily on business conduct and consumer protection issues. This permits each 
authority to clearly focus on its area of expertise. Prudential regulators can employ persons 
with business and economic expertise while business conduct regulators focus on hiring 
enforcement oriented staffs. Having the functions in separate entities can minimise conflicts 
between the two authorities as well as maximise economies of scale and improves 
accountability. 
 The Act created a new regulatory framework for the supervision and management of 
the UK banking and financial services industry. The Act also separated and clarified between 
two key risks, namely, prudential and systemic. The Act abolished the old FSA and created 
new bodies each with separate responsibilities for oversight of the market place and financial 
system. It also gave the Bank of England macro-prudential responsibility for oversight of the 
financial system and day-to-day prudential supervision of financial firms managing large 
balance sheet risk (otherwise known as firms that are 'too big to fail'). Three other bodies 
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were created as well, each with a goal of ensuring that safety and security and integrity of the 
UK's financial system namely, the Financial Policy Committee (FCP), the Prudential 
Regulatory Authority (PRA) and the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA). 
 The new Act also made extensive changes to the FSMA 2000 as well as the Bank of 
England Act 1998 and the Banking Act of 2009. In fact, the new Act (Section 7) further 
empowered the new FCA to impose stiffer fines and penalties on violators in the market 
place.
573
 The FCA has three objectives to achieve, namely: 
• To secure an appropriate degree of protection for consumers (the consumer protection 
objective) (new Section 1C, FSMA(.
574
 
• To protect and enhance the integrity of the UK financial system (the integrity 
objective)
575
  (new Section 1D, FSMA). 
• To promote effective competition in the interests of consumers in the markets for 
regulated financial services and services provided by recognised investment exchanges in 




 Legislation is a key tool for making changes to any system. Amelioration of systemic 
risk by the Authorities also included empowering the FCA to take strong legal action against 
any offender in the financial market thus sending a strong message to market participants that 
there will be zero tolerance towards fraud, market abuse, insider dealing and stock 
manipulation. 
 As a result of new legislation the FCA's scope of activities now include conduct of 
business (COB) regulation for all firms in both retail and wholesale markets. The FCA is 
responsible for the conduct of business regulation of all regulated firms, including PRA-
authorised firms and firms "passporting" their way into the UK. The FCA also inherited the 
former FSA's existing roles relating to markets regulation under Part XVIII of FSMA.
577
 
Institutions that provide both exchange services and central counterparty clearing services 
will be regulated by the Bank of England with respect to their activities as Recognised 
Clearing Houses (RCHs) and by the FCA as Recognised Investment Exchange (RIEs). 
 Finally, the FCA has inherited the former FSA's responsibilities for the regulatory 
oversight of client assets and countering financial crime. The 2012 Act also made some key 
changes to the power vested in the FCA and its ability to prosecute. This added 
empowerment was another tool given by the Government to the FCA to make it more 
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effective and some would say, more independent from the old FSA. In fact, the new 
Financial Services Act made quite a few amendments to the powers and responsibilities of 
the FCA as reflected in the old version of the Financial Services & Markets Act 2000. They 
include integrating the UKLA into the new FCA and applying the general FCA objectives to 
the listing regime; extending the powers of the FCA to impose sanctions on sponsors for 
breaches of UKLA rules and requirements imposed on sponsors (Section 18 of the Act). This 
will include the ability to impose financial penalties and to suspend a person's approval as a 
sponsor or restrict their activities. 
 The FCA has the power to regulate primary information providers ("PIPs") 
(organisations which channel information from issuers to the UKLA and announce 
information to the market) (Section 19 of the Act). Furthermore, the FCA is empowered to 
direct a firm to withdraw a financial promotion that the FCA considers is likely to breach its 
rules concerning financial promotion, subject to certain safeguards. The UK Government 
believes that credible and effective enforcement action should remain a key focus for the 
FCA. The FCA will continue the FSA's policy of credible deterrence by focusing 
increasingly on those in senior management that fail to recognise and manage their firms' 
risks, that fail to control the way that products are sold, and that fail to ensure that consumers' 
interests are prioritised when designing financial products as well as having a low tolerance 
for repeat offenders. 
 The UK's shift, from an integrated approach of financial regulation to that of a 'Twin 
Peaks' regulatory system is, in effect, a deep reflection of the changes required by the 
Authorities and Parliament to avoid the threat of systemic risk. The UK's integrated 
"tripartite" regulatory approach, namely; the BOE, FSA and the Treasury were collectively 
responsible for the financial stability of the UK capital markets and this system apparently 
failed to effectively identify the issues that were building in the financial system as well as to 
take steps to mitigate these issues. 
 Unlike the UK, the financial crisis did not cause as much financial loss in KSA.
578
 
Certainly, Tadawul slowed down and retail investors lost a lot of money but the overall 
market is generally well insulated from the knock-on domino effect of Western markets. 
KSA investors had, by the very fact of their isolation, limited exposure to US and UK 
collaterised debt obligations and had minimal direct leverage from large the US and the UK 
financial institutions. Cash reserves remained level and were sufficient to meet the needs of 
the nation. At no time did SAMA consider or require the need to shut down financial 
institutions in order to avoid counterparty risk default. There was no threat to systemic risk 
and was not required at any stage to pass any key legislation to ameliorate any systemic 
risk.
579
 Banks were well capitalised and local bank lending was stable.
580
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 The International Monetary Fund report on KSA,
581
 estimated the total amount of 
KSA banks' exposure to CDO in the US amounted to 3% of banks total assets. However, 
KSA authorities need to prepare for the eventual day when the market will be opened up to 
foreigner and direct foreign investment. At the moment, it is totally unprepared to keep and 
attract first class international investors. Mitigation of future systemic risks would best be 
served by ensuring corporate disclosure is up to global standards. Furthermore, SAMA, from 
a prudential risk perspective has made substantial efforts to introduce Basel II and III 
requirements especially for large exposures and connected parties. It is the recommendation 
of the IMF that SAMA address fundamental risk issues by bringing all aspects of risk 




 SAMA has never had to face a meltdown in systemic risk that the rest of the world 
experienced and in some cases is still experiencing. However, the closest that any major KSA 
entities experienced any form of collapse which may have had a strong impact on KSA 
financial systems was the widespread bank losses caused by the 2009 failure of Al-Gosaibi& 
Bros Co. and the Saad Group, two very large and well known KSA conglomerates.
583
 It 
would appear that SAMA needs to strengthen credit risk management techniques used by 
organisations in KSA. Nevertheless, SAMA responded to this default by ensuring that all 
losses were provisioned for. 
 SAMA also initiated interbank discussions and dialogue to help identify the reason 
behind such a massive default. Clearly, the matter relates to fraud and financial 
mismanagement but SAMA did well to highlight the fact that name lending (where banks 
lend vast sums of money to an organisation based upon the name and reputation of the firm 
only and not on its actual financial ability to service its debt) must be accompanied by close 
scrutiny. Individual large exposure must be scrutinised to ensure they are not a threat to the 
KSA financial system. It is noted that SAMA, over the years has consistently encouraged 
KSA banks to build prudent capital and provisioning buffers which, no doubt, has proved 
invaluable throughout the crisis and throughout the collapse of Al Gosaibi. SAMA has also 
introduced international accounting and auditing standards (IFRS & ISA).
584
 
 In conclusion, KSA financial authorities have, to date, appeared to be pro-active in 
light of the current global conditions. The Capital Market Authority (CMA) and SAMA have 
attempted to regularly address key issues faced by market participants that are unique to them 
and are not necessarily reflective of events occurring globally. KSA equity capital markets 
are somewhat more immune to the vagaries and shifts in global currents simply because the 
market is still so isolated. 
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 The approaches used by UAE financial Authorities including the CBUAE and the 
SCA to ameliorate systemic risk management issues are more varied than those of KSA. The 
financial crisis had a clearly negative impact on the UAE. Unlike KSA, whose market is 
closed to the outside world, the UAE's equity capital markets as well as banking system is 
relatively open to the influences of the external world. Decisive action by the CBUAE, the 
Ministry of Finance, the SCA and other responsible bodies helped to moderate the crisis. 
Infusion of liquidity into the markets by the deposit of long term government funds at banks, 
re-capitalisation of UAE banks and the tightening of lending rules to the real estate and 
construction sectors occurred almost overnight. 
 The financial crisis led to the SCA reviewing its licensing rules for brokerage houses 
with the subsequent shutting down of over 50 brokerage houses over a 2 year period after the 
onslaught of the financial crisis. It also led to giving more attention to risk management of its 
licensed institutions especially in the aftermath of the delisting of the two of the UAEs' 
largest mortgage lenders that were listed on DFM Amlak and Tamweel on 2008. Many 




 Similar to the UK, the significance of the danger to the UAE's systemic risk driven 
the UAE Authorities to consider a Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation, like the 
approach adopted by the Netherlands and Australia.
586
 The advantages of the Twin Peaks 
approach are well documented and will basically permit the regulation of the UAE's capital 
market sector by means of a bi-pronged methodology whereby conduct of business 
regulations including that of banks and insurance companies, will essentially be the domain 
of the SCA and prudential regulations and systemic risk the remit of the CBUAE. Notably, 
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the UAE has not, as of yet, adopted this approach to financial regulation even though 
discussions and research on the topic have been extensive. It is expected that the UAE will 
adopt the Twin Peaks regulatory system within the next two years. 
587
 
 Decisive policy actions by the authorities have helped moderate the effect of the 
crisis. These actions included the infusion of liquidity into the financial system through repos 
by central banks, and direct liquidity injections via the placement of long-term deposits by 
the government, provision of deposit guarantees and capital injections to banks, and, as 
preemptive measures, tightening of prudential norms for general lending and in particular for 
lending to real estate and for investment in equity. 
 In conclusion then, amelioration of systemic risk management issues can best be 
achieved by what the FCA refers to as "Regulation by Objective." Each regulatory body is 
tasked with focusing on one key area of the financial system. In this case, matters related to 
prudential regulation and the safety and soundness of the financial system fall within the 
responsibility of the Central Bank. In the UK, this falls under the PRA; in KSA it is SAMA 
and finally in the UAE it is envisaged to be the CBUAE. Conduct of business affairs as well 
as consumer protection fall under the FCA, the CMA in KSA and the SCA in the UAE. This 
separation allows each body to focus entirely on the job at hand. The benefits to this 
approach includes rapid policy response in times of crisis as well as (it is hoped) effective 
coordination between both regulatory agencies. 
 Another point of interest that needs highlighting is closely related to disclosure as 
well as management of systemic risk. The increasing complexity of transactions and financial 
instrument makes it very hard for investors and even those who operate within financial 
institutions to actually understand the complex nature of these instruments. A lot of 
information is disclosed in today's prospectuses or information memorandums but not 
everyone appears to understand the implication of purchasing such complex investments, 
especially the rating agencies. Furthermore, separating the PRA & the FCA allows for rapid 
policy response and could ensure that regulatory frameworks keep pace with dramatic 
changes and innovations in financial markets. It also facilitates effective coordination among 
the regulatory agencies, the BOE and the Treasury thus allowing for better monitoring of the 
financial system. 
 From a securities markets perspective, key risk management issues such as the 
settlement of securities has been addressed by SAMA and the CMA to ensure that systems 
work safely and efficiently. In July 2013, the IMF published the completed full assessment of 
the Saudi Securities Settlement Systems (SSSS).
588
 The IMF also assessed the CMA's 
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 In the assessment of the CMA, the SDC is in full compliance with fourteen of the 
CPSS-IOSCO recommendations. The self-assessment outlines that the legal framework 
governing the SDC is well-founded, clear and transparent. The laws, regulations and 
procedures governing the system are public and readily accessible to participants. Settlement 
risk is minimised by several aspects of the legal and technical framework. Furthermore, other 
key risks that may be prevalent in some more advanced market simply do not exist on 
Tadawul due to the existence of caps and controls such as the complete ban on short selling 
and zero derivative trading.
590
 
 Furthermore, Tadawul operates the (SDC), which, as per the KSA's CML, is tasked 
with the provision and execution of all equities transactions including settlement, deposit, 
clearing as well as registration of ownership of securities traded on Tadawul. Tadawul is 
aware of other key risks that it's equity market may face in the future and is currently in 
discussions (in conjunction with SAMA and the CMA) to implement a (DVP) system. 
 As previously indicated, the impact of the financial crisis on the UAE exchanges and 
the economy were huge. Losses on the DFM and ADX were in billions and share prices on 
the DFM suffered their biggest fall amid fears that a debt crisis is looming as Dubai World, 
giant conglomerate owned by Dubai government, asked its creditors for a six month debt 
payment delay. Dubai World debt was to become the Achilles heel of Dubai's recovery. 
From the onslaught of the crisis in mid-2008 till March 2014, the SCA has issued several 
very important regulations aimed at improving the safety and security of the capital markets 
as well as at improving investor confidence. Margin trading regulations were effectively 
established in 2008 as were regulations relating to safe custody; capital adequacy 
requirements for brokerage houses were released in 2010. Several other new rules have been 
passed as well that promote the use of new types of financial instruments such as covered 
warrants, securities borrowing and lending and investment management in order to boost and 
improve overall trading volumes and market depth. 
 While the CBUAE has established a Banking Stability Committee, currently it has no 
authority to include financial institutions outside the banking system in its macro prudential 
surveillance. Responsibility for systemic risk mitigation is divided between the Banking 
Stability Committee which is ultimately responsible for any action taken, and the Financial 
Stability Unit which provides the analysis, and proposes regulatory reforms to address 
identified risks. However as previously stated, the authorities are considering legislation 
governing the supervision of the financial sector to meet the demands of the UAE's new 
financial markets and modernise the regulatory framework. The draft law on the Regulation 
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of the Financial Services Sector in the UAE and associated amendments to a number of 
federal laws could signal a move towards a twin peaks model of financial supervision.
591
 
Therefore, while there are no clear formal arrangements of sharing information among 
regulators exist as it is done on a voluntary basis, it is expected that more established 
mechanisms among regulators will be created once the Twin Peaks regulatory model kicks 
off. 
 
1.2 Suggested Approaches to the Shortage of  Institutional Investors within the 
 Markets and the Investor Confidence 
 It is indeed interesting to note the significant difference in action between global 
regulators during the financial crisis. In the UK, short selling, CDO's, swaps and derivatives 
are generally seen as the instruments that caused most volatility with subsequent bans by the 
FSA on short selling and a total revamping of OTC derivative regulation including 
Parliaments passing of the 2012 Financial Act and the introduction of a 'Twin Peaks' system. 
The UK authorities certainly have been busy in their attempts to reduce systemic risk, market 
volatility and increase investor confidence.  
 In KSA, the herd instinct, isolationism, poor investor education as well as dismal 
KSA company performance caused massive fluctuations which led the CMA to ban evening 
trading, shut down online Internet trading sites, increase investor education as well as 
conduct road shows to attract large institutional investors vi-a-vis the mass of unsophisticated 
retail investors awash in the market.Tadawul was (and in some ways continues to be) volatile 
for many reasons (which once again gives credence to its 'standalone' classification by 
MSCI). Individuals still account for the majority of transactions and consequently, sections 
of the market are highly speculative, with market moving rumours, panic selling, insider 
dealing, front running and manipulation commoner than in more developed markets. Since 
the investment culture is still considered immature and emotionally driven, the CMA 
expends great energy in educating the public directly or through its brokers in order to 
correct this uninformed market etiquette manifested by local investors.
592
 
 In a similar vein to KSA, investors in the UAE are mostly retail and are similarly to 
some extent unsophisticated. Dispersal of market information is by way of mouth and the 
rumour mill. As a result of this, the UAE stocks have also been prone to a degree of 
volatility. Disinformation and lack of transparency, like KSA, have also caused increased 
fluctuation. A closer look to the UAE markets indicates that they are dominated by individual 
investors. There are four sectors to hold shares in the UAE companies. These are: 
individuals, companies, governmental institutions and other sectors (usually charities in the 
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case of the UAE).
593
 Therefore, a large percentage of the investors in the UAE markets are 
thought to be individual short-term speculators. Individual investors' dependence on 
sentiment and herding to make their investment decisions resulted in a volatile market. The 
current situation of individual investor domination is detrimental to the market in terms of 
volatility and risk and the authorities in the UAE should work to attract institutional 
investment into the markets.
594
 
 Hence, one of the key similarities between KSA and UAE equity markets is that they 
both suffer from an overabundance of retail investors. Opportunistic buyers, who are, more 
often than not, unsophisticated investors, flood the DFM & ADX exchanges in the UAE as 
well as Tadawul in KSA to such an extent that it is considered the norm rather than the 
exception. The speculative cash floods in and, just as quickly, pours out when news is bad 
and markets drop. Two key solutions to this adopted by KSA and the UAE is to attract more 
long term institutional investors. How was this achieved? 
 In general, one of the most desirable features that international and institutional 
investors would like to see in a market is that no distinction is made between local and 
international investors. The international standard for developed markets is the absence of 
any investor qualification requirement. In the UAE, the 2014 MSCI upgrade of the equity 
markets from "frontier" to "emerging" is the fruition of years of hard work by the SCA and 
other financial authorities to improve the rules and regulations particularly with regard to the 
introduction of foreigner investors directly into the market. Foreign institutional buyers may 
instruct their brokers to directly purchase equities in the markets in the UAE today up to limit 
as listed companies in the UAE are subject to foreign ownership limits. The UAE 
Commercial Companies Law states that foreigners may own up to 49% with the rest owned 
by locals.
595
 This would appear to be one of the key remaining points of contention amongst 
institutional foreign investors as well as foreign room level.
596
 In the UAE, listed companies 
may choose to limit the amount of trading that is permitted in their shares for foreigners. 
Some choose 20%, other less and some more. This means that if a foreign investor wishes to 
purchase X stock, he may be unable to do so since at the time of purchase foreigners already 
own the maximum permissible percentage of stock that is allowed. 
 This also means that the foreign investors have to either cancel their orders or wait for 
it to be fulfilled at another price. Clearly, this is not in line with large foreign institutional 
investor strategy since they would expect to carefully buy up positions at certain specified 
prices until the time comes to sell them. Foreign ownership limits are unattractive for 
                                                          
593
 In DFM, individuals bought an average of 74.8% of the total stock bought during the period from 2010 till 
2014, and sold an average of 75.8% for the same period. These figures illustrate the percentage of retail 
investors in the local stock markets. It is clear that institutional investors average trading (buy and sell) had not 
exceeded 25% on average for the comparable period.On the other side, ADX's trading figures shows higher 
percentage of institutional trading. The asthmatic mean of average securities bought by individuals for the 
period from 2010 to 2014 was 67.6% comparing to 32.4% for the institutions. These percentage increases for 
the average sell to reach 68.2% and decrease to 31.8% for the individuals and institutional investors 
respectively. See Esm.sca.ae (2014) Trade History Reports, supra note 78. 
594
 Albelooshi (2008) 'The Regulation of Insider Dealing…,' supra note 251, at 73. 
595
 See the UAE Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 Concerning Commercial Companies, supra note 65. 
596
 See the MSCI Global Market Accessibility Review, supra note 554. 
311 
 
foreigners but does have the added benefit of protecting the local investor community. It 
does, it would appear, have its merits. To date, the Authorities have managed to walk a thin 
line between balancing the needs of the local investor community and assuaging the 
investment appetite of the large international players.It is hoped that the introduction of these 
rules will encourage long term investors (who are more often foreign institutional investors) 
to maintain long positions and thus counteract speculation. This will subsequently reduce 
market volatility when speculative capital flows outwards.  
 In KSA, CMA has recently announced that foreign investors will be permitted to 
directly enter the markets as opposed to dealing via KSA brokers using swap agreements.
597
 
However, regulation to address this issue has still not been 'officially' passed but international 
investor appetite is buoyant and the expectation is that the CMA will authorise this within the 
foreseeable future. Unless stable and long term equity investors are allowed to directly 
participate in Tadawul, KSA will contain to be plagued by speculative capital flows within 
its markets. 
 Additionally, a key regulation amended by the UAE financial Authority, the SCA, 
was the recent change to margin lending. Margin lending-borrowing with cash or share 
holdings as security, has been in high demand as investors sought to maximise gains from a 
UAE market surge, with Dubai and Abu Dhabi's exchanges jumping 108 percent and 63.1 
percent respectively in 2013.
598
 Limits on such lending were introduced in 2008, but many 
brokers ignored these and faced few repercussions. The SCA has now made changes to what 
firms can lend customers and has become stricter in fining brokers who breach regulations. 
Unable to meet margin calls, many investors are wiped out and brokers are forced to dump 
stock to recover losses. This practice has added to market volatility in the UAE and has now 
been addressed by the regulator. Fines for breach of this regulation can reach 100,000 
Dirhams as the SCA is determined to stamp out illicit margin lending.
599
 
 Perhaps more telling is the SCA's efforts to reduce market volatility during the IPO 
boom period in the UAE of 2007. At the time, local UAE banks fueled the boom by 
financing investors with huge sums of money. Investors become over leveraged as a result 
and banks expected to realise quick profits (at the time, the UAE and in general GCC equity 
markets were considered a sure thing for investors).This reckless lending by banks to 
investors was curbed by the Authorities. The SCA introduced regulations that prevented 
start-up companies from immediately seeking a share listing  (they needs to have a three year 
track record) and the CBUAE passed a law requiring commercial banks not to provide loans 
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 The carnage in the UAE equity markets is well documented. Thousands of investors 
lost their money overnight, banks stopped lending money to anyone, liquidity dried up, cars 
and homes were repossessed, foreigners and expats with outstanding dues ran away to avoid 
imprisonment and the entire construction and real estate sectors came to a grinding halt. 
Unlike KSA, the UAE markets are accessible to investors and are therefore susceptible to 
global changes. This susceptibility to global currents and openness to foreign investment is a 
double edged sword. Unlike KSA, foreign investors actively invest in the UAE stock markets 
and as of December 2013 had invested well over US$ 700 billion into the DFM & ADX.
601
 
 However, ensuring stability as well as lowering volatility is vital for the UAE since 
the outflow of foreign investors could have the same crippling consequences it did in 2008 
when the global financial crisis caused a sudden out surge in investment leaving a crippling 
liquidity gap in its wake. Since 2008, the authorities in the UAE have taken measures to 
strengthen some of the weak links in the system. Banks have been recapitalised and the 
capital adequacy ratio of the banking system has strengthened to 21 percent.
602
 Weaker 
financial institutions, including banks, have been merged with stronger institutions. 
 Although short selling is common in developed markets, its use on the UAE's local 
markets was unregulated and that is what made it especially risky. While many stock brokers 
and financial institutions say they engage in short selling, the SCA does not recognise the 
practice, so investors are unable to sue and seek damages if short-selling contracts are broken 
and because of a lack of regulation, data about the number of investors selling short also goes 
undisclosed, putting other traders at a disadvantage. In part for these reasons, the SCA spoke 
out against short selling and administrative sanctions had been taken by the SCA against 45 
brokerage companies for different breaches and short selling was one of them.
603
 Regardless 
that the SCA passed covered short selling regulation in 2012 but to date short sellers do not 
operate on either the DFM or ADX yet.
604
 
 As retail investors continue to dominate the bulk of trading activity the Authorities 
believe that more investment is required from overseas to ensure healthy returns and long-
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term prosperity. To ensure this happens, Authorities consider the fact that investor education 
is vital towards increasing investors. Investor roadshows as well as educational programs 
conducted by both DFM and ADX help towards narrowing the gap. Furthermore, running 
parallel to the UAE's efforts in attracting institutional investors, ADX strategy changed in 
2009 towards offering a more sophisticated array of investment opportunities in the hope of 
attracting well-heeled international investors. As a result of this, the UAE's first exchange 
traded fund was listed and offered to investors. The primary advantage of an ETF is that 
investors can achieve a diversified portfolio by buying into one while avoiding the costs of 
purchasing a similar range of individual shares.
605
 
 Recently, the SCA's efforts of developing a set of regulations aimed at introducing 
market makers as well as securities borrowing and selling regulations and short selling is an 
attempt to provide international investors with greater flexibility as well as a familiarity with 
financial instruments which they are more used to utilising. The benefits of these regulations 
have yet to be felt by the UAE but it is expected that having market makers in the UAE 
markets will help in supporting UAE financial markets by maintaining the balance in the 
market; adjusting the pace therein and striving to attract more foreign investments. The 
success of the market maker to perform its role in UAE markets would be based on the 
accurate application of the instructions and controls governing trading on the market as 
stipulated by the regulations and legislations concerning the functions of the market. 
 These regulations and legislations stress the need for disclosure and transparency in 
transactions; prices to be determined based on normal interactions and successful 
promotional efforts to attract savings and direct them to lucrative investment channels to 
ensure optimal allocation for individuals and the society. However, the most important 
function of these markets would be realised, namely the ability to liquidate stocks quickly 
and easily, and to maintain a continuous balance between supply and demand, thus limiting 
price fluctuations, to have a fair price and to ensure continuity of the market's ability to carry 
out its duties and achieve its goals.
606
 Similarly, regulation for covered warrants has already 
been passed by the SCA as well as investment funds, which, it is hoped, will attract more 
institutional investors to the country. 
 There is no doubt that the prime objective of the securities market regulators must be 
the protection of investors. Investor confidence can only be achieved through a consistent 
and systematic application of rules that apply to all market participants. In the researcher's 
opinion, only equitable treatment of any and all market participant in the financial markets 
will result in sustained investor confidence. Equitable treatment of market participants means 
that the rules apply to everyone without exception. Additionally, consistent and regular 
dissemination of information is integral to a well-functioning market. Disclosure of 
information means that market participants must divulge required financial information that 
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avoids, in all circumstance, informational disadvantages that permit some participants an 
advantage over others. In essence then, investor confidence can only be achieved through: 
• Full disclosure and transparency. 
• Equitable treatment of all stakeholders. 
  
 A lack of investor confidence means a lack of trust in the fundamental mechanics 
underlying the system. It is for this reason that the MSCI Index still classifies KSA as a 
'stand-alone' market. Negative feedback from large institutional investors provides MSCI 
with the necessary data to make an assessment and it is this feedback that is vital for the 
international financial community to make an assessment as to whether to invest in a country 
or not. Authorities in KSA are aware that they need to address and improve investor 
confidence. They have approached this by attempting to follow through on two key 
objectives, namely; ensuring that market participants that violate regulations are punished 
and named – thus bringing equitable treatment to the market and secondly, attempting to pass 
regulations that will allow foreign investors access to Tadawul without having to enter into 
swap agreements with KSA broker/dealers. Investors need to see that that policies and rules 
are enforceable thus bringing disclosure and transparency to the market.  
For example, both the financial regulators the CMA and the SCA, have adopted rules 
to ensure that disclosure of information is adhered to by listed entities. The CMA has made 
tremendous efforts towards not only to attempt to inform the general public about annual and 
quarterly results and to provide information on their board of directors and corporate 




 Similarly, in the UAE, the SCA has ensured that listed company financial disclosure 
is released in a timely and consistent fashion and that this information is available to 
investors on the SCA website, and for that the SCA has achieved high rates of disclosure 
over the years.
608
 Such disclosure of information ensures that there are no informational 
disadvantages in the market that would allow an investor a degree of leverage over another. It 
may, therefore, be said to be an equitable distribution of information. Maximising investor 
confidence is a function of fair dissemination of information as well as equitable treatment of 
all investors in the market. These are not mutually exclusive matter and must be both present 
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1.2 Suggested Approaches to Insider Dealing. 
 Closely linked to corporate governance issues is the topic of market abuse. Most of 
the financial markets suffered, in some form or other, malpractices within the securities 
markets.
609
 The formal passing of federal laws aimed at protecting investors and market 
participants have been passed with an eye to curtailing negligent and fraudulent behavior. 
However, the crime of insider dealing is one of the most difficult illegal practices to be 
detected.
610
 In today's hyper-connected traded markets as a result of the globalisation of these 
markets and the rapid development of the e-commerce and e-trading makes it a lot more 
difficult to detect and subsequently prosecute insider dealing.
611
 The investigations are often 
more onerous and huge resources are expended by regulators to ensure that member firms 
and licensed individuals maintain high ethical standards.
612
 
 Insider dealing is considered to be a type of securities fraud and it is a serious 
crime.
613
 Such fraud leads to breaching a fiduciary and trust duties between the bargaining 
parties and the insiders or outsiders, who deal with undisclosed information. Insider dealing 
gives insiders advantages derived from their unjust acts when they get and use information 
without cost.
614
 Effective regulation of insider dealing has an important role to play in 
ensuring confidence in the markets.
615
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 and any other 
behaviour that likely gives a regular user a false or misleading impression with regard to the 
market orders (supply and demand orders), value, or price of a qualifying investment; or 
would, or would be likely to destroy the market in the view of the regular user. 
 No doubt there is a fine line separating each of these types of market abuse described 
above. However, the UK has used different approaches for prohibiting market manipulation. 
The law uses specific wording to cover the widest possible range of practices of market 
manipulation. It prohibits any course of action that may lead to deception of investors or that 
may create false impression, or cause the creation of an improper appearance relating to the 
demand or the supply or the value of an investment. 
 In addition, the FCA Handbook seeks to carefully define and outline the rules relating 
to market conduct and market manipulation. All member firms are required to follow the 
FCA's Conduct of Business Handbook requirements as well as appoint competent and 
experienced compliance officers to oversee the function.
623
 The Market Conduct Source book 
(MAR) sets out these rules and regulations.
624
 MAR is divided into two sections, namely, the 
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Code of Market Conduct (known as MAR1) 
625
 and the Price Stabilising Rules (known as 
MAR 2).
626
 Moreover, enforcement plays a vital role in the UK to ensure that insider dealing 
does not occur. In 2012, the FCA raised UK£312 million in fines alone, a huge number 
considering that the previous record high for fines collected in one year was UK£89 million.  
Since 2009, the FCA has successfully sought and received 23 insider dealing convictions 
with another two cases charged in 2013.
627
 
 There is, however, a potential inconsistency of policy in advocating more effective 
engagement between companies and investors, and at the same time prohibiting investors 
from deriving financial advantage from such engagement beyond the limited extent that such 
engagement benefits all holders of stock. Considering the strong emphasis on market 
conduct, an increasing emphasis on shareholder dialogue and the move to a new regulatory 
regime under the FCA, it would be logical for a dialogue to be opened between the new 
regulator and investors about ensuring that these two policy objectives namely, shareholder 
engagement and market abuse prevention remain aligned. This may increase market 
confidence and lead to better outcomes. 
 Thus, policing the capital markets has become a tremendously complicated task that 
requires high-tech and cutting edge information technology. Today, the FCA is able to run 
highly complicated, sophisticated and covert operations against any licensed individuals and 
firms that may be involved in insider dealing as well as team up with other governmental and 




 In KSA, the CML and the CMA oversee and prevent malpractice within the equity 
market. The CML provides two different routes for disputes leading to the CRSD depending 
on the nature of the complaint. The first is where an investor is willing to bring an action 
against a licensed broker. A complaint should start at the exchange (Tadawul), which enjoys 
the jurisdiction of settling disputes among members of the Exchange and between the 
members and their clients. The CMA has published a non-exhaustive list of disputes within 
Tadawul's jurisdictions, including problems in executing an order placed by a customer, 
refusal to provide brokerage services to a customer, or mismanaging a customer's account on 
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 Inevitably, there are some overlaps between the jurisdictions of Tadawul and the 
CMA with regards to investor complaints. The CMA indicates that it would reject any 
complaint submitted which is within the jurisdiction of Tadawul, and requires investors to 
submit initially a request to Tadawul in case of any doubt as to the appropriate authority to 
consider a dispute.
630
 On proper examination, both the CMA and Tadawul routes are merely 
informal means to settle disputes since an investor lodging a complaint with Tadawul or the 
Authority still enjoys the right to bring an action before the CRSD if the complaint is not 
solved within a period of time by agreement between the investor and the service provider. 
The difference between the two routes is that the CML states that the CMA is not permitted 
more than ninety days to consider a complaint otherwise an investor can bring an action 
directly to the CRSD.
631
 In contrast, the CML is silent as to the limit of time that Tadawul is 
permitted in considering a complaint. However, since the CMA is a higher authority, it could 
be reasonable to argue that what binds it should also be binding on the exchange, and thus 
there should be limited period of ninety days.
632
 
 It is vital that both market members and market participants, including investors have 
correct and functional channels within which to seek legal or institutional recourse. The 
CRSD's stated objectives are to ensure the "protection of investors against unfair or incorrect 
practices or any acts that involve fraud, deceit or manipulation,"
633
 and as such the CML 
empowers the CRSD to investigate and settle disputes that may occur including the 
imposition of sanctions and penalties. The preceding description shows that the judicial 
institutions having jurisdiction to deal with securities litigations are independent of the 
government. The CML of 2003, as the sole securities legislation, has created the securities 
courts and defined the jurisdictions of those courts. The courts have both civil and criminal 
jurisdictions. These courts are empowered by the CML to set appropriate compensation and 
penalties in all cases brought before them, as stipulated in the pertinent laws. Moreover, these 
specialised courts have absolute jurisdiction over securities cases.
634
 
 However, as previously indicated, the quality and effectiveness of the judiciary is 
significant for successful enforcement of securities laws. Thus, there is a real need for 
securities law schools, experts and more research in order to enrich the securities knowledge 
of judges and lawyers. Furthermore, the role of the CMA as the regulator of the market has to 
be more effective. Issuing rules and regulations to foster the confidence in the market should 
be a fundamental task of the CMA.
635
 Clearly, better functioning of judicial enforcement 
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requires an appropriate legal framework that encourages the objective enforcement of laws 
and pertaining regulatory framework. 
 Strong legal framework and efficient courts prevent illegal practices, benefits market 
participants, and thus deter disasters in financial markets. In other words, 'weak legal 
institutions can contribute to economic crises.' 
636
 However, the effectiveness of each court's 
operation is important in order for it to be able to dispense justice and maintain confidence 
amongst market participants. Many have argued that the quality of justice is measured by the 
quality of judges.
637
 It is not just a matter of what penalties are available, but of the 
willingness of the judiciary to impose them. It is also a matter of the training received for the 
extensive responsibilities that they bear. The members of the securities courts in KSA have 
broad powers ranging from imposing monetary penalties to imprisonment.
638
 
 It has been confirmed that in business transactions, the remedy of account of profit is 
significantly useful.
639
 The situation in KSA, however, requires a clear mechanism to 
distribute the gains resulting from the law violations to all investors who sustain loss or 
damage as a result of that violation, rather than simply allowing them to accrue in the 
accounts of the CMA for its own use. Indemnification of injured investors will increase 
investor confidence in the securities market by fostering the protection of investors.
640
 
 In brief, it is suggested that reforms of the judiciary are required to effectively deal 
with cases arising in the securities market. In addition, amendments are required to be made 
to Article 25 of the CML of 2003. This is because this Article governs the formation and the 
criteria for the selection of members of the CRSD and ACRSD. The law is required to be 
properly enforced; for this it requires more courts and judges and greater assurance of 
judicial independence. Equally important, it is necessary for a statutory securities class action 
to be available to the general investor to provide better protection. The interpretation of the 
sanctions and remedies of Article 59, especially with the enforcement of civil liability 
provisions is also necessary.
641
 
 Notably, in 2004, the CMA expanded on the insider trading provisions contained in 
the CML by issuing a Market Conduct Regulation to define"insiders", and prohibit illegal 
direct and indirect insider trading, as well as market manipulation. Moreover, the CMA has 
taken action against insider trading, and results have been published on its website.
642
 
 In the UAE, the Federal Law No. 8 of 1984 Concerning Commercial Companies 
provisions represent an insufficient means to define all the acts of market abuse, particularly 
in the securities markets. Therefore, the UAE financial markets need to develop a highly 
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structured and efficient legal system to deal with securities market malpractices. Not only the 
regime dealing with market abuse and other improper conduct is weak in the financial 
markets, there are some vague areas that the regime needs to remedy, reconsider and reform 
the UAE legislation. 
 The legislation should pay attention to preventive measures by criminalising all forms 
of market abuse. It needs to define these illegal practices rather than leave them as vague and 
in general terms. It needs to cover in detail elements of insider dealing and market 
manipulation. If this is achieved, reasonable protection for investors will be provided. It is 
due to the complexity of this offence, in most of the insider dealing cases, that there is 
difficulty in distinguishing between legal and illegal behaviour. For instance, in the case of 
trading based upon non-public information, the measures of materiality or sensitivity, 
precision, and publicity of such information present a significant challenge for investigators 
and judges in the UAE to establish the precise links between the legal elements of this crime. 
As a result, the elements of the crime have not been defined in either the SCA Law 4 of 2000 
or the SCA consequent regulations. Hence, the vagueness of the elements of insider dealing 
in the UAE, and the means involved in committing it can raise its complexity.
643
 
 The courts and legislatures in the UK have been confronting this offence for many 
decades, while the UAE has not yet begun to exercise investigative power. In the UK, the 
laws of the securities market that govern the offence of insider dealing require several 
elements to ascertain the legitimacy of the behaviour of any person who traded on the inside 
information. When such factors are confirmed, it could be safely determined that the person's 
activity was illegal. These factors include:
644
 
 The trading occurred based upon material precise undisclosed information; 
 The trading took place during the time when the person possessed material nonpublic 
information; and 
 The person who made the transaction obtained such information as a result of a 
confidential relationship, directly or indirectly, or a trust duty, which was violated by 
carrying out such trading. In other words, the information was misused. 
 Although the SCA issued several decisions to monitor and control stock market 
operations and to prevent any violations of its Law No. 4 of 2000, it has not presented a 
comprehensive decision regarding the practice of insider dealing and market abuse. 
Meanwhile, in the existing law, only two provisions, provisions 37 and 39, relate to insider 
dealing. These provisions are inadequate to safeguard market integrity and to protect investor 
interests.
645
 Articles 37 and 39 have prohibited exploiting inside information but did not 
characterise this information. There is no particular requirement that inside information 
should be specific or precise. The above Law also did not require that inside information 
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should be relevant to particular securities or to an issuer of securities. Both of these 
requirements (precise and relevant to) are omitted by the UAE law, which contrast to the UK 
laws. Hence, it is strongly recommended to amend this Article to add the requirement that 
inside information should be specific or precise and relevant to particular securities or to an 
issuer of securities. Therefore, the SCA should promulgate new rules and regulations, as the 
FCA has done by issuing the Market Conduct Source book (MAR)  
646
 to clarify and 
determine, the legal elements of insider dealing and market abuse and their scope, based on 
the provisions of the FSMA 2000. 
 Furthermore, the UAE regulator has not provided an adequate and comprehensive 
definition of 'insider', in contrast to the UK laws. Although, Article 39 
647
 of the law defines 
an insider as 'any person,' the SCA Regulations of 2000 limited the scope of this Article by 
providing that 'any person' must obtain the inside information by virtue of his position. In this 
sense this law did not include secondary insiders under this Article. Therefore, this Law must 
be modified and the penalty must be imposed upon both the person who is 'procuring' or 
'encouraging' others to deal and who has been procured or encouraged by insiders, and also 
who leaks inside information and who has received it if he used the information.
648
 Not only 
the definition should include those who have access to the inside information of an issuer by 
virtue of their employment, profession or activities. In addition, the term 'position' has a 
special meaning in the UAE culture as referring to one who is usually on the top of the 
hierarchy in entities and also has a different meaning in Arabic than it is in English. This 




 Undoubtedly, the UAE can learn from the expertise of the UK in securing its 
securities markets from insider dealing as a type of market abuse. In the UK, the three forms 
of insider dealing are criminalised, including trading on the basis of material, non-public 
information, disclosing or tipping such information to others, and encouraging others to trade 
on such information. In contrast, in the UAE, the form of trading is criminalised, while the 
acts of disclosing to or encouraging others are not considered within the scope of the insider 
dealing provisions. In addition, to accuse a person of the crime of trading on the basis of 
material, non-public information, the prosecution must prove that the person gained personal 
profit from the transaction. Therefore, the UAE legislation should widen its scope in order to 
criminalise the action of using inside information without requiring 'personal benefit.' As 
soon as an action is taken a crime has occurred since it is against the rule of equality and 
fairness between the investors with regard to access to inside information. These two issues 
create a legal loophole for the prosecution of offenders, which would make breaches of the 
insider dealing provisions more defensible.  
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 The SCA Law of 2000 should further provide criminal liability for the legal person 
who may commit insider dealing. It also should enhance the punishments for insider dealing 
that are set under this Law. According to Article 41,
650
 any person found guilty of violating 
the provisions of insider dealing shall be liable for a penalty of not less than 100,000 
Dirhams (approximately UK£ 16,500) and not to exceed 1,000,000 Dirhams (approximately 
UK£ 165,500), or imprisonment for a term of not less than three months and not to exceed 
three years, or both. Assuming that an insider has gained more than 10 million Dirhams from 
the act of insider dealing, he will be required to pay a fine of 1,000,000 Dirhams or less, 
which is not likely to achieve the deterrent effect. In other words, if the punishment is not 
severe enough, it will not deter individuals who are most likely to commit insider dealing. 
Especially that in the UK, pursuant to Section 61 of the CJA 1993, any person who commits 
the crime of insider dealing is punishable on summary conviction by a fine of up to the 
statutory maximum or/and imprisonment for any term not exceeding six months. Moreover, 
there is no limit on the fine that can be imposed upon conviction on indictment or 
imprisonment for a term not to exceed seven years or both.
651 
 Moreover, the courts must be empowered to order any offender to disgorge what he 
gained from the offence of insider dealing to those injured by his or her abusive behaviour. 
These criminal penalties should be applicable to both natural and legal persons. Notably, not 
only the UK legislation empowered the FCA to disgorge the profits obtained by insider 
dealing from the wrongdoer to the company in question, but that also applies even if he was a 
secondary insider (tippee). Under the authorisation of Section 383 of the FSMA 2000, the 
FCA has the power to order, through the court, any offender to disgorge what he gained 
through illegal insider dealing to those injured by such dealing.
652
 
 The UK Parliament, as the legislature, has regulated the fate of the contract rather 
than leaving it to the discretion of courts. The English law expressly requires that the doctrine 
of illegality be excluded at common law. That doctrine stipulates that a contract will be void 
and unenforceable if it is illegal or concluded through the commission of a crime. In other 
words, under the common law, the court held that no person shall be allowed to benefit from 
his own crime. In addition, the reason behind these sections is the difficulty of tracking the 
transactions concluded through the illegal use of inside information, along with the problem 
of identifying the contracting parties' identity.
653
 
 Hence, because institutional companies dominate trading in the securities market, 
while individual traders are gradually diminishing, it is vital to impose a criminal penalty on 
legal persons by enacting a law that holds them directly liable for violating the securities 
market law. The law should authorise the SCA to order the payment of civil penalties as well 
as disgorgement, as is done through the legal framework of the UK. Further, the SCA, as the 
financial regulator, should be given broad powers of authority to investigate and prosecute 
                                                          
650
 Article 41of the SCA Federal Law No. (4) of 2000 Concerning Emirates Securities, supra note 75.  
651
 Legislation.gov.uk (2012) The Criminal Justice Act 1953, Section 61, Penalties and prosecution. [Online] 
available from: http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1993/36/section/61. [Accessed: 13 August 2012]. 
652
 The Enforcement Guide, supra note 457. 
653
 Cleaver v Mutual Reserve Fund Life Association, [1892] 1 QB 147, 156. See also Avgouleas, (2005) 'The 
Mechanics and Regulation of Market Abuse…', supra note 98, at 429. 
313 
 
insider dealing and market abuse. Meanwhile, the law should criminalise action that might 
hinder or impede investigations and law enforcement. Moreover, the concept of a Chinese 
wall
654
 policy should be introduced in the UAE markets by law in the same way as the UK 
framework to prevent the inappropriate flow of material, non-public information, thereby 
reducing the chances of committing insider dealing. 
 The difficulties that arise from proving, preventing, detecting, and controlling insider 
dealing activity, which are faced in the UK market, must be borne in mind. Further, the 
mechanisms utilised to overcome these issues should be considered. Hence, the SCA 
investigators should be well qualified and acquainted with the manner of investigations 
which the FCA investigators use and should be aware of the methods available to fight such a 
complex crime. They should be provided with sufficient investigation tools to enable them to 
detect and prove insider dealing easily with minimal cost and effort. 
 Therefore, developing the skills of market abuse policing teams and prosecutors 
should be a priority of the UAE government. The investigative authority, even the judges 
concerned with this kind of crime, also need such training in the technical methods used to 
commit insider dealing and market abuse. In addition, the investigating teams must have the 
skills of detecting suspects and assembling, examining, and securing incriminating evidence. 
They must also keep current in their preparedness with regard to new manners of committing 
market abuse and insider dealing. The effectiveness and efficiency of the investigation team 
should be enhanced through professional training programs and joint seminars and 
workshops in the area of securities market crimes. 
 Additionally, the SCA should be able to disqualify company directors and officers 
who have been convicted of, or pleaded guilty to, the offence of insider dealing. The law 
should empower the authority to do so, and not leave it to the courts. It is obvious, therefore, 
that the disqualification penalty is a valuable instrument in the developed markets, such as 
those in the UK, for deterring insider dealing and securing the integrity of the market. 
Accordingly, that instrument should be given to the SCA to enable it to carry out its roles in 
preventing and combating insider dealing in a very effective manner. 
 Although the offence of insider dealing can lead to criminal and civil penalties, it 
provides with a number of defenses. The legislature of the UK has realised that many persons 
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who act in good faith can be affected by the generalisation of the prohibition of insider 
dealing. Accordingly, while the Emirati legislation has not provided any specific defenses to 
the charge of insider dealing, the UK regulations contain safe harbors against such a charge. 
The CJA 1993 and FSMA 2000 contain defenses that can protect any person who possesses 
price sensitive information that are not generally available, against being charged for insider 
dealing. Hence, the existence of a legitimate justification for trading in securities by someone 
who knows material non-public information opens the door widely to a successful defence 
against the charge of insider dealing. In contrast, in the UAE, no statutory defenses protect 
investors if the element of good faith is present. 
 Furthermore, the CMA and the SCA need to empower their respective enforcement 
departments or units as well as the customer complaints divisions whose objective is to bring 
reparation to aggrieved parties. Moreover, the SCA regulations need to provide for strict 
punishments, for those market participants who breach the rules as previously indicated. 
Since prevention is always better than attempting to correct after the occurrence, it is in the 
best interests of both KSA and the UAE financial regulators to ensure that strict enforcement 
measures are in place to prevent these types of behavior.
655
 
 In addition, the general awareness of the securities market laws and regulations 
amongst the investing public should be developed. The majority of local investors in the 
financial markets of KSA and the UAE are unfamiliar with investing in the securities market. 
They get involved in the securities market without knowledge or understanding of the 
processes of investments. They just want to maximise their return without understanding the 
consequences. Investors need real knowledge of sophisticated financial instruments and 
understanding of electronic commerce. It is the responsibility of both countries' regulators to 
spread awareness and knowledge amongst investors. 
 The SCA also has a dedicated complaints and appeals system run by the Enforcement 
and Follow up Department of the SCA which deals with all issues related to transaction 
executed in the markets. As per the federal UAE regulation, the financial authority must have 
a system to receive and equitably deal with investor complaints. Article 11 of the Regulations 
of Market Licensing & Supervision 
656
 specifies that the Authority shall accept complaints 
made relating to the investors and brokers as well as follow through with necessary 
investigations. 
 The complaint system is online and must be written and relate to securities or 
commodities transactions executed on either or both the DFM and the ADX. The SCA is 
obliged to contact the complainant within five (5) working days 
657
 after which all necessary 
steps including the required documentation are collected and examined. The SCA estimates 
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that it takes anywhere between 2-12 weeks to resolve and complete a complaint. In the event 
that a complaint takes the form of arbitration, investors have the option to seek legal redress 
as well in accordance with Regulations for Arbitration as specified in Article 4 of the Federal 
Law of the Emirates Securities & Commodities Authority and Market.
658
 
 A complainant must fill in an application form and pay an arbitration registration fee 
of 1,000 Dirhams (US$275) as well as pay a fee of 3,000 Dirhams towards the administrative 
costs entailed in pursuing legal action. The complainant must also show documented 
evidence of the wrong doing as well as breakdown of compensation sought from the accused. 
The SCA estimates that the procedures for all administrative work will take about 10 days in 
order to appoint a court judge to oversee the case with an additional 5 days post appointment 
to ensure that the judiciary is fully updated with all the relevant paperwork and case details. 
Evidence, unlike KSA on the efficacy of the court is thin since the SCA does not publish 
these cases. As mentioned previously, the CMA has taken a new stance by ensuring that 
wrong doers are 'named and shamed' whereas this is still not yet the case in the UAE. 
 Generally, the SCA and the securities markets roles in preventing market abuse are 
not distinctly defined and there is a multiplicity and overlapping of jurisdiction between the 
SCA and these markets. It is therefore proposed that the UAE establish a specialist court in 
the financial market, introduce the concept of criminal reconciliation, and publish offenders' 
names and proportional fines. 
 Insider dealing has become eminent in the world today, the reason why reforms in the 
form of regulations were put in order so as to address and dissuade it through the 
enforcement methods of regulators in imposing civil or administrative fines. The UK is one 
of the key countries by which the said reform has implemented and enforced. The UK 
government has traditionally placed its confidence on simply applying criminal sanctions, 
which resulted to a low rate of successful prosecutions on cases regarding insider dealing. In 
order to tailor and provide an efficient system that will enable insider dealing cases to be 
handled legally and successfully, the UK has established the FSMA 2000 under the civil or 
administrative administration. Therefore, it can be said that the current trend in regulation is 
to establish an empowered administrative system in order to deal with insider dealing and 
market abuse.  
 The practical reason underlying such a trend is that proof in a civil/administrative 
case is easier than in a criminal case. It can be observed, especially from the UK experience, 
that an administrative regime is more efficient than a criminal regime. Therefore, it is 
recommended to introduce a civil/administrative system to deal with insider dealing and 
other market misconduct. An administrative regime in which the regulator has powers to 
impose civil penalties on insider dealers is believed to be more practical. Adequate authority 
should be delegated to the SCA in order to enable it to introduce rules, supervise markets, 
and investigate and prosecute insider dealing.
659
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 It is worth indicating that in the last few years, the SCA has clamped down on insider 
dealing by approving and passing a series of measures to check and curtail insider dealing 
and share price manipulation by issuing new regulation. As part of these regulations, senior 
management of listed companies including chairmen, board members, general managers and 
other employees who are privy to price sensitive information have been barred from trading 
in the company's or its subsidiaries' shares.
660
 The new regulations defined the SCA's 
regulatory role over the securities markets and lay down conditions for obtaining licenses and 
regulatory approvals as well as compel any person believed to be engaged in suspicious 
activities to disclose relevant information which could, in any way influence, share 
prices.The SCA board also approved an amendment to Article 37 of its Resolution on 
Disclosure and Transparency by adding a clause, referred to as Clause 2, to empower the 
board of directors to levy fines on any investor and/or suspend him from trading shares for a 




1.2 Suggested Approaches to False Accounting 
 It has been proved how false accounting can has tremendous negative impacts on the 
capital markets. These impacts are affecting the strategic objectives for any regulatory body 
which are: investors' protection, markets' efficiency and confidence, disclosures and 
corporate governance structure. Therefore, we had seen many initiatives from regulators 
worldwide to increase the level of controls and prevent false accounting from happening, 
whether it was by intention or as a result of negligence and not conducting the necessary 
fiduciary duty. These efforts by the regulators are challenged by the fact that companies' 
financials nowadays are no more that simple, accounting treatments can be manipulative if 
they are misused by the companies, taking into consideration the complexity of companies' 
financials due to the complexity of business itself. 
 The UK's experiment in this regard considered to be one of the first initiatives since 
long time. The primary financial legislation that attempts to address the matter of false 
accounting relates to the Theft Act of 1968.
662
 The Act has addressed the false accounting 
matter clearly through defining and criminalising it, and stating the legal consequences for 
such practice, as it will be explained in the first recommendation below. On the other hand, 
the UK considered one of the leading countries in promoting the accounting profession and 
enhancing the auditing culture through establishing various professional bodies to be 
considered as references for the accounting and auditing industry, this includes associations  
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 Having all these associations will boost the standards in the accounting and 
auditing professions, which leads to better accounting treatments and framework through 
ensuring the appropriate of level competency and professional integrity. 
 Another aspect of UK's initiatives in this regard is the role of the audit committees, 
which considered a key internal function that aims to prevent false accounting and fraud from 
occurring and ensure that false accounting and fraud are kept to a bare minimum. Therefore, 
directors of an audit committee are considered independent to the company itself in the UK.  
Furthermore, corporate governance codes have been established for UK listed entities to 
ensure that senior management and board members have the correct internal systems in place 
that would prevent false accounting from occurring. The importance of document 
management in combating and suppressing accounting fraud cannot be understated as well as 
other matters related to the general duties and responsibilities of directors including financial 
reporting and accounting responsibility. The strict penalties imposed by the FCA including 
large penalties, withdrawal of a licensed persons status as well as subsequent loss of 




 In KSA, measures used to prevent concealment or falsification of records and 
documents is not specifically referred to in the CML but there are several other methods by 
which the Authorities can suppress this activity. Similar to the UK, requirements for correct 
internal risk management procedures as well as stiff fines serve as potential preventatives. 
The CMA Board also has the power to suspend and withdraw licenses from approved 
persons in the event a breach has occurred. However, adherence to a systematic and 
streamlined global accounting standard such as the IFRS is a key issue that both the CMA 
and SAMA are still in the process of implementing in KSA and will go a long way in helping 
to uncover any fraud or accounting irregularities.
665
 The establishment of Saudi's 
Organisation for Certified Public Accountants "SOCPA"
666
 considered one of the early 
initiatives that the Kingdom has in regards to strengthening the accounting profession 
through consolidating the accounting references used by KSA firms. Yet, there are no clear 
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indicators about the initiatives and the impacts of SOCPA in KSA and how it can be utilised 
to minimise false accounting cases or even attempts.
667
 
 In UAE, there were many initiatives in the last years due to the share of false 
accounting and fraud cases which the country had as a result of lax regulation, weak 
enforcement and especially a market perception that perpetrators are insufficiently punished 
for their crimes. This perception of poor retribution is, in the researcher's view, endemic to 
the region. The credit crisis in the UAE resulted in increased scrutiny being exercised over 
many government-related entities due to the realisation by authorities that several high-
profile government figures and business executives were benefiting illegally from the 
misappropriation of public funds. This prompted the Ruler of Dubai to issue Dubai Law of 
2009 on the recovery of public funds and money collected illegally.
668
 It also provides for the 
imprisonment of those that benefited illegally, with the opportunity for the culprit to reduce 
or escape a prison sentence where they reimburse the illegally appropriated funds. Further, in 
2010 another Dubai Law was issued on the Audit Finance Department. The Law grants the 
Department extensive powers over government entities and any company in which the 
government of Dubai holds 25% or more of the shares. As to corruption, Article 19(9) of the 
Law is very clear: "accepting or requesting [a] bribe... abuse of position, unlawful earning, 
[or] conflict of interest" constitutes a "financial violation" under the Law, where such an act 
is committed by an official or employee of entities within the Department's scope.
669
 
 Some of the key steps that had been taken by the financial regulator in the UAE, have 
led to an overall improvements in relation to the disclosure requirements as well as the 
implementation of the sound corporate governance practices. These regulatory provisions 
include structure of boards, separation of the role of CEO from that of Chairman, 
requirements for strict internal controls as well as risk management systems.Companies are 
also required to produce annual compliance reports detailing the actions taken as well as 
preventative measures to combat and uncover malpractices within their respective 
organisation. Unlike the UK, the corporate governance code in the UAE is mandatory and 
non-compliance will result in penalties being imposed. The imposition of such penalties is 
envisaged to act as a preventative measure to ensure compliance with sound corporate 
governance practices. The requirement that each board of director of listed entities initiate 
and establish effective internal controls coupled with the annual compulsory external audit 
act as further backstops in the fight against fraud. 
 The current legal and regulatory framework oblige the listed companies to provide an 
audited and reviewed financial statements annually and quarterly respectively, these 
statements should be disclosed within the regulatory timelines. Furthermore, companies are 
obliged to provide fair financial statements, however, this framework shall be strengthen 
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through the criminalisation of all false accounting cases, and provide the SCA with the 
necessary legal authority to pursuit all related parties in such cases, this include companies' 
auditors, too, and take strict legal actions in these cases. 
 Another regulatory development needed to empower the SCA being the capital 
market regulator is to conduct risk assessment and examinations' visits to the registered audit 
firms, particularly those who are auditing the financial statements of the listed companies. 
This can be done mutually in cooperation with the MOE, as the latter is the regulatory body 
responsible for licensing and supervising audit firms as per the federal law. However, the 
main objective of these visits is to ensure that these firms have the required level of internal 
controls and professional competencies to conduct the audits on the listed companies as per 
the SCA rules and regulations that govern the capital markets, especially corporate 
governance codes and international financial reporting standards. 
 The financial crisis also raised the importance of the compliance and risk 
management functions in the companies to ensure their long-term sustainability and business 
continuity. On the strategic level, the role of audit committees in the boards shall be 
enhanced and the members of those committees should be accountable seriously for the 
effectiveness of internal controls and accounting treatments which effects the financial 
statements of the company. This aims to force these committees to be more involved in the 
strategic decisions and act practically for the benefit of the company and its shareholders. 
 On the operational side, the functions of internal auditors or controllers also need to 
be empowered and developed to integrate with the role of compliance and risk 
management!The nature of internal audit functions requires a special expertise in the 
accounting field, in particular public accounting or forensic accounting. The SCA has to 
develop a special program that aims to govern this role in the listed companies through 
enforcing these companies to appoint fulltime internal auditors whom should be licensed and 
registered by the authority. Hence, the SCA can ensure the competencies and level of 
professionalism of internal auditors who are responsible specifically to look after the 
company's financials. 
 Although the SCA regulations require the companies to appoint an independent 
external auditor, the roles and responsibilities of those auditors shall be increased to ensure 
their ability to audit the financial statements fairly and deeply, this increase in role and 
responsibility will bring with it an increase of accountability, as those auditors will be 
questioned seriously about any failures.Functions of external auditors and their duties shall 
be covered in more details under the SCA rules and regulations. This aims to question those 
auditors in cases where there are any failures, and to specify a framework for those auditors 
to work within. The SCA shall have the right to demand listed companies to change their 
external auditors for every significant period – three or five years – in order to ensure the 
independency of those auditors and increase the level of credibility, within this period. The 
external auditor shall be asked to rotate the audit teams and individuals periodically. 
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 Too big to fail companies which are known as "SIFI's" have great impact on the 
capital markets and their stabilities. The failure of any of such companies may result in the 
loss of confident in the whole market's system and the regulatory framework that governs it. 
Therefore, those firms need to fall under a special financial supervisory program that could 
be divided into the following: 
1. Appointing two different external auditors to be responsible for auditing the financial 
statements of such a company, 
2. Conduct a special risk assessment programs on these companies by the SCA to 
examine and audit their accounting records and financial statements, 
3. Introduce a "Financial Information Intelligence System" that monitor the financials of 
these companies and predict any kind of false accounting through unusual financial 
results or indicators. This will allow the decision makers to take the appropriate 
decision in the right time to open any kind of investigation or predict any impacts of 
false accounting. 
 The current regime requires listed companies to present their financials within ninety 
days after the end of the fiscal year. This is quite long period and can be shortened in order to 
ensure the promptness of preparing and presenting the financials. This will reduce the 
opportunity of any intentions to false the accounts and focus on delivering the statements 
with the regulatory deadline. However, such deadline should be reduced in order to provide 
the companies with appropriate time to prepare their financials without any operational 
burdens. 
 Although the UAE Accountants and Auditors Association has been established in 
1997. However, there is a critical need to have a federal organisation that has the legal power 
and financial resources necessary to conduct its mission in regard promoting the accounting 
and auditing profession in the UAE in cooperation with other regulatory bodies such as the 
MOE, the SCA, and CBUAE. Establishing such an entity will enforce its initiatives and 
promote the practices in the accounting field, form this entity, different initiatives can come 
to reality such as having a professional platform for accountants and auditors similar to the 
UK model. However and due to the vary in culture, this entity will be formed as a federal 
organisation instead of association.One of the recent initiatives that the UAE is issuing a new 
Law in December 2014 to that aims to strengthen the guidelines that are governing this 




 Under the UK model, there is a clear legal sentencing and provisions for false 
accounting. Section 7 of the Theft Act 1986 considered a good reference as it states clearly 
the sanctions which could reach to seven years of custody, these sanctions are determined 
based on the amount of harm as stated in the Act. Such a model could be implemented for 
false accounting cases in the UAE to ensure minimising these cases as possible. Finally, 
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despite all what had been mentioned above, and the fact that the recent years has witnessed 
various initiatives and efforts to minimise false accounting's cases globally, regionally and 
locally, false accounting remained one of the biggest challenges that regulators still have to 
keep watching in order to ensure that it will not affect the markets and the investors. 
 
1.1 Suggested Approaches to Problems Related to Corporate Governance 
 On 24 February 2010 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) published a report  
671
 that included a set of conclusions and best practice to 
complement its Principles and encourage enhanced corporate governance which relates to the 
following: 
1. The need to improve the corporate governance framework - the OECD reports that the 
Steering Group's analysis showed a gap between existing standards and actual 
implementation. Although it is primarily the responsibility of companies, the board and 
shareholders to ensure compliance, jurisdictions should also regularly review their 
supervisory, regulatory and enforcement authorities to ensure effective implementation 
and timely update. 
2. The governance of remuneration and incentives - remuneration is an issue for the board. 
The board must ensure that it aligns remuneration with the longer term interests of the 
company and this information should be disclosed in the remuneration report. The 
procedure for setting remuneration should be fully transparent and the roles and 
responsibilities of those involved should be clearly defined and separated. Remuneration 
policies and implementation measures should also be submitted to shareholders at the 
annual general meeting to raise awareness of the remuneration policy and enable 
shareholders to comment on the policy. 
3. The governance of risk management - risk management is the responsibility of the board. 
An effective risk management policy should be implemented and it is good practice for 
those directors involved in setting such a policy to be independent of profits centres. Risk 
management and results of risk assessments should be disclosed "in a transparent and 
understandable fashion." 
4. Improving board practices, including board composition, independence and competence - 
the OECD reports shows that the boards of many companies which it reviewed were 
dominated by the chief executive officer (CEO) which "stifled critical enquiry and 
challenge essential for objective, independent judgment." The chairman of the board 
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should ensure that the board tackles the most important issues, and adequate measures 
should be put in place to ensure that the roles of the chairman and CEO are separated to 
avoid conflicts of interest. To promote board competence, the company should promote 
regular training evaluation and the results of that evaluation should be disclosed to 
shareholders. 
5. The exercise of shareholder rights - the OECD has identified the need to improve the 
exercise of shareholder rights, especially by institutional investors.
672
 
 Corporate governance regulations/codes are one of the most effective apparatus that 
regulators use to achieve investor confidence in the boards and management teams of the 
companies they invest in. Sound corporate governance practices minimise conflict of interest, 
increase disclosure and transparency and greatly mitigate wrong managerial practices. As 
previously indicated, the UK regulatory framework for corporate governance comprises a 
number of sources including the Companies Act 2006, the Listing Rules (LR), Disclosure 
and Transparency Rules (DTR) 
673




 The Code issued by the Financial Reporting Council (FRC) is a set of non-mandatory 
principles that listed entities are required to adhere to. Disclosures on corporate governance 
in annual accounts and reports of listed companies, under what is now referred to as the 
"Combined Code," were originally prompted in 1992 by the recommendations of the 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (the Cadbury Committee). 
Responsibility for updating the corporate governance requirements and associated guidance 
on internal controls now rests with the FRC. The FRC also has stringent corporate 
governance requirements especially with regard to matters related to financial reporting and 
accounting. These requirements, however, are part of an overall EU directive and apply to all 
member states and not just the UK's financial regulatory authority. 
 Listed companies are required under the Listing Rules either to comply with the 
provisions of the Code or explain to investors in their next annual report the reasons for not 
having done so. In the event that shareholders are not satisfied they can use their powers, 
including the power to appoint and remove directors, and to hold the company to account. 
This type of "leadership by consensus" as it were has its merits. It ensures that senior 
management remain accountable to their shareholders and is a constant reminder to them that 
the management of the business to which they have been appointed is a position of trust that 
cannot be abused. In a sense, the format is similar to that of a democratically elected 
parliament. The elected leaders serve the people, in this case the shareholders and not the 
other way around. 
 In the FCA's Conduct of Business (COB) strict corporate governance measures 
ensure that a firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best 
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interests of its client (referred to as the "client's best interest rule").
675
 In order to comply with 
the clients best interests rule a firm must always seek the best interests of its client at all 
times as well as provide appropriate information in a comprehensible form to a client about 
the firm and its services so that the client is reasonably able to understand the nature and 
risks of the service and consequently, to take investment decisions on an informed basis. 
 There are also strict rules on inducements and gifts and firms must not pay or accept 
any fee or commission or provide or receive any non-monetary benefit other than a fee, 
commission or non-monetary benefit paid or provided to or by the client or a person on 
behalf of the client. The guidance on inducements 
676
 ensures that the firm always acts 
honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best interests of its clients. Another 
key issue related to good corporate governance is to ensure record keeping is always updated. 
A firm must make a record of the information disclosed to the client in accordance with 
COBS 2.3.1R 
677
 and must keep that record for at least five years from the date on which it 
was given. 
 Therefore, the UK's approach towards dealing with corporate governance is to 
provide a framework (the Code) for firms. The fact that this is voluntary, in the researcher's 
opinion, adds the onus of responsibility on the board of directors and management to ensure 
that a system is put in place since every year each company is obligated to report to its 
shareholders whether its board and senior management have abided by the rules. Ultimately, 
the shareholders are empowered by law to remove a board member who has not conducted 
himself in a suitable manner. In essence, CGRs are about ensuring that the board of directors 
and senior management conduct themselves in suitable and appropriate manner. Good 
corporate governance code, like the one used in the UK, are based on transparency and 
accountability. 
 It is difficult to measure good corporate governance and it is certainly more difficult 
to oversee, since the conduct of the board of directors and senior management of a firm is 
essentially a closed affair between the board and its company. Assessing whether companies 
do in fact comply can be a rather subjective call. 
678
 That is why, each firm with a premium 
listing on the LSE must state whether its board has been in compliance with FRC code or not. 
The shareholders, at the annual meeting are then permitted to vote on the suitability of a 
board member or for his removal. Thus, at the risk of being removed from the board 
members are likely to ensure compliance with this Code.
679
 
 The UK and other countries in the EU and around the world have as a central plank of 
their corporate governance regime a voluntary code that has the principle of comply or 
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explain at its core. Experience demonstrates that countries that have implemented comply or 
explain, enjoyed a convergence towards better governance practices. The perception of 
comply or explain in the UK is very positive, however; while accepting the fact that the 
principle is considered by many participants and regulators as an appropriate and efficient 
regulatory mechanism, it has been found by others that  the approach operates with deficient  




 The first deficiency is apparent form the lack of shareholder engagement. This is a 
matter of significant concern, as the principle is predicated on the basis that the shareholders 
will be the ones who will monitor board compliance with code provisions; and that if they do 
not comply, shareholders are to ensure that the board provides adequate explanations for 
deviating. Secondly, statements by companies that are designed to explain why the company 
has not complied are often very brief and uninformative.
681
 
 The comply or explain concept would work better if regulators or other authorities 
had the power to check that companies had in fact complied with code provisions when they 
did not provide explanations for non-compliance, and to evaluate explanations – when 
provided- for deviating from the code.
682
 Such a move would mean that appropriate sanctions 
have to be introduced for board failures. These could include, first, the regulator conveying 
to the company's board informally that the principle has not been adhered to, together with 
the threat of further action if the company does not rectify its failings. A second and stronger 
possible sanction is for the regulator to publish any breaches of the comply or explain 
principle. This could be seen as a public censure of companies who fail to comply. Critically, 
any decision to provide for statutory regulation in the area under consideration, has to be 
thought thoroughly so that the gains made under comply or explain are not lost.
683
 
 In KSA, one of the key recommendations of the IMF towards improving corporate 
governance involves IOSCO principles relating to KSA issuers specifically with reference to 
clarification of the role of the CMA in assessing the duties of directors of listed companies. 
This would need to have amendments to both the CMA and the MOCI legislations. 
Nevertheless, an awareness of the importance of good corporate governance is beginning to 
emerge in KSA.
684
 In the wake of the market correction of 2006, authorities and market 
regulators pushed for better corporate governance and legal and institutional reforms. These 
included the CGRs of 2006 for listed companies,
685
 guidelines on corporate governance best 
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practices for banks and further strengthening of the supervisory functions across the financial 
sector. A definitive change has already been seen in the CMA in the publishing of its 
transparent and revealing financial report for 2012.
686
 
 As of January 2011, listed companies were required to comply with Article 15 of the 
CGRs by forming a nomination and remuneration committee by the Board of Directors.
687
 
This committee is tasked with the review and audit of the rules and policies related to 
appointment, qualifications, structure, authorities, independence, and remuneration of the 
board members. The composition rules of the nomination and remuneration committee are 
proposed by the board of directors and approved by shareholders in a general assembly.  
These changes were brought about in order to develop accountability in KSA equity capital 
markets. 
 Companies licensed by the CMA to conduct capital-market activities are also 
required to comply with corporate governance rules pursuant to circulars issued by the CMA. 
Effective January 2012, the CMA-licensed entities are required to include independent 
members on their board of directors and to disclose in annual reports information about board 
composition, activities, internal audit and financial matters. Further, CMA-licensed entities 
must establish corporate governance policies to cover different areas including board 
membership appointment criteria; authorities of the board members; ethics rules for 
employees and composition of audit and remuneration committees. Violators have been 
penalised by the CMA up to SR 50,000.
688
 Also as part of the CMA's strategy of gradual 
mandatory implementation of the Corporate Governance Regulations, the Board of the CMA 
issued many resolutions to make certain articles and paragraphs of the Regulations 
mandatory for companies listed on Tadawul.
689
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 On another note, KSA's compliance with the OECD Principles of Corporate 
Governance 
690
 indicate that although basic shareholder rights appear to be in place, all 
shareholder have a clear and equal right to participate and vote in general meetings. 
Cumulative voting has also been recently introduced as per the corporate governance rules as 
a method of nominating members of the board of directors. However, the corporate 
governance regulations governing the disclosure of third party transactions are still 
underdeveloped. 
691
 There is a lack of reference to the issue of third party transactions in the 
actual CGRs. This will need to be addressed if KSA is to resolve its issues of investor 
confidence. 
 As we have seen from the previous chapter in relation to the data released in the 
CMA 2012 annual report, there appears to be a significant amount of malfeasance and 
manipulation in the markets. Many investors, including potential international investors have 
voiced concerns that brokers and other market participants engage in improper conduct and 
market abuse. This includes trading on inside information, improper trading of shares in 
investor accounts and market manipulation. Another constantly stated problem with CGRs in 
KSA is the wide held belief that compliance with non-financial disclosure requirements is 




 In a similar vein, KSA and the UAE have both adopted detailed corporate governance 
rules in the hope of mitigating and reducing problems related to poor corporate governance. 
The CMA's CGRs framework covers the protection of the rights of shareholders, disclosure 
and transparency as well as board structure and responsibilities. The implementation of 
KSA's CG code was initiated in 2006 as a result of the market correction and came at a most 
opportune time indeed. The problems associated with remuneration and nomination of board 
members was solved by ensuring, as per the CGRs, that a nomination and remuneration 
committee was formed and that this was composed of board members. As of January 2012, 
all CMA licensed entities are required to disclose in their annual reports details relating to 
board of directors, compensation as well as independence of board members. 
 Furthermore, recognising the importance of applying the standards and rules of 
governance on the CMA's business and internal operating environment in order to strengthen 
its internal organisational and regulatory structures in line with best practices and standards 
adopted in similar international authorities to be a role model followed by related parties, the 
CMA Board approved the establishment and formation of a number of ad-hoc committees, 
and approved the regulations and rules governing these committees. Under the bylaws of the 
Internal Audit Committee and the rules governing the business of ad-hoc committees, the 
CMA Board approved the establishment and formation of the Internal Audit Committee and 
Ad-hoc Committees such as Committee for Capital Market Institutions Supervision and 
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 The CMA has also built an Electronic Communication System that enables listed 
companies to update their data, fill in and submit the forms required by the CMA 
electronically. With this system, the CMA can also send circulars to listed companies 
electronically. The system is intended to apply the concept of e-government and standardised 
means of communication in addition to accelerating transactions between the CMA and listed 
companies. The number of forms that have been reviewed through the system since it went 
live on 1/1/2013 stood at 6,348 forms up to 31/12/2013. During 2013, the following forms 
were reviewed: 
• Designating representatives of listed companies. 
• Submitting financial statements of listed companies. 
• Résumés of nominees to board membership of companies listed on the Saudi Stock 
Exchange "Tadawul." 
• Information of members of boards of directors, senior executives and their relatives. 
• Reporting expired membership of a board member, or termination of business 
relations with a senior executive 




 In the UAE, corporate governance has been regulated for a number of years by the 
SCA via the old CGRs No. R/32 of 2007. In October 2009, the MOE issued a new CG 
resolution which amended the old and was referred to as the Governance Rules and 
Corporate Discipline Standards (the 2009 Resolution).
695
 This code refines and updates the 
old especially taking into account international standards. It is mandatory on all listed 
companies (except foreign listed companies) and there is no voluntary opt-out. The key 
issues in the new code covered many areas which the older one had not. The new code 
addressed many problematic scenarios which the Authorities were forced to deal with. Key 
issues addressed included the following matters: 
• Board Structure – balance of executives, non-executive and independent directors. 
• Separation of the role of Chairman from that of CEO. 
• Directors duties and responsibilities. 
• Board Committees including the appointment of an audit committee and nomination 
and remuneration committee. 
• Internal control – including the appointment of a compliance officer. 
• Governance reporting – annual compliance reports to shareholders and the SCA too. 
 
 The UAE has also taken major steps to alleviate corporate governance problems by 
amending the CGRs again in 2014. The new regulation also sets out the key issues including 
related parties transactions as well as financial disclosure requirements. The SCA is 
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 The SCA Resolution of 2009 Concerning Governance Rules, supra note 295. 
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continuously developing the corporate governance code and streamlining it with the IOSCO 
principles. It has also developed the code to conform to the relative international 
competitiveness indicators including but not limited to the investor protection indicator in the 
World Bank doing business report,
696
 and the board of director's effectiveness indicator at the 
world competitiveness yearbook issued by the International Institute for Management 
Development (IMD).
697
 The SCA's efforts were rewarded by achieving the number one rank 
in MENA region,
698
 as well as achieving the number one rank in corporate board 
effectiveness (Corporate boards do supervise the management of companies effectively).
699
 
 To be able to achieve that, the SCA made the following specific changes to CGRs in 
order to enhance investor protection.
700
 It extended the definition of related party to include 
persons that assume any of the following positions or their relatives, including board chair 
and members, the executives in the company, its subsidiaries, its parent, sister company or 
executives in any company with a controlling stake. It clearly defined the meaning of 
conflicts of interest and introduced provisions to regulate conflicts of interest. It also 
determined responsibility for any harm, whether to the company or to a shareholder, caused 
by a transaction with a related party or if such transaction is unfair or entails a conflict of 
interest. In addition, it indicated the shareholders with 5% ownership right to review all 
related party transactions documents either personally or through an independent auditor 
hired by them from the company, the regulator or through a court order. Not only the court 
can rule the transaction null and void it can ask the related party for compensation and to 
return any profits generated if the court finds that its harmful to the company or any of its 
shareholders. 
 It also required the chair of the board to provide the SCA with the information of 
related party transaction along with a statement ensuring and documenting the fairness of the 
transaction and that it benefits the company and its shareholders. If the value related party 
transaction is equivalent to 10% or more of the company's total assets (as valued in the latest 
annual or quarterly reports), then the related party has to disclose such transaction, its nature 
and the benefits gained from it to the board. The board has to disclose such information and 
any conflicts of interest to the exchange, in its financial reports, and must present it in the 
general assembly meetings. If the related party failed to meet the above disclosure 
requirements, then the board or any shareholder with a holding of 5% or more of the 
company's shares has the right to file a suit with the relevant court against the related party to 
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 There are other suggested amendments to the UAE CGRs such as the requirement to 
have some relevant experience with some of the Nomination and Remuneration Committee 
members to help accomplish its required tasks, and if this is not possible, then the Committee 
can use experts to help it to accomplish its tasks. Also, the code should address the rule of 
having a sufficient number of non-executive members to form a Nominations Committee, 
and not permitting the board of directors to use external members in that committee, although 
it is justified for the Audit Committee. There is also a need for the legislation to reconsider 
granting the chairman of the board of directors a casting vote. The legislation can keep the 
casting vote of the chairman at board meetings when members' votes are equally divided, 
provided that the chairman has been chosen through the general assembly of the company. In 
other cases, it should postpone the vote on that matter to a later meeting where the number of 
the present members can change, and the required majority for the decision can be achieved 
or refer to the general assembly of the company in cases of an equality of votes.Also the 
CGRs do not require that the financial expert member of the Audit Committee to be a non-






 In light of the discussions in this chapter, it can be safely concluded that the key 
themes underlying the endemic problems of the securities markets have been addressed to a 
large extent by the developed markets like the UK. In the meantime, the markets of KSA and 
the UAE are in the process of identifying and addressing increasing transparency, 
strengthening the disclosure regime, stricter enforcement, containing insider dealing and 
better investor education. The disclosure and transparency can be strengthened by ensuring 
timely and adequate disclosure, both pre-trade and post-trade as well as creating conducive 
environment for participation by long term foreign investors. The enforcement of laws and 
regulations has to be balanced, consistent and equitable, without fear and favour and the 
'naming and shaming' of perpetrators of financial misconduct should be encouraged. 
 The difficulty to prove market malpractice of insider dealing is better contained by 
enhancing the legal framework to precisely define and criminalise the malpractice. Further 
measures include increasing the penalties and including disgorgement of illegal gains while 
at the same time developing the legal infrastructure. This can be further enhanced by 
imparting financial knowledge to legal practitioners and having an appropriate appeal system 
in place. Putting all these elements together will have the dual impact of discouraging the 
practice of insider dealing as well as providing redressal in case of occurred instances. 




 Abdel Moniem (2014) 'Corporate Governance in the UAE Legislation', supra note 297. 
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 The principle of 'regulation by objective' implemented through the twin peaks model 
has to be encouraged to deal with the systemic risks, clearly delineating the roles of the 
prudential supervision and the conduct of business requirements while the market volatility 
can be tackled by means of reducing the herd mentality of investors by empowering them 
with sound financial education as well as encouraging the participation of foreign investors 
with longer term outlook for the markets. Mandating better information dissemination can 
also be a potential and powerful tool in the hands of the regulators which will lead the 
investors to better deal with episodic market volatility. Whereas, in matters of implementing 
sound corporate governance, substantial progress has been done in the UAE as compared to 
KSA markets, further steps in regard to implementation and enforcement of the CG Codes 
will lead to better corporate governance at the listed companies thereby leading ultimately to 
fairer and more efficient markets and enhanced price discovery. The final chapter of this 
thesis will use the above mentioned findings and analyses to formulate the conclusions and to 





Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
 
8.1 The Outlook for the Future –Ever– Increasing Globalisation within the 
Securities Markets of the World. 
 To begin to understand the effect of globalisation on equity capital markets around 
the world we need to first define the term 'globalisation' within this context. The world is 
increasingly connected and the Internet as well the increase of specialist technology 
platforms have resulted in people and businesses far removed from one another to be easily 
connected at the click of a button. There are simply no more boundaries. Globalisation may 
therefore be termed as the process of international integration as a result of the almost 
simultaneous exchange of information, ideas and culture. Markets all over the world are 
required to constantly update, review and re-interpret their activities and platforms in light of 
changes that are occurring. It seems that in order to be considered as an attractive market 
within which to invest, stock exchanges as well as financial regulators must adapt the advent 
of technology as well as regulations must be constantly upgraded.  
 The impact of globalisation has affected capital markets around the world. 
Deregulation of the markets as well as relaxing (or at least trying to in the case of KSA) 
restrictions on the acquisition of domestic securities by foreign investors are two key 
initiatives that have been a result of globalisation. We may also include in this the relaxation 
of rules that allow foreign entities to issue bonds. All the major financial centers of the world 
today are heavily populated by foreign banks and investment houses that are fully involved in 
underwriting bonds and stocks in domestic stock markets. Technology and money are now 
highly mobile. Brokers and dealers are inter-connected on a massive scale providing 
investors with real time prices and the ability to monitor large geographically diverse 
investment portfolios on-screen in complete details. The ability to instantly monitor market 
performance has totally changed the risk/return strategy of financial institutions. Decisions 
which had previously taken a few hours or days to be made are now made almost 
instantaneously by computer and algorithmic trading programs. 
 Cross border listing that allow companies to raise capital anywhere in the world has 
flourished as evidenced by the LSE increased role in such activity especially on the 
alternative investment platforms such as AIM. More and more companies worldwide are 
tapping foreign markets to raise funds. For example, AIM has assisted well over 3,100 
companies raise in excess of US$ 150 billion in the last decade and it is the home to 1,253 
companies from diverse geographic locations that have a total market capitalisation of almost 
UK£65 billion of which 20% are foreign entities.
703
 By the provision of balanced regulation, 
international investor base, geographical reach and sector growth as well as a huge expert 
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advisory network, AIM is today one of the world's primary destinations for serious long term 
investors.  
 The effects of globalisation have produced visibility and a high profile for companies 
in the UK that could not have taken place within a closed and non-connected environment. 
The practice of cross listing is the most significant phenomenon that creates linkages among 
stock exchanges. The number of dual listed firms has increased significantly during the last 
decade. Many leading corporations' shares are traded more in foreign stock exchanges than 
traded in their home exchanges. The majority of foreign firms listed on second stock 
exchange have to meet dual requirements; other firms that may not meet the second 
exchange's requirements use the so-called depository receipts as an alternative for cross 
listing. 
 Today's globalised world is dominated by large financial institutions such as pension 
funds, mutual funds, insurance companies as well as large "too big to fail" banks that realised 
tremendous losses due to the 2008-2012 financial crisis. The issue of size is moot.
704
 Large 
banking and insurance groups still dominate the financial services markets. Such large 
groups are a hallmark of today's globalisation and though heavily criticised for their size as 
being too large have nevertheless emerged stronger within the global markets. Similarly, the 
traditional role of the stock exchange has changed. 
 As a result of the sweeping and constantly changing effects of technology, an 
explosion of internet and computer based trading systems has changed our perception of 
stock markets. Anyone, anywhere can trade from home today. Stock exchanges are 
completely accessible from anywhere in the world. Accordingly, stock markets have to 
change to meet these needs. Additionally, there are a number of new factors that continue to 
affect the operation of the stock exchanges. Listing rules have been harmonised on major 
global exchanges and information disclosure requirements are generally similar on the major 
stock markets. The way companies present their annual and quarterly statements is moving 
towards a set of harmonised international standards. Some multinational enterprises are 
raising new capital on several stock markets simultaneously. This requires coordination 
between exchanges. It is increasingly being realised that the home country of a company 
which has shareholders around the world has a responsibility for ensuring that price-sensitive 
and material information is available to all shareholders and not just to those in the home 
country. 
 Thus international regulatory initiatives, particularly those aimed at standardising 
accounting and other disclosure requirements need to be enforced vigorously. The 
combination of institutionalisation, automation and globalisation will lead to more market 
liquidity, greater volatility and lower trading costs. It would therefore appear that the world's 
stock markets are heading rapidly toward globalisation through two major changes namely, 
the liberalisation of international stock trading rules, and the globalisation of stock trading 
practices. 
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8.2 Disclosure & Transparency 
 This thesis has sought to provide a detailed comparative overture of capital market 
regulations in the UAE, KSA and the UK. The thesis has researched several key themes in 
each of these markets in an attempt to pinpoint the key regulatory frameworks that are either 
lacking or under-represented with specific relevance to the UAE and KSA. 
 London is held as the best practice example for several reasons including the fact that 
GCC nations have historically and traditionally had very close business ties over the last fifty 
years. Furthermore, the London capital markets have always been considered a safe haven 
for GCC funds and as a result, many rules and regulations have been adopted in the hope of 
emulating the UK's success in becoming a global financial hub. Of primary importance to 
this research are the key differences between the UAE and KSA on one hand and the UK on 
the other with regard to disclosure and transparency. International investors hold London's 
disclosure and transparency regime in very high regard. Market participants trust the system. 
 Companies listed on the UK exchanges cannot circumvent disclosure rules with 
impunity since the repercussions from both a financial as well as reputational perspective 
would be enormous. The research demonstrates that disclosure and transparency issues need 
to be seriously addressed in both the UAE and KSA in order for them to be on par with 
London. Cultural matters must be taken into consideration as well since it is pointless to 
impose written rules and regulations that have no basis in current cultural operating norms. 
Successful investor protection requires strong laws and equally strong enforcement. Investor 
protection in securities markets relies on having an effective regulator that is not only 
empowered but is seen to use such powers in an effective manner. 
 It is only by taking action that a regulators reputation is cemented. Indeed, it can be 
surmised that there is no point in empowering a financial regulator on paper if the regulator 
does not take strong actionable steps when required. The research has concluded that this 
may be construed as cultural idiosyncrasies which, nevertheless, do negatively impact 
investor perception. 
 There is no doubt that the UK's financial regulators take quick prescient action in the 
event that rules are breached. No-one is above the law there. Can the same be said about the 
UAE and KSA Capital markets?  It is evident from the thesis research that tremendous steps 
have been taken by GCC regulators to improve the financial milieu and certainly, in the case 
of the CMA, instances of disclosure by the CMA of wrong doing have increased 
tremendously. 
 It is precisely this type of disclosure which lends confidence to international 
investors. Market participants and investors need to know that they will be treated in the 
same equitable manner as everyone else and that no preference will be given simply because 
the violating party is a locally based entity or for that matter, well-connected. It is therefore 
imperative that the power of the regulator to enforce securities laws (and thus enhance 
transparency) is generally conceived of as comprising investigation of any breaches as well 
as the taking of appropriate action including swift (but just) punishment. Proponents argue 
020 
 
that transparency makes capital markets accessible to both retail and institutional clients, 
enhances market integrity and stability, and provides regulators greater ability to monitor 
activity. They reason that with the introduction of transparency, price discovery and the 
bargaining power of previously uninformed participants improves. 
 The research would indicate that the UAE market is equally transparent to that of 
KSA especially in regards to the price discovery perspective. Price discovery is essential for 
an investor to assess viability of markets returns. Such timely price disclosure builds 
credibility. A transparent market also disseminates timely post-trade information. In today's 
fast paced and interconnected world it would seem very strange indeed if investors were 
unable to access corporate price and trading information of any given listed stock but instead 
had to rely on a limited set of options including telephone calls with broker dealers or 
consultations with other third party specialist who would provide such information for a fee. 
 CMA and the SCA have, over the years spent considerable time and effort in 
updating their price reporting platforms thus benefiting local investors as well as attracting 
international investors in the process. Similarly, in the UK and as per both MIFID and the 
FCA regulation, all EU regulated market securities (including all the UK securities) are 
supported by a pan-European trade reporting service.
705
 
 Such price dissemination is crucial in order to maximise investor confidence and on a 
stock exchange as prestigious as London, it is imperative that investors have no doubt in their 
minds that corporate and financial information will be released in a timely and efficient 
manner. Furthermore, the content of this information must be detailed and pertinent and 
investors need to be certain that the Authorities (in this case the FCA and the UKLA) have 
vetted all the said information to ascertain its veracity. As a result, investors have high 
confidence in the UK's financial Authorities as well as the LSE. The research finds that in the 
UK, the most successful medium for improving market transparency are the open forums 
held by the FCA in which market participants are free to openly discuss (and criticise) rules 
and regulations with the regulator in order to iron out any differences they may have. This 
manner of open debate has proved to be most conducive. The thesis finds that such a manner 
of open policy building is lacking in the GCC, particularly KSA and that such an approach 
would be invaluable towards boosting investor confidence. 
 
8.3 Breach of Disclosure & Enforcement 
 The research finds that swift punishment and enforcement in the GCC capital markets 
vis-à-vis London is somewhat lacking. Why is this the case? Is this a reflection of poor 
enforcement? Are disclosure regulations insufficient? Or are regulators politically unable to 
take action? This matter naturally leads to issues of 'independence' of the regulator. 
Enforcement of the disclosure regime in KSA is derived from the fact that judicial 
enforcement is construed as weak. 
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 When judicial enforcement is inadequate in protecting investors then it is the function 
of the regulator to step in and provide such protection. The research concludes that the CMA 
is definitely attempting to do this although historically this has been the Achilles heel of the 
CMA for many years. Strong enforcement is essential to maintain and improve the capital 
market and consequently, the role of both the CMA and the SCA is significant in terms of 
investor protection and market growth. Government laws and regulations ensure 
transparency and disclosure requirements are diligently followed through. In the UK, the 
Authorities are not at all shy in imposing penalties on those who do not abide by the rules. 
 Although there have been fines imposed on some listed companies for breach of 
disclosure regime and on participants for insider dealing in the UAE stock market. Though it 
would nevertheless appear in this research that payment for violations appears to be far less 
than say the UK regulator. It is clear that many companies in both KSA and the UAE do not 
have sufficient fines levied against them. This may be due to plethora of reasons including 
reluctance of the financial regulator to take action due to political considerations.In contrast 
to this, is the ability of the UK regulators to sanction breaches of the disclosure and 
transparency rules involves potentially indefinite amounts of fines including both monetary 
as well as fines and bans imposed upon the violator.  
 The research also shows that a plethora of regulations have been passed including 
investment fund regulations, market code of conduct as well corporate governance which 
have indeed provided a clearer framework for companies and individuals to use.
706
 However, 
it is the application of these rules that has given cause for concern. There is no point in 
having detailed regulations if there is no one to enforce these rules. In one of its regular 
assessments of the KSA capital markets, the IMF 
707
 has commented that the CMA does not 
enforce penalties on board members of KSA listed entities who do not adhere to corporate 
governance regulations. This is a poor precedence to follow and sets a very bad example for 
other perpetrators. It means that the rules can be broken with impunity. Disclosure and 
transparency in enforcement also appear to be an issue. Enforcement penalties are not 
exercised equally across all the listed entities on Tadawul with the result that the CMA has 
been unable to demonstrate a balanced, consistent and equitable track record in its regulatory 
action.
708
 Thus, as Tadawul is significantly larger than other GCC markets, it is expected that 
it carries the same reputational weight amongst international investors. 
 Having researched the rules and regulations in both KSA and the UAE, the thesis 
finds that any perceived or actual lack of prevention of violations may be related to the 
financial authority's lack of intervention. Regulators in KSA and the UAE do not appear to 
move as swiftly nor take the necessary preventative measures as the UK's. This harms 
investors' confidence since the violators go unpunished. When this happens any international 
investors waiting on the side lines may have second thoughts as to participation in the market 
with the obvious subsequent loss of foreign direct investment. Both the CMA and the SCA 
need to be seen by international investors to tackle breaches with impunity and a firm hand. 
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 The reasons behind this lack of uniformity in exercising regulatory power must be 
addressed. Is this lack of uniformity a function of the regulators' inability to execute swift 
action? Or is it because the regulators simply are not aware of the violations? Or is it much 
more of a case of allowing the perpetrators a wide degree of leniency due to other political 
considerations? The research has concluded that both the CMA has wide and sweeping 
powers as per laws issued and it is therefore unlikely that an assessment of inaction can be 
boiled down to poor regulatory empowerment. The wide and strong powers of the CMA for 
example provide it with the ability to severely sanction offenders. However, a great 
hindrance to the proper enforcement of the disclosure rules and to the prevention of insider 
dealing is the weak penalties that are available in the SCA Law in the case of breach of 
related rules. In other words, if the punishment is not severe enough, it will not become a 
deterrence to companies and individuals who are most likely to commit such breaches. 
 
8.4 Investor confidence 
 The research has also concluded that although both the UAE and KSA capital 
markets have made marked improvements over the years in attracting investors, there still 
remains much improvement on attracting and retaining international investors specifically 
foreign investors. In KSA, the complete lack of a foreign investor's ability to 'directly' enter 
the market is prohibitive and clumsy (although as stated in this thesis, the CMA has recently 
taken steps to amend by introducing regulations that correct this). 
 The UAE has taken a different approach and has, for all intents and purposes, 
practically opened up the markets to all investors wishing to directly participate. Although 
this is constricted in some stocks it is generally considered to be a far more investor friendly 
market than KSA. 
 The research has highlighted that lack of investor protection is considered major 
obstacle for the development of the securities market in the GCC especially KSA. 
Continuous effort is required by both the CMA and the SCA to attain the levels of market 
regulation benchmarked by the UK regulators. Potential weaknesses in legal provisos as well 
as enforcement machinery contribute to inadequate protection of investors which has a 
subsequent knock on effect on investor confidence. Both KSA and the UAE capital markets 
are pre-eminent in the Middle East. KSA's capital market is the largest in the region and the 
UAE's market is considered by many to be the financial hub of the entire MENA region and 
as such merits close attention. 
 Protection of investors inevitably leads to investor confidence and there are a variety 
of mechanisms available to build such confidence. For example, the SCA has, as of March 
2014, attempted to further boost transparency and investor confidence by making it 
compulsory for all listed companies to establish a dedicated investor relations department.
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Each listed entity will now need to appoint an individual who is tasked with communicating 
with investors and maintaining a good rapport with them. Furthermore, investors are to be 
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kept abreast of company news as well as kept updated with necessary financial and stock 
market information.Other significant attempts at improving transparency and disclosure 
include the issuance of new conflict of interest regulations in May 2013, the upgrade of 
investor protection and shareholder liability rules as well as a current detailed review and 
overhaul of related party transactions and their impact on transparency. 
 The research finds that the UK's track record in disclosure and transparency is second 
to none. All these requirements are diligently adhered to in the UK and the Authorities are 
not shy about imposing fines either. Perhaps one of the key lessons that the UAE and KSA 
need to learn from the UK is the extent of fines that the FCA and the PRA levy on violators. 
The FCA Fines Tables for 2014 
710
 is a key reminder of just how often the FCA punishes 
transgressors. The fines levied for 2013 and published in March 2014 are a staggering 
UK£86 million. As mentioned before, rules mean nothing without strong policing. 
 The current disclosure and transparency rules with regard to all corporate governance 
issues, particularly with respect to disclosure of information related to beneficial ownership, 
board of director qualifications and nominations procedures still remain haphazard and 
unreliable.
711
 However, Tadawul has attempted to correct this key concern by undertaking an 
initiative to publish ownership data online on a par with international best practices. Clearly, 
the CMA and Tadawul need to continue to develop the process to ensure that company 
disclosure is in compliance with applicable rules and it should also enforce disclosure of 
compliance equally across all offending entities without exception. 
 Disclosure frameworks have evolved relatively fast in the UAE. The IFRS are now a 
relevant reporting standard for listed companies in the UAE which are required by law to 
provide audited annual reports and semi-annual report too. Immediate disclosure of material 
events are also a compulsory requirement in the UAE and insider dealing has relatively 
become more regulated and controlled. 
 The 'naming and shaming' approach taken by the FCA's regime clearly has benefits 
towards improving transparency in the country. Ensuring that violators are named and 
shamed is certainly not an easy matter in KSA and the UAE where there is a deep cultural 
aversion towards airing faults and displaying violations in public and it is this cultural 
variation that leads to such disparity in investor perception. This must be changed. 
 The SCA had already issued detailed transparency and disclosure rules
712
 as early as 
2000 detailing the rules and regulations for ensuring capital market integrity as well as 
accuracy and efficacy of transactions. The transparency rules state that the SCA has the 
authority to cancel the listing of any security that violates regulations. Both stock markets in 
the UAE are required to submit to the SCA regular trading reports detailing volumes, stock 
movements and details on buyers so as to ensure compliance. On-going obligations (post-
listing)
713
 are similarly stringent and detail company requirements such as changes to 
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management and company structure, share movements and ownership, audited financials and 
interim reports. As mentioned, the SCA has attempted to further boost transparency and 
investor confidence by making it compulsory for all listed companies to establish a dedicated 
investor relations department. 
 
8.5 Development of the secondary markets 
 The thesis has also researched key areas related to secondary market and issues 
relating to corporate governance. For the general investor, the secondary market provides an 
efficient platform for trading of securities. Needless to say, the primary and secondary 
markets in the UK are very well developed and have been for decades now. A well-
developed secondary market includes several types of instruments such rights issues, 
issuance of bonus shares by listed companies to their shareholders, issuance of preference 
shares, government securities, corporate debt and debentures, bonds, GDRs and ETFs. 
 The secondary markets are as important to a booming financial economy as the 
primary are. However, this thesis has focused on secondary markets. The secondary market 
comprises of equity markets and the debt markets. In the UK, secondary markets include 
warrants, structured products, ETF's and OTC derivatives are also traded. Juxtaposed to the 
vast size that is the UK's bond market, to the practically non-existent secondary markets (for 
bonds and other structured products) in the UAE and KSA. How can such a vast difference 
exist? Surely the complete lack of secondary markets for bonds and other structured products 
in either the UAE or KSA would indicate weak primary market activity? An efficient 
secondary market is imperative for a fully developed financial market. The country suffers 
from a weak secondary market which is a reflection of a narrow investor base, a short-term 
investment culture and the absence of investment banks and large foreign institutional 
investors. Due to a lack of a liquid secondary market, portfolio and fund managers are also 
reluctant to invest. 
 The market also lacks fixed income institutional investors and investment funds that 
usually play an important role in secondary market trading. There does appear to be hope for 
change and the KSA authorities have suggested that one of the ways that they can begin to 
ameliorate disclosure and transparency issues is to allow foreign investors to actively and 
directly invest in KSA equity markets. Clearly, introduction of foreigners into the market will 
not directly improve transparency and disclosure but will certainly help persuade market 
participants that if foreign capital is to remain in the country then serious transparency and 
disclosure measures will have to be taken. 
 
8.6 Improving Systemic Risk & the Introduction of the Twin Peaks Model 
 Like the UK, the severity of the threat to the UAE's systemic risk system prompted 
the UAE Authorities to consider a Twin Peaks approach to financial regulation, similar to 
that approach used by the Netherlands and Australia. Of the many calls for reform, one that 
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was particularly important to the UK parliament was the reform and re-organisation of the 
regulation of securities markets as well as the shift from an integrated approach of financial 
regulation to that of a "Twin Peaks" system. The Act created a new regulatory framework for 
the supervision and management of the UK banking and financial services industry. The Act 
also separated and clarified between two key risks, namely, prudential and systemic. 
 The UK's shift, as it were, to a Twin Peaks regulatory system is, in effect, a deep 
reflection of the changes required by the Authorities and Parliament to avoid the threat of 
systemic risk. The UK's integrated "tripartite" regulatory approach, namely; the BOE, FSA 
and the Treasury were collectively responsible for the financial stability of the UK capital 
markets. Arguably, this system failed to effectively identify the issues that were building in 
the financial system as well as to take steps to mitigate these issues. 
 Of the many reasons, this failure occurred because the tripartite system vis-à-vis the 
Twin Peaks approach places responsibility for all financial regulation in the hands of a single 
financial regulator, in this case the FSA. The FSA was not able to effectively deal with all 
matters ranging from safety of the largest investment banks to the customer practices of the 
small financial advisers. Similarly, the BOE did not have the tools or levers to carry out its 
role effectively as primary provider financial stability whilst the UK Treasury has overall 
responsibility for maintaining the legal and institutional framework but empowered with no 
clear responsibility for dealing with a crisis which placed billions of Pounds of public funds 
at huge risk. The shift to Twin Peaks therefore necessitated a strong focus on two key areas, 
prudential regulation and conduct-of-business/consumer protection and markets regulation. 
There is now a dedicated focus on macro-prudential oversight to ensure that any future risks 
developing across the financial system are quickly identified and responded to. Overall, more 





8.7 Tackling Insider Dealing 
 The research has also found that while the regulatory and legal framework in the UK 
has evolved over time and learned from past incidences in the markets. It has precisely 
defined the market malpractice of insider dealing, focusing on the defining who can be 
potential insiders, what type of undisclosed information can be price sensitive and in what 
manner it can be used in insider dealing. Thereafter, it developed an appropriate legal 
framework to manage the malpractice including linking the penalties to the proceeds of 
insider dealing, criminalising it and having an appropriate appellate court system for hearing 
of cases. Care has been taken in the UK's system to ensure innocent investors do not get 
penalised by putting the burden of proof to substantiate insider dealing on the prosecution. 
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 In KSA and the UAE financial markets, the lack of investor knowledge and the 
prevalence of herd mentality coupled with the earlier system of making investments by 'word 
of mouth' recommendations entailed some amount of insider dealing. However, with the 
development of the markets, the regulators in both countries have put in place the legal 
infrastructure to manage such occurrences. The legal framework is lacking in terms of 
pinpointing the scope of insider dealing by appropriate definitions of price sensitive 
information and identifying insiders, however, the regulators have made substantial strides in 
enforcing the existing legal provisions around insider dealing. In the UAE, the amount of 
maximum penalties needs to be enhanced to act as a powerful deterrent and also to cover 
disgorgement of illegal gains. In KSA markets, the lawyers and officials in the appellate 
bodies, Tadawul, the CRSD and the ACRSD need to be provided with appropriate 
knowledge and appreciation of the insider dealing malpractice so that they are suitably 
qualified to understand the long term market impacts of such malpractices and can pronounce 
suitable corrective legal decisions. 
 
8.8 Corporate Governance and Financial Reporting 
 Corporate governance is the system by which companies are directed and controlled. 
In its narrow sense, it is a source of shareholder value. Good corporate governance leads to 
better company performance, higher profitability and efficiency levels. In its wider sense, the 
definition takes into account all the company's stakeholders and corporate social 
responsibility. Corporate governance is important because it is part of the institutional 
infrastructure (laws, regulations, institutions and enforcement mechanisms) underlying sound 
economic performance. The UK's approach towards dealing with CG is to provide a 
framework for firms. The fact that this is voluntary, adds the burden of responsibility on the 
board of directors and management to ensure that a system is put in place since every year 
each company is obligated to report to its shareholders whether their board and senior 
managements have abided by the rules. Good CG codes, like the one used in the UK, are 
based on the principles of high transparency and strong accountability. 
 In a similar vein, KSA and the UAE have both adopted detailed corporate governance 
rules in the hope of mitigating and reducing problems related to poor corporate governance. 
The CMA's CG framework covers the protection of the rights of shareholders, disclosure and 
transparency as well as board structure and responsibilities. The implementation of KSA's 
CG code was initiated in 2006 as a result of the market correction and came at a most 
opportune time indeed. The problems associated with remuneration and nomination of board 
members was solved by ensuring, as per the CG Code, that a nomination and remuneration 
committee composed of board members was formed. As of January 2012, all CMA licensed 
entities are required to disclose in their annual reports details relating to board of directors, 
compensation as well as independence of board members.  
 Likewise, there has been a significant push in the UAE in recent years to further 
advance and promote the adoption of best corporate governance practice across many 
industry sectors.  Listed companies have seen the introduction of compulsory requirements in 
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the UAE, while financial institutions have been provided with non-binding guidelines as a 
starting point. In 2009, the SCA introduced a new corporate governance regulation which 
applies to all joint stock companies and institutions whose securities are listed on a market. 
All such companies were required to comply with the Corporate Governance Regulations 
that set high standards of corporate governance. There were various consecutive amendments 
to the Regulations that covered many areas and addressed many problematic scenario's which 
the Authorities were forced to deal with including board structure; separation of the role of 
Chairman from that of CEO; directors duties and responsibilities; board committees, conflict 
of interests, and governance reporting to shareholders and the SCA. 
 The CG regimes vary in regards to voluntary versus "comply or explain" or 
mandatory code where non-compliance is frowned upon and must be publicly explained and 
disclosed and breaches can result in penalties, whether these be financial or written or 
suspension from listing. Interestingly, a high level comparison between corporate governance 
regimes in the UAE, KSA, and the UK reveal some interesting differences. For example, in 
the UAE and KSA, it is required that at least one third of the board of directors be 
independent 
715
 whilst the corporate governance regulations of the UK, require that half of 
the board of directors be independent. Corporate governance compliance is mandatory in the 
UAE but is voluntary in the UK and to a certain limit in KSA. 
 Effective corporate governance is generally supposed to add or increase the value of a 
firm. This will of course be reflected in the stock price and in the buying pressure witnessed 
on a scrip throughout a trading day. With this in mind, the new UAE CG code should in fact 
increase investor confidence in the UAE and thus increase prices and boost market sentiment. 
With the progress of the corporate sector and financial market development in the UAE, the 
governance of firms has become and will continue to become an important issue for 
investors, foreign institutions and local corporations and is expected to play a central and 
important role in the further growth of the UAE equity capital markets. 
 Besides all the above, further development in the current regulatory regime is 
required through the criminalisation of all false accounting cases, and providing the 
regulators with the necessary legal authority to pursuit all related parties in such cases, 
including companies' auditors, too, and to take strict legal actions in these cases. In addition, 
the role of audit committee, the functions of internal auditors, and the responsibilities of the 
external auditors should be enhanced. Moreover, there is a need to develop a special financial 
supervisory regime for "too big to fail" companies not to mention to establish a professional 
legal body responsible for promoting the accounting and auditing profession especially in the 
UAE. 
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